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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation aims at analyzing the effects of various assumptions that may 
affect the upstream transmission of the benefits of commodity checkoff programs.  
Despite the amount of econometric research on evaluation of the effects of checkoff 
programs for producer benefits, little empirical research has focused on the various 
simplifying assumptions often made in those analyses that may influence the rate and 
extent of the retail-to-farm transmission of generic advertising and promotion effects.  
The first part of this study is a qualitative analysis of the world soybean and soybean 
products markets.  Then the conceptual model is proposed and discussed. A model of 
world soybean and soybean markets has been developed which relaxes all of the 
simplifying  assumptions often made in analyses of commodity checkoff programs. The 
model is used to analyze the implications of those assumptions for the upstream 
transmission of the returns of the soybean checkoff program to producers.  
After estimating the econometric parameters of the model, the model has been 
simulated over history as a means of model validation. Then the model has been 
simulated again assuming that the U.S. soybean checkoff program had not existed over 
history. The differences from the simulation results by the baseline simulation are 
considered as the base case against which all other simulation results are compared. The 
base case results indicate that the soybean checkoff program has been highly effective 
over the study period returning $6.9 in revenue to soybean producers for every checkoff 
dollar spent.  
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 This upstream transmission of the benefits of the soybean checkoff program is 
analyzed through a series of simulations with the world soybean model in which the 
simplifying assumptions made by other checkoff program analyses. These are imposed 
on the model including the assumptions of no supply response, no price response, no 
government intervention, no free riders, no domestic supply chain linkages, no global 
supply chain linkages, no checkoff investments in production research and no promotion 
programs at multiple levels of the supply chain. The results of the scenario simulations 
provide the evidence that simplifying assumptions made in checkoff program analyses 
can seriously bias the calculation of the benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) for checkoff 
programs.  Some assumptions have a tendency of overestimating the BCR for checkoff 
programs while others have a tendency of underestimating the BCR calculation. The 
implication of these findings is that analyses of checkoff programs must consider 
carefully the simplifying assumptions made to avoid seriously under- or over-estimating 
the returns of those programs to producers. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
To enhance the profitability and competitiveness of the agricultural commodities 
they grow, producers of many agricultural commodities cooperatively invest in funding 
research and demand promotion programs, commonly known as “checkoff” programs. 
The promotion messages of many of these groups have become well known among 
American consumers. “Got Milk?”  “Orange Juice: Healthy, Pure, and Simple.” “Cotton: 
The Fabric of Our Lives.” “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.” “American Lamb from 
American Land.” “Pork. The Other White Meat.” These and other familiar promotion 
messages by various commodity groups are parts of the efforts of these groups to impact 
the demand for their agricultural commodities. Such messages are generic in nature and 
the system for funding them is referred to as commodity checkoff programs. There is 
some type of organization for nearly every agricultural commodity to enhance producer 
welfare. The funding comes from associated producers funded through fees on sales. 
Although the funds collected by checkoff groups are often used to promote demand 
through both generic advertising and the development of new uses of the associated 
commodities, many checkoff programs also fund research intended to reduce production 
costs and/or enhance yields (Williams and Capps, 2006). 
The major strategic concern of commodity checkoff groups is that those who pay 
for the generic advertising and promotion programs operate at the front end of often 
lengthy supply chains while the consumers they hope to influence are downstream at the 
 2 
 
opposite end. To promote sales of their commodities, therefore, checkoff groups often 
advertise at the retail end of the supply chain to enhance demand under the assumption 
that sufficient benefits will migrate upstream to the farm level to more than cover the 
cost of the advertising and promotion. However, for commodities such as soybeans with 
lengthy supply chains, the retail-to-farm transmission of the effects of generic 
advertising and promotion is a major uncertainty. For this reason, the 1996 Farm Bill 
requires periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of and returns to federally mandated 
commodity checkoff programs. 
The federal requirement to evaluate checkoff programs has spawned widespread 
analysis of these programs, many of which are reviewed in the following section. Most 
such studies have taken an econometric modeling approach and provide numerical 
measures of the impacts of checkoff programs on the demand and, to a much lesser 
extent, the supply of checkoff commodities along with some type of benefit-cost analysis. 
Although substantial scholarly effort has been devoted to examining farm level impacts, 
much of this literature is silent on the upstream transmission of generic advertising and 
promotion effects.  
Wohlgenant (2006) discusses various factors that can influence the rate and 
extent of the retail-to-farm transmission of generic advertising and promotion effects, 
including (1) the supply response all along the supply chain to higher farm prices 
induced by generic advertising and promotion; (2) government intervention in 
supporting farm prices and influencing farm supply; (3) free-rider effects of imports; and 
(4) cross-commodity effects (the so-called "spillover" effects) of generic promotion.  To 
 3 
 
this list could be added various other factors that can influence the upstream 
transmission of generic advertising and promotion effects such as the growing 
globalization of agricultural and food supply chains and the practice of many checkoff 
groups to simultaneously fund advertising and promotion at various levels in the supply 
chain (wholesale, retail, foreign markets) as well as supply-enhancing research.  
Little empirical research has focused on the relationship between downstream 
checkoff promotion efforts and any resulting upstream benefits or the upstream 
transmission of such benefits. As Wohlgenant (2006) observes, most evaluations of 
checkoff programs make some assumptions about the share of the generic advertising 
returns that transmit from the retail level where checkoff promotion generally occurs 
upstream to producers with little concern for the assumptions that can affect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of transmission of those returns along the supply chain. 
Ignoring the effects of such assumptions on the upstream transmission of the benefits of 
generic promotion programs could have serious consequences for the measurement of 
the producer returns from checkoff programs. Research is needed to examine the extent 
of the impact of the many assumptions that can affect the upstream transmission of the 
returns to checkoff promotion, including those discussed by Wholgenant and others. Any 
significant impact of one or more of these assumptions on the upstream transmission of 
benefits would cast serious doubt on the efficacy of the returns to producers from 
checkoff promotion as reported by many studies of checkoff programs. 
 
 
 4 
 
Purpose and Objectives 
 The overall objective of this dissertation is to examine the upstream transmission 
of checkoff programs with emphasis on the effects of specific assumptions that could 
affect the extent and effectiveness of the transmission of those effects from the market 
level where the promotion occurs through the supply chain to the farm level of the 
market.  The soybean checkoff program will be the focus of the study for various 
reasons. First, the U.S. soybean market is an integral component of an extensive world 
soybean market that will allow the analysis to consider the global supply chain effects of 
the transmission of soybean checkoff expenditures in both domestic and foreign markets.  
Second, soybean checkoff expenditures are made at various levels of the market, 
including domestic wholesale and retail (soyoil and soymeal), processing (soybeans), 
foreign (soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil), and farm (soybeans) which will allow for an 
analysis of how the market effects of checkoff expenditures at different market levels 
interact and affect the transmission of benefits to producers.   
 Specifically, the objectives of this study include the following:  
(1)  Develop a simultaneous, non-spatial price equilibrium, econometric simulation 
model of world soybean and soybean products markets that includes adequate 
disaggregation to account for the markets effects of the U.S. soybean checkoff 
program by country (exporting and importing), by commodity (soybeans, 
soymeal, and soyoil), by market level (farm, wholesale, retail, international), and 
by market activity (production, consumption, prices, etc.); 
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(2)  Develop a database of soybean checkoff expenditures over time which is 
disaggregated by country (exporting and importing), by commodity (soybeans, 
soymeal, and soyoil), by market level (farm, wholesale, retail, international), and 
by promotion activity (production research, domestic promotion, and 
international market promotion); 
(3)  Use the world soybean model and accompanying checkoff expenditure database 
to econometrically measure the relationship between the demand for soybeans 
and products in the U.S. and foreign markets and promotion expenditures in 
those markets as well as between soybean production by region in the United 
States and soybean research expenditures funded by the soybean checkoff 
program. 
(4)  Validate the econometric world soybean model including the effects of the 
soybean checkoff program through historical simulation over the period of 
1980/81 (the earliest year for which soybean checkoff data are available) though 
2012/2013 to determine how closely the model tracks history as determined by 
various validation statistics such as the Theil inequality coefficients, the Theil 
decomposition coefficients, root mean squared error, etc. 
(5)  Use the validated world soybean and soybean products simulation model to 
simulate    the removal of U.S. soybean checkoff promotion expenditures to 
measure the effects of those expenditures over time on U.S. and world soybean 
markets, including the effects on soybean and soybean product production, 
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processing, consumption, prices, trade and world market share of the U.S. and its 
major export competitors. 
(6)  Use the results of the historical simulation of the removal of the soybean 
checkoff expenditures to measure the overall returns transmitted to U.S. soybean 
producers from U.S. soybean checkoff programs over time. 
(7)  Conduct various scenario analyses with the model of world soybean markets 
intended to isolate and compare the effects of various assumptions that could 
affect the transmission of the returns of the soybean checkoff program to soybean 
producers, including all of the following and compare those results to the 
standard share-of-the-retail-dollar assumption often made in studies of checkoff 
programs: 
(a) the effects of no supply response; 
(b) the effects of no price response;  
(c) the effects of no government intervention in supporting farm prices and 
influencing farm supply; 
(d) no free-rider gains to Brazil and Argentina; 
(e)  no domestic supply chain effects;  
(f)  no global supply chain effects;  
(g)  no checkoff investments in production research (only in demand 
promotion), and  
(h)  no promotion programs at multiple levels of the supply chain (promotion 
occurs at only the retail level of the market).   
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Literature Review 
 A large number of studies of the effectiveness of the generic advertising and 
promotion efforts of commodity checkoff programs have been done over the years. For 
example, domestic and/or international promotion programs have been found to have a 
positive and significant benefit for U.S. producers for various livestock products (see, for 
example, Rosson, Hammig, and Jones 1986; Halliburton and Henneberry 1993a; 
Halliburton and Henneberry 1995b; Goddard and Conboy 1993; Le, Kaiser, and Tomek 
1997; Comeau, Mittelhammer, and Wahl 1997; Chung and Kaiser 1998; Ward 1999; 
Kinnucan 1999; Davis et al. 2001; Capps and Williams 2008; Williams, Capps, and 
Dang 2010), tobacco (Rosson, Hammig, and Jones 1986), peanuts (Halliburton and 
Henneberry 1993b), almonds (Halliburton and Henneberry 1995a; Kinnucan and 
Christian 1997), raisins (Kaiser, Liu, and Consignado 2003), pecans (Onunkwo and 
Epperson 2000; Moore et al. 2009), grapefruit (Fuller, Bello, and Capps 1992), apples 
(Richards, Ispelen, and Kagan 1997), citrus fruit (McClelland, Polopolous, and Myers 
1971; Lee, Myers, and Forsee 1979; Armah and Epperson 1997; Williams, Capps, and 
Bessler 2004; Williams, Capps, and Palma 2008), cotton (Ding and Kinnucan 1996; 
Kinnucan, Xiao, and Yu 2000; Beach et al. 2002; Capps and Williams 2006), rice 
(Rusmevichientong and Kaiser 2009), wheat (Halliburton and Henneberry 1995b; 
Henneberry and Lu 2000; Adhikari et al. 2003), and soybeans (Williams, Myers, and 
Callaham 1982; Williams 1985; Williams 1999; Lim, Shumway, and Love 2000; 
Williams, Shumway, and Love 2002; Williams, Capps, and Bessler 2009) to list only a 
few. 
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The majority of these studies have used three types of econometric models: (1) 
single demand equation, (2) demand system, or (3) structural system.  Each model type 
has both advantages and disadvantages.  
The objective of the single demand equation studies is to derive a direct measure 
of the effect of promotion on the relevant demand variable. For example, using a set of 
single export demand equations for U.S. frozen concentrated orange juice for France, 
United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Netherlands, Armah and Epperson (1997) found 
a statistically significant export demand response to U.S. foreign advertising of orange 
juice. Kaiser, Liu, and Consignada (2003) developed single equation raisin import 
demand models and found a statistically significant effect of the California raisin 
industry’s export promotion programs in Japan and in the United Kingdom. 
Rusmevichientong and Kaiser (2009) conducted an analysis of the responsiveness of U.S. 
rice export demand with respect to U.S. rice export promotion. From their single demand 
equation estimation, they found that rice promotion expenditures have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on U.S. rice exports to the world market.  Schmit and 
Kaiser (1998) examined the effectiveness of generic egg advertising in the U.S. demand. 
Generic advertising were found to have positively and significantly affected per capita 
egg demand. Capps and Williams (2008) conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of the 
lamb advertising and promotion program of the American Lamb Board using a single 
lamb demand equation. Their statistical results indicate that the lamb checkoff program 
has had a positive and significant impact on U.S. lamb demand.  
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Unfortunately, the single equation model has a limitation since it is restricted to 
one particular market and assumes no price response. For example, if South Korean 
soybean import demand increases as a result of foreign promotion expenditures, the 
increase in demand would be expected to lead to a higher price of soybeans in South 
Korea that would lead to some reduction in the total increase in South Korean soybean 
import demand. However, if the model used is a single equation demand function, then 
the price is assumed to be exogenous so that the measured increase in soybean demand 
distorts the effect of promotion because the price effects on demand are not taken into 
account. In essence, such models assume a perfectly price elastic supply of the 
commodity. 
If, however, the supply of the commodity is actually price inelastic, then 
promotion can lead only to a price increase. The use of a single equation demand model 
in this case would lead to the erroneous conclusion that promotion leads to a quantity 
increase when, in fact, the promotion would more likely lead to a price increase rather 
than a quantity increase. Because the single equation model only accounts for the 
demand for a commodity in a single market rather than the whole supply chain, any non-
zero supply response of producers, government intervention, free-rider effects are 
ignored. 
In demand system models, the objective is to measure the effect of promotion on 
commodities that are closely related in demand. For example, Comeau, Mittelhammer, 
Wahl (1997) investigated the effectiveness of advertising and promotion efforts in 
Japanese markets for meats by using an inverse almost ideal demand system. Richards, 
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Ispelen, and Kagan (1997) used a two-stage almost ideal demand system to investigate 
the effectiveness of export promotion in increasing both the total consumption of apples 
in import markets of Singapore and the United Kingdom as well as the U.S. share of 
exports to those markets.  
 Although demand system models account for cross commodity and potential 
spillover effects, the measurement of the effects of promotion using such models is still 
problematic because supply is still assumed to be exogenous. Consequently, any price 
effects and price-induced supply response are still ignored. Demand systems also 
typically fail to account for the transmission of benefits up the supply chain and the 
complications of government intervention in commodity markets.   
Structural, supply chain models, however, attempt to correct for the deficiencies 
of single demand and demand system models by explicitly modeling the supply response 
and market linkages from the retail to the farm level of the commodity market of interest, 
including international trade and price linkages. Few studies have taken a structural, 
supply-chain approach to measuring the effects of checkoff programs. Williams (1985) 
was among the first to apply this approach using a 96-equation econometric simulation 
model of world soybean and product markets that accounted for the supplies, demands, 
prices, and trade of whole soybeans, soymeal and soyoil in the United States and seven 
other major trading regions of the world to measure the effects of the soybean checkoff 
program. Updated versions of the model have been used for subsequent analyses of the 
U.S. soybean checkoff program (Williams 1999; Williams 2012; Williams, Shumway, 
and Love 2002; Williams, Capps, and Bessler 2009; Williams et al. 1998). The structural, 
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supply chain approach has also been used to analyze the checkoff programs for cotton 
(Williams and Capps 2011), orange juice (Williams, Capps, and Bessler 2004), and pork 
(Davis et al. 2001). 
Although several studies have estimated the impacts of generic advertising and 
promotion efforts of commodity checkoff programs, as Wohlgenant (2006) observes, 
research has not focused on the retail-to-farm price transmission process in estimating 
the rates of return to these programs. To date, the effects of the various assumptions that 
may affect the upstream transmission of the benefits of commodity checkoff programs 
have not been empirically analyzed. This study is an attempt to specifically address this 
gap on the literature.  
 
Organization of Remaining Chapters 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II will provide 
a background, descriptive analysis of the soybean and soybean product industries of key 
exporting and importing countries and regions with a focus on the agricultural policies of 
each region. Chapter II will also provide an historical overview of the generic 
advertising and promotion administered by the U.S. soybean checkoff program.  
Chapter III will propose and discuss the conceptual model, data, and other 
relevant conceptual issues. In that chapter, the effects of the generic advertising and 
promotion on U.S. soybean producers will be examined graphically. One of the 
contributions of this dissertation is the development of the world soybean model capable 
of incorporating the related various assumptions that could affect the transmission of the 
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returns of the soybean checkoff program of each region. The background analysis in 
Chapter II will help inform the model development.  
Chapter IV will provide and discuss the econometric simulation model based on 
the conceptual model developed in the preceding chapter. Chapter IV will discuss the 
results of econometrically estimating the parameters of the model. This chapter will also 
discuss the model validation statistics. 
Chapter V will use the econometric model of world soybean markets developed 
in the previous chapter to simulate and compare the effects of various assumptions that 
could affect the transmission of the returns of the soybean checkoff program to soybean 
producers. Chapter VI will include a summary and conclusions of the study and 
recommendations for future research.  
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CHAPTER II  
BACKGROUND 
 
 Soybeans have been a major source of protein supply in East Asia for more than 
3,000 years. After the 15
th
 century, soybean cultivation spread from East Asia to much 
of the rest of Asia, including Japan. In the 18
th
 to 19
th
 centuries, cultivated soybeans 
were introduced into America and Europe. Before the middle of the 20
th
 century, 
soybeans were mostly used for food in Asian countries while soybeans were used in 
whole form primarily as an animal food and a cover crop in non-Asian countries. After 
the middle of the 20
th
 century, soybean production began to grow in North and South 
America due to the growth of feed demand. Over the last 50 years, the cultivation of 
soybeans in the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina increased dramatically. Consequently, these 
three countries have become the major soybean producers and exporters in the world. 
 As economic growth has occurred in Asia over the last several decades, the 
demand for soybean meal in that region for use as a protein feed ingredient to support 
the rapidly growing livestock inventories and for soybean oil as a cooking medium has 
also increased substantially. The growth in soybean production in these countries over 
the years, however, has been insufficient to meet the demand. With the opening of 
China’s market to soybean and soybean products trade in 1995/96, liberalization of 
world trade under the Uruguay Round Agreement beginning in 1994, and the accession 
of China to that trade agreement in 2001, Asian soybean imports began to increase 
dramatically. China has become the world’s largest soybean importing country. Japan is 
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also a major Asian soybean importer. The EU-27 is the world’s second largest soybean 
importing country and the largest soymeal importing country given its small soybean 
production compared to the high demand for feed in the country. 
 
The U.S. Soybean Industry 
 Before mid-1980s, the U.S. essentially dominated world soybean markets. 
However, the U.S. share of world soybean exports has decreased in recent years 
primarily due to increased soybean exports from its South American competitors, Brazil 
and Argentina. While the U.S. has been the world’s top soybean producing country, the 
general trend in recent years has pointed toward Brazil eventually surpassing the United 
States, hastened by the 2012 drought that had devastating effects on U.S. soybean 
production. While Brazilian spring 2013 production of soybean surpassed the U.S. 2012 
fall crop, the U.S. will likely return to its previous dominance of the market in the short 
run. However, over time, U.S. farmers will likely be unable to keep up with the rate at 
which Brazilian producers are expanding the acres devoted to soybeans. Over the next 
decade, Brazilian production may well permanently exceed that of the United States.  
The U.S. is currently the second largest producer of both soymeal and soyoil in the 
world. Although the U.S. soybean export market share has decreased in recent years, 
U.S. soybean exports have gradually increased due to the growth of world soybean 
demand since 1980 (Figure 1).  
 The EU-27, Japan, and China are major buyers of U.S. soybeans. The U.S. share 
of global exports has substantially diminished in recent years mainly because importers 
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are increasingly switching sources of soybean supply from the U.S. to South American 
suppliers. At the same time, the recent expansion of U.S. soyoil demand for biofuel 
production and stable growth in domestic livestock feed demand have focused the U.S. 
soybean industry increasing on growing domestic needs and limited the supplies of 
soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil for export.    
 
U.S. Soybean Supply and Demand  
 Soybeans were introduced into the Cornbelt in the mid-1760s. Soybeans were not 
a major crop until World War II. At the time, soybeans were largely a nitrogen-fixing 
rotation crop that was grazed off by livestock. Nevertheless, planted area and production 
of soybeans gradually increased during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1939, soybean 
production had reached 90 million bushels. U.S. soybean production dramatically 
increased during World War II and largely replaced imported fats and oils (Hymowitz 
1990). U.S. soybean production jumped from 78 million bushels in 1940/41 to 107.2 
million bushels the next year and then 187.5 million bushels in the following year. Prior 
to 1940, soybean harvested area was less than half of the planted area but increased to 80% 
~ 90% in subsequent years. 
 A continuation of area and yield growth during the 1950s boosted U.S. soybean 
production from 283.8 million bushels in 1951/52 to 555.1 million bushels in 1960/61.  
Between the 1960s and the mid-1990s, the U.S. was the unrivaled world exporter of 
soybeans (Nakajima 2011). U.S. soybean area planted and production grew substantially 
during 1960s and 1970s. Over that period, U.S. soybean planted area increased three fold 
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from 24.4 million acres in 1960/61 to 71.4 million acres in 1979/80. Over the same 
period, soybean production increased from 555 million bushels to 2,261 million bushels. 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Soybean Production, Crush, and Exports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/NASS 2013; USDA/ERS 2013 
 
 During the 1980s, U.S. soybean planted area stagnated due to farm programs (on 
the 1981 and 1985 farm bills) which did not include soybeans as program crops but did 
include the major competing crops like corn and other feed grains, cotton, rice, and 
wheat under farm programs (Ash, Livezey, and Dohlman 2006). The result was an 
incentive for farmers to switch from soybeans to program crops. Beginning in the early 
1990s, U.S. soybean planted area and production increased as world demands for both 
soybeans and soybean products were growing. The Federal Agriculture Improvement 
and Reform Act (1996 Farm Bill) eliminated planting restrictions on crop bases allowing 
soybean farmers to respond to the growth of soybean prices by expanding soybean 
plantings (Ash, Livezey, and Dohlman 2006).  
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 Moreover, biotech soybeans were commercially introduced in 1996 and spread 
rapidly throughout the United States. The introduction of biotech soybeans reduced 
production costs and improved weed management in the rotation of crops, the result was 
a further increase in soybean area (Ash, Livezey, and Dohlman 2006). Currently, biotech 
soybeans occupy more than 90 % of total U.S. soybean production. Since 2000, soybean 
area planted area has stagnated to a large extent but soybean production has increased 
slightly due to the some yield growth. 
 Currently, soybeans are the second most planted field crop in the United States. 
In 2012/13, U.S. soybean planted area was 77 million acres across 31 states. Total 
soybean production at 3,015 million bushels. The Cornbelt (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, and Ohio) is by far the largest soybean production region in the U.S. at 1,382 
million bushels, followed by the Plains states (Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota) at 593 million bushels, the Lakes states (Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin) at 457 million bushels, the Delta states (Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi) at 275 million bushels, the South states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas), the Atlantic states (Delaware, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia) , and the Other states (New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia) (Figure 2). Iowa is the largest soybean 
producing state (414 million bushels) with Illinois close behind (384 million bushels).  
 Favorable weather conditions, the spread of biotech varieties of soybeans, and 
the expansion of corn-soybean rotation in the mid-1990s have significantly increased 
soybean planting and soybean production in traditional feed grain states (Cornbelt, 
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Plains, and Lakes). Soybean production in the Plains and Lakes regions has increased 
particularly sharply since the mid-1990s. Soybean acreage expansion in these regions 
has come largely at the expense of wheat and corn production.   
 
Figure 2. U.S. Soybean Production by Regions, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/NASS, 2013 
 
U.S. Soymeal  
 Soymeal production in the U.S increased steadily until the mid-2000s (Figure 3). 
Soymeal became an important product in livestock and poultry production following 
World War II as the most cost-effective source of protein for balanced feed ration 
production. The growth in domestic meat consumption stimulated the increase in 
soymeal production over the years. Approximately 70% to 90% of soymeal production 
has been used for domestic consumption with the rest being exported (Figure 3). 
 Soymeal exports showed substantial growth beginning in 1997/98 due to the 
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growth of soymeal imports by China. Since the mid-2000s, growth of soymeal 
consumption and production stagnated due to weakening feed demand.  
 
Figure 3. U.S. Soymeal Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/ERS, 2013 
 
U.S. Soyoil  
Most soyoil produced in the U.S. has been used for domestic consumption over 
the years. Since the 1970s, a steady growth in soyoil demand has pushed soyoil 
production steadily upwards from 6,292 million lbs in 1976/77 to almost 20,580 million 
lbs in 2007/08 (Figure 4). A surge in soybean export demand which limited soybean 
supplies available for crushing limited the production of soyoil and pushed up the soyoil 
price.  At the same time, strong soyoil export demand contributed to the higher domestic 
price of soyoil and reduced domestic consumption. The U.S. soyoil consumption 
recovered to 18,300 million lbs in 2011/12. The U.S. soyoil exports have fluctuated for 
decades between approximately 1,000 and 3,500 million lbs. The share of soyoil 
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production accounted for by exports decreased from 21 % in 1970/71 to 7.4 % in 
2011/12.  
 
Figure 4. U.S. Soyoil Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/ERS, 2013 
 
Biodiesel policies have had an important effect on domestic soyoil consumption 
(Ash, Livezey, and Dohlman 2006). The nationwide and statewide mandates for 
biodiesel use were implemented in 2005. The tax incentive for biodiesel production 
using new vegetable oil was also implemented in the same year. The bioenergy program 
also subsidized the use of soyoil for producing biodiesel. 
 
U.S. Soybean Policies 
Soybeans were a minor crop in U.S. until tWorld War II, thus there were not 
particular policies for soybeans. During World War II, the increase of soybean acreage 
was encouraged by high support prices (Goldberg 1952). Soybean prices were supported 
by simple nonrecourse loans at the farm level (Houck, Ryan and Subotnik 1972). A loan 
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program was the only soybean program for farm price support until early 1990s but the 
market price was mostly higher than the loan rate (Goldberg 1952; Cochrane and Ryan 
1976).  
After the early 1990s, the U.S. government made efforts to assist in the 
development of new markets for soybeans and soybean products. As part of the 1990 
Farm Bill, the Soybean Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act became 
effective in 1991. The Act allowed establishment of a national soybean checkoff 
program through which soybean producers invest in promoting both foreign and 
domestic demand for soybeans and soybean products (Williams, Shumway, and Love 
2002). Soybean checkoff dollars have also been invested in production research to 
enhance yields and reduce costs.  
A loan program for soybeans added marketing loans to existing nonrecourse 
loans under the 1990 Farm Bill. The marketing loan program that provides payments to 
cover the difference between the market price and the loan rate (when market price falls 
below the loan rate) was extended to soybeans (Ash 2001). The 1996 Farm Bill, the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, provided acreage flexibility to 
farmers by introducing fixed payments and eliminating acreage set-aside requirements. 
As a result, farmers are more able to shift production out of other crops and into 
soybeans more effectively as market conditions change. Under the 2002 Farm Bill, the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, soybean farmers became eligible for 
direct payment (DP) and countercyclical payments (CCP).  
 22 
 
The 2008 Farm Bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 reformed 
U.S. agricultural policy to provide farmers almost complete planting flexibility in 
deciding which crops to plant (De Gorter 2012). A loan program, direct payment, and 
countercyclical payments are major policies related to soybeans. The payment rate for 
soybeans used to make direct payments was $0.44 per bushel. The payment rate used to 
make countercyclical payments is equal to the difference between the target price 
($6.00/bushel) and the effective price. The effective price is equal to the sum of the 
payment rate ($0.44/bushel) of direct payments and the higher value between the 
national average market price received by producers during the 12-month marketing year 
and the national average loan rate for a marketing assistance loan. Currently, the national 
soybean loan rate for soybeans is $5.00/bu.  
 
Factors influencing Competitiveness in U.S. Soybean Industry  
 One of the most important challenges in U.S. soybean sector is the emergence of 
Brazil and Argentina as major competitors to U.S. soybeans in export markets. As 
mentioned above, major soybean importers have switched the source of at least some of 
their soybean imports from the U.S. to South American countries. As a result, the U.S. 
shares of global soybean and product exports have declined substantially over the years. 
` In addition to growing competition in export markets, border measures against 
the importation of biotech soybeans by major soybean importing countries are a major 
challenge to the U.S. soybean industry. The EU-27 has implemented a zero-tolerance 
policy on the import of unauthorized biotech soybeans. China requires a safety 
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certificate for each shipment of biotech soybeans. Since most of U.S. soybeans are 
biotech soybeans, these import policies are limiting the growth of U.S. soybean exports. 
 Current negotiations under WTO may affect U.S. soybean production. According 
to proposals coming out of the Doha Development Round, trade-distorting farm program 
payments will need to be further reduced. For the U.S. soybean sector, this means that 
policies such as marketing loans and CCPs may need to be modified. At the same time, 
tariffs on imports of U.S. soyoil and soymeal in import countries would need to be 
further reduced under a new WTO agreement that would benefit the U.S. soybean sector.  
 
The Brazilian Soybean Industry  
In 2011/12, Brazil is the third largest soybean producer in world soybean markets. 
Brazil is the third largest producer of both soymeal and soyoil in the world. In world 
soymeal markets, Brazil is currently the fourth largest consumer behind China, EU-27 
and the U.S. Brazil is also the third largest consumer of soyoil behind China and the U.S. 
Between 2001/02 and 2011/12, Brazilian soybean exports grew more rapidly (150%) 
than those from the U.S. and Argentina, Brazil’s main export competitors.  
China is Brazil’s largest soybean market, accounting for 67% of total Brazilian 
soybean exports volume (Salin 2012). Powered by favorable prices and surging demand 
in for feed in China, its imports of Brazilian soybeans also increased dramatically since 
2001/02. Total Brazilian soymeal exports also increased over the period, because of the 
increase in animal feed demand in the EU, South Korea and Vietnam (USITC 2012). 
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The EU-27 imports about 70% of Brazilian soymeal. China is Brazil’s largest soyoil 
buyer, accounting for 36% of total Brazilian oil exports in 2011(USITC 2012). 
 
Brazilian Soybean Supply and Demand  
Soybeans were brought to Brazil in 1882 by agronomic professor Gustavo Dutra. 
Two decades later, soybean plantations were introduced into the state of Rio Grande do 
Sul. (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2009). The marginal profitability of soybean cultivation 
restrained the growth of soybeans in Brazil until the 1960s when soybeans were 
determined to be a suitable crop to plant in rotation with winter wheat. In the early 1970s, 
El Niño negatively affected the anchovy catch in Peru, reducing the world supply of fish 
meal, a common protein supplement in livestock rations. At the same time, U.S. soybean 
production declined sharply due to adverse weather conditions. Facing a sharp increase 
in the price of soybeans and panic buying particularly by Japanese soybean importers, 
the U.S. government banned the export of soybeans in 1973 to avoid a domestic shortage. 
As a result, foreign buyers turned to Brazil to meet their soybean demand requirements. 
Since the 1980s, soybeans have become a key Brazilian agricultural crop. Brazilian 
soybean production experienced remarkable growth between 1980/81 and 2011/12 from 
15.2 mmt to 66.5 mmt (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Brazilian Soybean Production, Crush, and Exports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Favorable conditions in international markets and aggressive support policies of 
the Brazilian government, such as production subsidies and credit incentives, have been 
the major factors in rapid growth of soybean production in Brazil. Another factor 
contributing to expansion of soybean production in Brazil was the development of a 
tropical soybean seed that flourishes in the tropics’ shorter day length and wet climate. 
EMBRAPA (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária), a quasi-governmental 
agency established in 1975, conducted systematic research to develop soybean cultivars 
with high yields in regions close to the equator. EMBRAPA’s research effectively 
lowered production costs and encouraged the expansion of soybean output in Brazil 
(Vieira and Williams 1996). Until the mid-1970s, soybean production gained spread 
primarily in the South and Southeast regions of Brazil that encompass the states of Rio 
Grande do Sul, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and São Paulo. With favorable soybean market 
price and introduction of a tropical soybean seed, expansion of soybean cultivation into 
the Central Brazil region which includes the states of Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, 
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Goiás, and the Distrito Federal began in the late 1970s (Vieira and Williams 1996). 
Since that time, most soybean area expansion in Brazil has occurred in this Central 
Brazil region. In 2010/11, soybean production in the Central Brazil region represented 
45% of the soybean area in Brazil (Salin 2012).  
In recent years, distances, lack of infrastructure, transportation costs, political 
backlash on the continuing deforestation of the Amazon have become obstacles to 
continued expansion of soybean production in this region, especially Mato Grosso.  
Consequently, most of the Brazilian soybean area expansion in recent years has taken 
place in the Northeast region comprised of the states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and 
Bahia (referred to as MATOPIBA). According to Salin (2012), these areas have benefits 
compared to the Central Brazil region, including close proximity to the coastline and the 
lack of rainforests. The principal soybean producing states in 2010/11 were Mato Grosso 
(27.1%), Paraná (20.5%), Rio Grande do Sul (15.4%), and Goiás (10.9%).  
Brazil is the third largest processor of soybeans in the world behind China and 
the U.S. Brazil’s soybean processing capacity has increased from 110,560 mt per day in 
2002 to 173,441 mt in 2012 (ABIOVE 2012). The processing industry was concentrated 
in the Southern states of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and Santa Catarina in 1992, with 
over 60 % of the total oil extraction capacity (Vieira and Williams 1996). In 2012, the 
processing capacity in the southern region is only 39.8% of total processing capacity in 
Brazil while the processing capacity in the Central Brazil region jumped to 39% from 
only 17% in 1992 (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Brazilian Soybean Processing Capacity by Region, 2003-2012 
 
Source: ABIOVE, 2012 
 
Brazilian Soymeal  
Soymeal production in Brazil has increased steadily over the last four decades. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, approximately 20% of Brazilian soymeal production was 
used for domestic consumption and the rest was exported. Brazilian economic growth 
and expansion of the Brazilian livestock industry have increased the consumption share 
of total soymeal production from 30.5% in 1990/91 to 49.4% in 2012/13 (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Brazilian Soymeal Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1970/71-
2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Brazilian Soyoil  
Since 1970/71, soyoil production in Brazil has steadily increased from 0.31 mmt 
to almost 7.3 mmt in 2011/12. Brazil is one of the major soyoil consumers in the world. 
Soyoil has been widely used as edible oil for cooking and salad dressings and in the 
manufacture of food products in Brazil.  
Brazilian exports of soyoil also steadily increased until the mid-2000s, reflecting 
increasing world soyoil demand during that period (Figure 8). Subsequently, however, 
Brazilian soyoil export growth was limited by expanding domestic use as a result of 
sharply rising biodiesel production in Brazil (USAD/FAS 2008). A 3% biodiesel blend 
has been  mandatory in Brazil since 2008. The proportion of Brazilian soyoil production 
used for domestic purposes increased from 53.5% in 2004/05 to 78% in 2011/12.  
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Figure 8. Brazilian Soyoil Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Brazilian Soybean Policies 
The Brazilian government introduced several policies to support expansion of the 
soybean industry such as agricultural research to boost soybean yields and the minimum 
price guarantees. The minimum price guarantee for soybeans lasted until 1995. The price 
guarantee policy contributed to supporting soybean farmers in Midwest regions who face 
high costs of transporting beans to Brazilian ports where the majority of processors were 
located. Between the mid-1960s and the 1970s, an aggressive Government agricultural 
credit incentive program which provided production credit at low interest rates was 
implemented to support farm income and to enhance exports (Vieira and Williams 1996). 
However, the overall size of the credit program was sharply reduced at the mid-1980s 
(USITC 1987).  
In the late 1970 s and early 1980s, a devaluation of the Brazilian cruzeiro 
combined with a soybean export quota provided a strong incentive for Brazil to export 
soyoil and soymeal rather than soybeans (FAO 1984). The Brazilian government 
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intensified restrictions on soybeans export. Restrictions on soybeans export were aimed 
to ensure adequate supplies of soybean products for the domestic market and to enhance 
the acquisition of foreign currency. Brazilian government intended to maximize export 
earning though the export quota on soybeans and the relatively low export taxes on 
soymeal and soyoil, compared with domestic sales taxes on both soybean products.  
After the end of military rule in 1985, the Brazilian government reformed 
agricultural policies in an attempt to assist small farmers and domestic consumers rather 
than the export industry (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). Nevertheless, soybean 
production and exports in late 1980s increased significantly. During the early 1990s, a 
number of negative factors such as the appreciation of the Brazilian cruzeiro and the 
abolition of the national farm price guarantees impacted the Brazilian soybean industry 
(Vieira and Williams 1996). At the same time, the international prices of soybeans and 
products declined and the value-added tax on exports increased. After the late 1990s, 
Brazil began to slowly reduce or eliminate government intervention in soybean markets 
resulting in a decline of government support to Brazilian soybean producers. Brazilian 
government support for agricultural production is currently low compared to that of 
other major agricultural producing and exporting countries (USITC 2012).  
Brazil’s complex tax system influences the Brazilian soybean supply chain. The 
Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS) is the most important tax on Brazilian 
soybean products. The tax rate varies depending on the state and differentiates between 
primary and processed agricultural products, normally varying between 7% and 12% of 
the total value of soybean products (USITC 2012). Before 1996, the ICMS applied to all 
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soybeans and soybean products include exports. However, the tax on exports was 
eliminated by the 1996 Kandir Law (Vieira and Williams 1996). Even so, the ICMS was 
maintained on domestic sales of soybeans, soymeal and soyoil implying a disincentive to 
sell soybean products for domestic consumption and an incentive to export them. The 
ICMS must be paid when soybeans cross state lines even if the processed soybean 
products (soymeal and soyoil) are exported at a later date, therefore, soybean processing 
facilities are located in the state in which soybeans are grown to avoid paying the tax 
(USITC 2012).  
 
Factors influencing Competitiveness in Brazilian Soybean Industry 
Brazilian soybean production costs (17-18 cents/kg) in 2010 were estimated to be 
only 57% to 61% of U.S. costs (30 cents/kg) that year (USITC 2012). Land and seed 
costs in Brazil are relatively low compared to those costs in competing countries, 
however, higher inland transportation and freight costs are a competitive disadvantage 
for soybean producers in Central Brazil who are farther from ports and major domestic 
markets than producers in the southern region (USITC 2012). To deal with this problem, 
the Brazilian government has been working on a Growth Acceleration Program together 
with a National Plan of Logistics and Transportation (PNLT) for the period 2008-2023 
to improve the transportation infrastructure that supports soybean production and 
distribution.  
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The Argentine Soybean Industry  
 Soybean production in Argentina began to increase rapidly in about the mid-
1990s, growing more than 220 % between 1995/96 and 2011/12. Argentina is currently 
the world’s third largest producer of soybeans and the third largest producer of both 
soymeal and soyoil in the world. Although it is also currently the third largest soybean 
consumer behind China and the U.S., Argentina is also the third the largest exporter of 
soybeans. China is the largest importer of Argentine soybeans and soyoil. From 2001/02 
to 2011/12, soybean crush in Argentina has increased from 20.9 mmt to 35.9 mmt while 
Argentine soybean exports have increased from 6 mmt to 7.4 mmt (Figure 9). In 2011/12, 
18.4 % of Argentina’s soybean production was exported. Exports account for 55.4 % of 
Argentine soyoil production and 93.2 % of Argentine soymeal production (Figure 10; 
Figure 11). 
 
Argentine Soybean Supply and Demand  
Even though soybean cultivation in Argentina has a long history, soybeans were 
not economically viable crops in Argentina before the 1960s. However, the sharp 
increase in the world soybean price in the 1970s following the disastrous anchovy 
catches in Peru and the U.S. soybean export ban in the early 1970s spurred a more than 
60 fold increase in Argentina’s soybean production in the 1970s. The dramatic growth of 
its soybean production during that period catapulted Argentina into third place in world 
soybean exports behind the U.S. and Brazil.  
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Throughout the 1970s, the profitability of soybeans relative to corn, sorghum, 
and barley continued to lead to a substitution of production area away from grains to 
soybeans (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). Before the 1990s, Argentina’s soybean 
yields grew a steady 3% annually during the 1970s and 1980s that played a large role in 
the dramatic rise in Argentina’s soybean output (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). 
Then, in the late 1990s, the widespread adoption of biotech soybeans stimulated a rapid 
expansion of the area planted to soybeans in Argentina. Soybean production in 
Argentina has increased rapidly since that time with the exceptions of 2008/09 and 
2011/12 when an historic drought negatively influenced production (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Argentine Soybean Production, Crush, and Exports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Over the years, the Argentine agriculture sector has received very little direct 
government support (Vilella et al. 2009). In 1991, the newly elected government enacted 
important economic reforms that adopted an open-economy policy and created a more 
liberal policy regime.  The success of these reforms unleashed Argentina’s natural 
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comparative advantage in the production of soybeans (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 
2001). The greatest change made during that period was the elimination of all export 
taxes on processed soybean products. Furthermore, these reforms boosted imports of 
fertilizer and farm machinery so that farmers could invest heavily in new technologies 
that improve yields (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001).  
Initially, Argentina’s soybean area expanded mostly in the central production 
region, known as the Pampas. The soybean area extended through northern Buenos 
Aires, southern Santa Fe and southwest Córdoba. By the 1990s, more than half of total 
soybean area in Argentina was in these regions. Beginning in the late 1990s, soybean 
area in the northern and northwestern provinces of Argentina (including Santiago del 
Estero, Chaco, Formosa and Entre Ríos) also expanded with infrastructure 
improvements and the introduction of new technologies. The infrastructure 
improvements began to open these provinces to the major ocean ports of Rosario and 
Buenos Aires via an overland connection to the Parana-Paraguay waterway at 
Resistencia (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). The new technologies enabled 
farmers to attain higher yields with the same number of hectares and laborers. Despite 
the growth of soybean production in the northern and northwestern provinces, Córdoba, 
Santa Fe, and Buenos Aires remain the major Argentine soybean production regions, 
accounting more than 80% of total soybean production in Argentina (SIIA 2013). 
 The processing capacity and the quantity of soybeans crushed have grown 
rapidly in Argentina, responding to increased production. Policy reforms in the early 
1990s encouraged private investments in the Argentine soybean processing sector 
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resulting in more efficient technology and larger processing capacity (Schnepf, Dohlman, 
and Bolling 2001). Currently, Argentina is the third largest processor of soybeans in the 
world. The volume of soybeans crushed in Argentina has increased from 1.3 mmt in 
1981/82 to 20.9 mmt in 2000/01 and 35.9 mmt in 2011/12. The processing industry is 
concentrated in the provinces of Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Buenos Aire with Santa fe 
accounting for over 80% of Argentine processing capacity. Argentine processing 
facilities are oriented toward soymeal and soyoil exports since Argentina has little 
reason to crush soybeans for its relatively small domestic market. However, by reducing 
the export tax burden on soymeal and soyoil compared to soybeans, Argentina created 
an incentive in favor of the domestic processing of soybeans rather than exporting. Since 
1990, approximately 10% to 30% of Argentine soybean productions have been exported 
with the rest crushed in Argentina.  
 
Argentine Soymeal  
 Argentina has several advantages over the U.S. and Brazil for exporting soybeans 
and products. Most importantly, soybean production areas are located relatively close to 
the ports where most of the processing capacity is located, minimizing transportation 
costs. In addition, the costs of seeds are lower in Argentina because many of Argentina 
farmers evade payment of the technology fee for biotech soybeans (Schnepf 2003). 
Furthermore, the average port cost in Argentina is cheaper than that in Brazil (López, 
Ramos, and Starobinsky 2008).  
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 Argentine exports of soymeal began in the early 1970s. Nearly all soymeal 
produced in Argentina has been exported over the years. In 1990/91, only 4% of 
soymeal production was consumed in the domestic market and only 3% in 2011/12 
(Figure 10). Argentina’s cattle industry is predominantly grass-fed and the poultry and 
pork industries are relatively small (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). In 2011/12, 
soymeal production in Argentina was 27.9 mmt of which 26 mmt was exported.  
 
Figure 10. Argentine Soymeal Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1970/71-
2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Argentine Soyoil  
 Argentine soyoil exports also began from the early 1970s. In 1990/91, only 8% 
of soyoil production was consumed domestically. New laws requiring mandatory usage 
of biodiesel in the U.S. and the European Union in recent years, however, have boosted 
investments in the Argentine soyoil market. As a result, the domestic consumption share 
of soyoil reached 44% in 2011/12 (Figure 11). A  Chinese ban on soyoil imports from 
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Argentina for six months in 2010/11 helped reduce Argentina’s soyoil exports that year 
and generate more domestic use. 
 
Figure 11. Argentine Soyoil Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1970/71-
2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Argentine Soybean Policies 
Before the 1990s, Argentina’s agricultural sector including soybeans was at a 
considerable competitive disadvantage because of  the unstable macroeconomic 
environment of the country characterized by high inflation, an often overvalued 
exchange rate, and a heavy external debt burden (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). 
Furthermore, at that time, the National Grain Board (JNG) and the National Meat Board 
promoted the transfer of agricultural sector resources to the industrial sector to help 
industrial growth by favoring import substitution (Vilella et al 2009; Lence 2010). The 
import substitution program penalized the Argentine soybean sector by applying tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions on imported agricultural inputs to encourage the sale of 
domestically produced inputs and imposing export taxes on soybeans and soybean 
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products to help pay for the growing government debt (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 
2001). The export taxes on soybeans and soybean products and import tariffs on 
production inputs distorted production incentives and strangled agricultural productivity 
growth (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). Despite these obstacles, Argentina’s 
soybean production rose dramatically between 1980 and 1990, mainly due to yield gain. 
By the early 1990s, Argentina had become the world’s largest exporter of soyoil and a 
major soymeal exporter (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). 
In 1991, the newly elected government instituted major changes in government 
policies, including the elimination of export taxes on soymeal and soyoil. However, 
soybeans exports continued to be taxed at a rate of 3.5% to encourage growth of the 
domestic processing industry. Furthermore, all quantitative restrictions on imported 
agricultural production inputs were eliminated (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001). 
In 1992, the Argentine government established an export rebate system designed to 
encourage soymeal and soyoil exports by reducing the domestic costs of production 
(whole soybean exports were not made eligible for export rebates). The policy reforms 
helped Argentine soybean industries increase usage of the imported inputs and expand 
soybean product exports. Argentina’s reform of the agricultural sector was accelerated 
by the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) encompassing Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay (Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling 2001).  
A devaluation of the Argentine peso in 2002 along with the rise in the 
international prices of soybeans and soybean products gave a great impetus to its exports 
of soybeans and soybean products (Deese and Reeder 2007). In 2002, the Argentine 
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government took advantage of the export surge and applied export taxes to 23.5% on 
soybeans, to 20.0% on soymeal and to 19.3% for soyoil (Deese and Reeder 2007; Vilella 
et al. 2009). In 2007, the soybean export tax was raised to 35% and to 44% in 2008.  The 
tax increases met with resistance from Argentine soybean farmers and many in the 
soybean industry. As a result, the government eased the soybean export tax back to 35% 
later in 2008. The soybean export tax is currently 35% and 32% for soymeal and soyoil. 
 
Factors influencing Competitiveness in Argentine Soybean Industry 
The proximity of Argentine production regions to ports and processing facilities 
and the relatively lower cost of producing soybeans in Argentina compared to the United 
States and Brazil enabled the growth of the Argentine soybean industry. Even though the 
Argentine soybean industry benefits from lower production costs in comparison to the 
U.S. and Brazil, Argentina’s high soybean and soybean product export taxes continue to 
undermine its global competitiveness. In 2004, Argentina allowed crushers to import 
soybeans from Paraguay and re-export the soymeal and soyoil by only paying the value 
added tax, not the full export tax. This policy effectively boosted soybean crushing to 
utilize available capacity until 2009 when the policy was terminated (Markley 2012). 
 
The Chinese Soybean Industry  
In 1995/96, Chinese government began to open its soybean market. As a result, 
China quickly switched from being a small net importer of soybeans to being a net 
importer. Chinese soybean imports have subsequently increased dramatically. The U.S., 
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Brazil, and Argentina account for more than 95% of China’s soybean imports. China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001 that obligated China to open its soybean markets to 
imports was a primary factor in launching the growth in its soybean imports. Between 
2001/02 and 2011/12, China’s soybean imports increased from 10.4 mmt to 59 mmt, a 
nearly 500% increase (Figure 12). As a result, China has become the largest soybean 
importing country in the world.  
China is currently the world’s largest producer of soymeal and soyoil. China’s 
soymeal production has been sufficient to meet domestic needs so that Chinese soymeal 
trade is minimal. On the other hand, China’s large and rapidly growing demand for 
soyoil has required growing imports of soyoil.  Between 2001/02 and 2011/12, China’s 
soyoil imports increased by almost 172% from 551,000 mt to 1.5 mmt (Figure 14). 
 
Chinese Soybean Supply and Demand 
Evidence indicates that soybeans were first domesticated during the Zhou 
dynasty in about the 11th century B.C in the eastern half of the northern region of China 
(Hymowitz 1990). Domestication in China probably took place during the Shang 
dynasty between about 1700 B.C. and 1100 B.C (Williams 2012). Soybean production 
probably reached southern China by the first century A.D. (Smith 2003).  
Before the 1930s, China was by far the world's leading soybean producing 
country. In 1933, China and Manchuria, an independent state under Japanese control at 
the time, accounted for 87% of world soybean production (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007b). 
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Chinese soybean production declined markedly 
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due to revolution in China and the China-Japan war.  Following World War II, the 
socialist Chinese government adopted the first Five Year Plan for the economic 
development of China that called for intensive industrialization with relatively little 
capital investment to be made in the agriculture sector (Williams 2012).  
In the 1950s, the Chinese government encouraged an increase in agricultural 
production that resulted in a dramatic increase in the area planted to soybeans (Shurtleff 
and Aoyagi 2007b). At the time, the major soybean production regions were the central 
and northeast provinces of China including Shandong, Henan, Heilongjiang, and Anhui 
(Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007b). However, during the 1960s, soybean production declined 
substantially due to the changes in the domestic political environment (Shurtleff and 
Aoyagi 2007b).    
Chinese soybean production and planted area began a slow growth after 1976 
once again, mainly because of a change in Chinese government policy that shifted land 
out of grain production and into cash crops such as soybeans and expanded research and 
extension work related to soybean production (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007b). The gains 
in Chinese soybean production in the early 1980s occurred mainly in the central 
provinces of Henan and Anhui. Even so, about 40% of all Chinese soybean production 
occurred in the northeast provinces of Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin (Shurtleff and 
Aoyagi 2007b).  
Chinese soybean crush increased more than 34 fold to 61 mmt between 1984/85 
and 2011/12. Economic growth after the 1980s increased the domestic demand for 
vegetable oil and meat creating demand for soybeans for processing. Soybean 
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production gradually increased until the mid-2000s, mainly as the result of some 
increase in the planted area. Area harvested reached 9.6 million ha in 2005/06. After the 
mid-2000s, soybean area in China declined sharply primarily due to the low returns to 
soybean planting (Meador and Xinping 2013) because the Chinese government wants to 
be self-sufficient in grain production thus government policies reduced the incentives to 
plant soybeans in favor of more highly subsidized rice, corn and wheat (Lagos and 
Junyang 2013). Farmers have shifted the acreage away from soybeans toward corn or 
rice that are more profitable. 
In recent years, soybean acreage has tended to decline with unfriendly policies, 
and the increasing cost of land and other production inputs. In 2011/12, the per hectare 
profit in Heilongjiang for soybeans ($245) is far below the profit for corn ($637) and rice 
($923) (Meador and Xinping 2013). Soybean production in China is still concentrated in 
the Northeast region (including the Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces) and the Yellow 
River region (including the Shandong, Henan and Hebei provinces) which together 
account for about 60% of China's soybean production. However, lower soybean profits 
relative to competing corn and rice in these two regions have caused a significant decline 
in soybean area (Meador and Xinping 2011; Meador and Xinping 2012). 
 China is the fourth largest soybean producer and the largest processor of 
soybeans in the world. The volume of soybeans processed in China began to grow 
rapidly in mid-1980s, due mostly to economic growth. Increased income, population 
growth, and urbanization in China stimulated the growth in demand for soymeal and 
soyoil (Tuan, Fang, and Cao 2004). The expansion of industrialized feed production 
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during the 1980s and 1990s was an important factor in the rapid growth of Chinese 
soymeal demand (Tuan, Fang, and Cao 2004). Chinese soybean crush was 1.7 mmt in 
1984/85 but reached 61 mmt in 2011/12 (Figure 12). The Chinese oilseed processing 
industry has the capacity to process 125 mmt per year and over 360,000 mt per day 
(Meador and Xinping 2013). 
 
Figure 12. Chinese Soybean Production, Crush, and Imports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
The processing industry was concentrated along the coastal region, with about 
80 % of total crush capacity, to facilitate the receipt of imported soybeans (Meador and 
Xinping 2013). About half of Chinese soybean crush plants in 2012 were located in the 
East and Northeast coastal provinces of Shandong (28.4%), Jiangsu (15.8%), and 
Liaoning (5.8%) (Meador and Xinping 2013).  
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Chinese Soymeal  
Before the 1980s, Chinese soymeal production averaged about 1 to 1.5 mmt 
(Figure 13). In the early 1990s, Chinese soymeal demand and production of soymeal 
began a steady increase. Domestic soymeal production has come primarily from 
imported soybeans (Williams 2012). China has been a net exporter of soymeal, except 
during the period of 1995/96 through 1998/99, primarily because the meal produced 
from the imported soybeans has been more than sufficient to meet domestic needs. 
Domestically produced soybeans are destined primarily for food use (Williams 2012). 
Chinese soymeal production and consumption increased 136% and 211%, respectively, 
between 2001/02 and 2011/12 (Figure 13). 
  
Figure 13. Chinese Soymeal Production, Consumption, and Exports, 1970/71-
2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
  
 45 
 
Chinese Soyoil 
 The dramatic growth in Chinese soyoil supply and demand since the 1980s have 
been heavily influenced by government soyoil import policies (Tuan, Fang, and Cao 
2004). The rapid expansion of domestic crushing capacity reduced soyoil imports 
beginning in the late 1990s. An outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 
and avian flu in early 2000s reduced the demand for meat, and therefore, the demand for 
soymeal as a livestock feed ingredient fell (Tuan, Fang, and Cao 2004). A subsequent 
surplus of soymeal in the market leads to a decline in the crush of soybeans leading to 
the need to begin importing soyoil. Chinese soyoil imports, however, are relatively small 
compared to the domestic production of soyoil. The 2011/12 self-sufficiency ratio for 
Chinese soyoil was about 86%. The accession of China to the WTO in 2001 contributed 
to the dramatic growth in the production and consumption of soyoil of 205% and 186%, 
respectively, between 2001/02 and 2011/12 (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14. Chinese Soyoil Production, Consumption, and Imports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
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Chinese Soybean Policies 
As mentioned earlier, the area planted to soybeans in China was expanded in the 
1950s as the result of Chinese government policies to promote agricultural production. 
However, in the early 1960s, China implemented measures that gradually shifted acreage 
away from soybeans and industrial crops toward grains (Williams 2012). In the late 
1970s, China instituted economic growth policies that resulted in a shift of grain 
production area back into soybean production along with increased public investments in 
soybean research (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007b). 
In 1994, the amount of soymeal imports was only 50,000 mt. The following year 
the Chinese government lifted the 13% value-added tax (VAT) on imported soymeal to 
counteract the rapid growth in the demand for soymeal (Tuan, Fang, and Cao 2004). 
Consequently, Chinese soymeal imports increased until 1997/98 to 4.2 mmt. However, 
the surge of soymeal imports reduced the demand for soybeans for processing and, thus, 
a shortage of soyoil supply. Consequently, the Chinese government re-imposed the 13% 
VAT on imported soymeal in 1999 (Tuan, Fang, and Cao 2004). China became a net 
exporter of soymeal in 2000/01. In 2004, the Chinese government attempted to 
encourage soymeal exports by reimbursing the 13% VAT on soymeal exports (Tuan, 
Fang, and Cao 2004). 
In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government reduced soybean import tariff rate to 3% 
and to 5% for soymeal. Before its accession to the WTO, China had used import quotas 
and import licensing for soyoil. Under the comprehensive bilateral trade agreement 
reached between the U.S. and China in 1999, China established tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) 
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for soyoil that increased each year (Hsu and Gale 2001). The total TRQ level for soyoil 
of 1.7 mmt in 2000 increased to 3.3 mmt in 2005. This measure, along with a reduction 
in the over-quota tariff to 9% in 2005 from 74% in 2000, facilitated imports of soyoil 
until the mid-2000s. The soyoil trade was liberalized by 2006, including elimination of 
monopoly by state trading and tariff-rate quotas. 
Prior to the accession of China to the WTO in 2001, China government 
implemented the biotechnology and food safety regulations referred to as the “Biosafety 
Administration Regulations on Agricultural Biotech Products” which require labeling of 
soyoil products containing biotech soybeans, create  an approval process for an 
application for a safety certificate for imports of biotech soybeans, and also require an 
individual safety certificate for each shipment of biotech soybeans (Tuan, Fang, and Cao 
2004).  In 2002, the government established testing guidelines and rules for imports of 
biotech soybeans (Song, Marchant, and Xu 2006). Under these regulations, China 
granted a safety certificate for importing Monsanto’s Roundup Ready biotech soybeans 
in 2004. 
 
Factors influencing Competitiveness in Chinese Soybean Industry 
The poor profitability of growing soybeans in major production areas has 
continued to shift soybeans acreage to crops that are more profitable. Furthermore, the 
price gap between domestic produced soybeans and imported soybeans disadvantage 
processing companies near soybean production regions. The relatively high price of 
domestic soybeans lowers the competitiveness of inland processing companies compared 
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with processing companies located in southern coastal regions that use imported 
soybeans. Chinese soybean farmers’ competitiveness continues to be undercut by limited 
arable land and low yields (Meador and Xinping 2011). Furthermore, relatively low 
returns to soybean production continues to influence farmers to switch to more profitable 
crops.  
 
The Japanese Soybean Industry  
Liberalization of Japanese soybean imports began in 1961. Then, in 1972, the 
tariff on soybean imports was eliminated. Before World War II, much of Japan’s 
soybean imports originated in Manchuria, now part of China. By the 1960s, however, 
Japan’s soybean imports were primarily from the U.S. Currently, the U.S. supplies 65% 
to 75% of Japanese soybean imports with the rest coming from Brazil, Canada, and 
China (Hayashi 2012). Canada and China supply Japan with non-biotech soybeans for 
food use (Hayashi 2012). 
Japan was the fourth largest soybean importing country in 2011/12 behind China, 
EU-27 and Mexico. The recent high soybean prices and a shift in Japanese consumption 
patterns leading to reduced soyoil consumption have contributed to a decline in Japanese 
soybean imports since 2003/04. Although soymeal consumption has been stable since 
the early 2000s, imports of soymeal have increased to replace the declining production. 
Japan is currently the fourth largest soymeal consumer in the world behind the EU, 
Indonesia, and Thailand. Japan imported 2.28 mmt of soymeal in 2011/12 (Figure 16).  
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The Japanese crushing industry has long been protected by border policy. 
Consequently, until the early 2000s, the quantity of Japanese soyoil imports was quite 
small relative to the quantity of soyoil consumed in Japan. Japanese soyoil consumption 
and production peaked in 2002/03 after which they have both been on the decline. 
However, soyoil production has declined more rapidly than consumption leading to a 
slight increase in imports since 2002/03 (Figure 17).       
 
Japanese Soybean Supply and Demand  
Soybeans have been an important crop for many centuries in Japan. Soybeans are 
widely used in making miso, soy sauce, tofu, and natto, traditionally important 
components of Japanese diets. Soybeans have been cultivated in the Japan since the 
Yayoi period that began in about 300 BC (Takahashi 2009). Soybean cultivation became 
widespread in Japan during the Kamakura period from 1192 AD to 1333 AD. The spread 
of Buddhism during that period discouraged the consumption of meat and provided an 
incentive for the cultivation of soybeans as a protein food source.  
Japanese soybean processors have depended on imports for several decades. 
From the 1930s to 1940s, domestic production accounted for only 30% to 35% of the 
soybeans processed in Japan, the rest being imported primarily from Manchuria 
(Nakamura 1961). The area under soybean cultivation in Japan peaked in the late 1940s 
at more than 400,000 ha. Japan then entered a period of rapid economic growth and 
liberalization of tariffs with its accession to the GATT in 1955. The liberalization of 
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soybean imports began in 1961 with the tariff on soybean imports finally eliminated in 
1972 (Yoon and Lee 1990).  
The U.S. became the primary source for Japanese soybean imports in the 1960s. 
Soybeans were initially used to make traditional foods in Japan. However, after the late 
1950s, soybeans began to be used for crushing to make soyoil and soymeal (Nakamura 
1961). The Japanese processing industry preferred U.S. to Japanese soybeans because of 
their higher oil content compared to domestic or Chinese soybeans. During that period, 
Japanese soybean production declined substantially from 418,000 mt in 1960/60 to only 
136,000 mt in 1969/70. Over the same period, soybean imports increased by nearly 300% 
from 1.2 mmt to 3.3 mmt.  By 1970/71, approximately 96 % of all soybeans consumed 
in Japan were imported, mostly from the U.S.  
There was a slight increase in soybean planted area and production from the late 
1970s until the late 1980s. However, almost 95% of soybean use continued to be 
supplied by imports (Figure 15). In the mid-1990s, the Japanese government decided to 
enforce its rice diversion program due to a high level of rice stocks in government 
inventories. The objective was to divert rice paddy fields to alternate crops such as 
soybeans (OECD 2009). Consequently, Japanese soybean planted area and soybean 
production experienced an increase once again in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. In 
2000, the deficiency payments were stopped and soybean planted area has not increased 
since the mid-2000s. For the last decade, the production area has been at around 130,000 
ha to 150,000 ha. Soybean production has been less stable due to soybean yield 
fluctuations over the years. 
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Figure 15. Japanese Soybean Production, Crush, and Imports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
The Central and Northern regions of Japan, including the Hokkaido, Akita, 
Miyagi, Niigata, and Tochigi prefectures have been the principal soybean producing 
areas. Hokkaido is the largest soybean prefecture in Japan accounting for about 20 % of 
production. Most soybeans in Japan are planted into paddy fields except in the Hokkaido, 
Tohoku and Kanto prefectures.  
In 1989/1990, there were 117 crushing factories in Japan (Hamamoto 2002). 
However, due to shrinking profitability, the number of crushers has declined gradually 
over the years as companies have consolidated (Nozaki 2000). In 1998/99, there were 88 
crushing factories with a total crushing capacity of 8.9 mmt but only 40 crushing 
factories with a total crushing capacity of 8.6 mmt in 2009/10 (Hayashi 2012). 
Since the early 2000s, a relatively high international price for soyoil compared to 
that of palm oil has been a primary factor behind the shift in consumption and, therefore, 
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the decline in soyoil and soybean imports since 2002/03. Soybean imports dropped 
almost in half between 2002/03 and 2011/12 from 5.1 mmt to 2.76 mmt (Figure 15).  
 
Japanese Soymeal 
About 80 ~ 90% of the soybean meal produced and imported by Japan is used for 
feed production with the remainder used for soybean products like tofu (Hayashi 2012). 
After a cow infected with Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known 
as mad cow disease, was discovered in Japan in 2001, the demand for soymeal as protein 
supplement in animal feed rations replaced protein  from animal origins leading to an 
increase in soymeal consumption in 2001/02 and 2002/03 (Hamamoto 2003). 
After that time, reflecting stagnant demand for feed from the livestock sector, 
total soymeal consumption stabilized until 2011/12. However, total soymeal production 
had been on a downward trend due to the downturn in the amount of crushing soybeans. 
Therefore, soymeal imports have increased due to decreases in soymeal production. The 
amount of imported soymeal increased by 111% in 2011/12 compared to 2001/02 and 
domestic soymeal production decreased from 2.98 mmt in 2001/02 to 1.48 mmt in 
2011/12 (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16. Japanese Soymeal Production, Consumption, and Imports, 1970/71-
2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Japanese Soyoil  
 Japanese soyoil consumption and production increased until the early 1980s and 
then remained stable for two decades. High tariffs on imported soyoil assured little 
competition for the domestic crushing industry from imports. Since 2002/03, however, 
both the consumption and production of soyoil have been declining consistently as 
consumers switched to other oil sources due to growing concerns about trans-fat in Japan 
and a relatively high price of soyoil compared to other oil like palm oil. As Japanese 
soyoil production has dropped, imports of rapeseed oil and palm oil have increased 
(Wixom and Hayashi 2011). Because soyoil production has declined more rapidly than 
consumption, soyoil imports have increased over the last decade. Japanese soyoil 
consumption declined by 46.9% from 2002/03 to 2012/13 while domestic soyoil 
production decreased from 765,000 mt in 2002/03 to 380,000 mt in 2011/12 (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17. Japanese Soyoil Production, Consumption, and Imports, 1970/71-
2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
Japanese Soybean Policies 
Until 1960, Japan maintained a 10% tariff rate on imported soybeans after which 
the tariff was steadily reduced until it was completely eliminated in 1972. There are 
currently no tariffs on soybean or  soymeal imports. Soybean oil is a different story. 
Over the years, Japan has maintained a soyoil tariff that has effectively protected the 
Japanese crushing industry from competition with imports.  
Because the relatively low price of imported soybeans for food uses has had a 
tendency to depress the price of domestically produced soybeans over the years, the 
Japanese government has implemented programs designed to support domestic 
production. Beginning in 1961, soybean producers received a deficiency payment in 
which the government paid the difference between the market and target prices to 
farmers when market prices fell below a fixed target level, regardless of any quality 
differential in the price of the soybeans (Hamamoto, Dyck, and Stout 2002).   
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In 2000, the deficiency payment program was replaced by a Soybean Subsidy 
Program that the government paid soybean farmers the difference between the market 
price and a production cost estimate (Hamamoto, Dyck, and Stout 2002). Under this 
subsidy program, the government pays a fixed subsidy to farmers when the sum of the 
producer price and the fixed subsidy does not reach the production cost set by the 
government each year (Hamamoto 2003). Meanwhile, if the sum of the producer price 
and the fixed subsidy exceeds the production cost, the farmers are paid only the 
difference between the production cost and the producer price, instead of full amount of 
the fixed subsidy (Hamamoto 2003). In the case of the producer price exceeding the 
production cost, farmers would not benefit from the subsidy.  
In addition to the subsidy for soybeans, the Japanese government also 
implemented an income stabilization policy in 2000. This program compensates 
participating farmers with 80% of the difference between the current year market price 
and the average of the market prices of the previous 3 years (Hamamoto, Dyck, and 
Stout 2002). Another major policy that supports domestic soybean production is rice 
diversion subsidies which are paid per hectare of soybeans planted on paddies that have 
been diverted away from rice production (Hamamoto, Dyck, and Stout 2002).  
Because the overall Japanese domestic agricultural production declined in recent 
years, Japanese government launched the Farm Income Support Payment program in 
2011 designed to increase domestic production of major grains including soybeans. 
Under this program, farmers who plant soybeans on rice paddies receive a fixed subsidy. 
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Farmers who cultivate soybeans in upland field receive the difference between a 
nationwide standard production cost and the nationwide standard farm price. 
 
Factors influencing Competitiveness in Japanese Soybean Industry 
As mentioned above, for the last decade, soyoil consumption has declined mainly 
due to changes in consumer preference for rapeseed oil and palm oil rather than soyoil.  
Japanese consumers have become more concerned about food safety and are demanding 
non-biotech soybeans for food purposes.  
 An important competitive change for the Japanese crushing industry has been the 
reduction of the historically high protection against soyoil imports in the form of high 
import tariffs. Currently, Japan’s tariff on imported soyoil is applied on a specific rate 
basis and the rate is 10.9 yen/kg that is as high as or higher than for other similar 
vegetable oils (e.g. palm oil 3.5 yen/kg; sunflower oil 8.5 yen/kg; rapeseed oil 10.9 
yen/kg).  Under WTO rules, the high Japanese tariffs on imports of soyoil will need to 
be reduced which will likely create a competitive disadvantage for Japanese soybean 
crushing industry. 
 
The EU Soybean Industry  
In the early 1900s, soybean imports from East Asia rapidly increased in Europe. 
At that time, England was the leading soybean importer in Europe. European soybean 
imports declined sharply during World War I. In the post-war years, European imports 
of soybeans and soyoil began to recover rapidly (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007a). After the 
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late 1920s, Europe began to import more soybeans and extract the soyoil domestically, 
which dampened European imports of soyoil (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007a). Soybean 
imports fell to almost zero during World War II because of naval warfare over trade 
routes and Japanese invasions of Manchuria and China (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007a).  
After the war, imports of soybeans recovered dramatically from 0.11 mmt in 
1945 to 2.8 mmt in 1960. However, the U.S. rather than East Asia became the major 
source of the imports (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007a). In the Dillon round of GATT 
negotiations during the early 1960s, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
negotiated zero duties on imports of soybeans (Bertheau and Davison 2011). Between 
1960/61 and 1979/80, European soybean imports grew from 2 mmt to 16.3 mmt.  The 
major soybean importers were West Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Italy (Shurtleff 
and Aoyagi 2007a).  
During the 1990s, soybeans and soymeal imports gradually increased while 
soyoil imports sharply decreased. Before mid-1990s, the United States had been a major 
supplier of soybeans to Europe, accounting for 45% of EU imports (Hasha 2002). 
However, consumer rejection of biotech soybeans in Europe reduced the U.S. share of 
EU soybean imports to 22 % in 2007 (van Gelder, Kammeraat, and Kroes 2008). In 
contrast, European imports of soybean from Brazil that grows both biotech and non-
biotech have been rapidly increasing. Since the mid-2000s, Brazil has accounted for 
more than 50% of the soybeans imported by the EU while the U.S. has accounted for 
less than 20% (European Commission 2013). 
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Given its small soybean production compared to its high demand for feed use, 
the EU is the world’s second largest importer of soybeans and the largest importer of 
soymeal. Although Brazil is still the EU’s leading soybean supplier, the market share of 
Brazil in EU soybean imports has decreased while soybean imports from Paraguay and 
Canada have increased substantially over the last two years. Total imports of soybeans 
by the EU have decreased over the last decade due to reduced demand for soymeal in 
animal feed (Krautgartner et al. 2012). The Netherlands, Spain, and Germany account 
for 60% of total EU soybean imports. Argentina and Brazil are major soymeal exporter 
to the EU that account for more than 95% of the soymeal imported from these two 
countries.    
 
EU Soybean Supply and Demand  
Although the EU is the second largest soybean consumer in the world, soybean 
production is small in the EU. The production of soybeans is at a competitive 
disadvantage in Europe due to adverse climate and soil conditions. Moreover, closely 
substitutable commodities, such as rapeseed, sunflower seed, and cottonseed, are more 
suited to the climatic and soil conditions in Europe.  
Soybean production in Europe began in 1933 in countries along the Danube, 
including Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007a). Total 
production in these countries reached 125,000 mt in 1941 before World War II forced a 
dramatic decline in production (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007a). By the early 1950s, small 
amounts of soybeans were produced in Eastern European countries such as Romania. 
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However, there was still no noteworthy production of soybeans in Western European 
countries.  
In 1973, a shortage of soybeans in the U.S. impacted soybean imports by 
Western European countries which motivated some European countries such as Spain 
and France to attempt to reduce their dependence on imported soymeal by encouraging 
the production of soybeans (Shurtleff and Aoyagi 2007a). Domestic soybean production 
in Europe, however, still only contributed about 5% of total soybean crush at the time. In 
the 1980s, European countries began subsidizing the production of rapeseed and 
sunflower seed in an effort to reduce their dependence on imports. Consequently, 
production of other oilseeds increased while the volume of soybeans crushed declined.  
During the 1990s, European soybean crush demand and soybean imports both 
gradually increased by almost 30% (Figure 18). However, the area planted to soybean in 
Europe did not expand given its relatively low price compared to other oilseeds like 
rapeseed. During that period, the share of soybeans in total European oilseed production 
was less than 10% (Borremans 1998). 
 
 60 
 
Figure 18. EU Soybean Production, Crush, and Imports, 1970/71-2012/1 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
In the early 2000s, the EU soybean production was concentrated in Italy, France, 
Austria, and Spain. European soybean crushing increased in the early 2000s due to the 
prohibition against the production and use of meat and bone meal in the EU and 
improved crushing margins for soybeans (Talks 2003). However, by 2005/06, the EU 
soybean crushing was on the decline due to high crushing costs and relatively high 
soybean prices (Talks 2004). When Romania joined the EU in 2006/07, soybean 
production increased slightly. However, production declined again in 2007/08 mainly 
due to the prohibition against the production of biotech soybeans in Romania (Bendz 
2007). In the late 2000s, the annual EU-27 soybean production in EU-27 was no more 
than 600,000 mt to 850,000 mt, which is only 3% of total EU-27 oilseed production. 
More than 50% of EU-27 soybeans are produced in Italy.  
The decline in the EU soybean imports over the last decade is due mainly to a 
decline in the demand for feed including soymeal and growing substitution of rapeseed 
meal for soymeal in livestock rations. A decreasing crush margins for soybeans is also 
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one of crucial reasons for the decline of soybean imports (Bendz 2005). Over the last 
decade, the EU countries have tended to increase their imports of soymeal and soyoil 
rather than soybeans. After 2010/11, there was growth in the acreage planted to soybeans 
in major European soybean producing countries such as Italy and France leading to a 
slight increase in the EU-27 soybean production. The almost continuous decline in 
soybean crush demand in the EU-27 is primarily the result of a decline in the demand for 
soymeal in animal feed rations and a decline in soyoil demand with greater competition 
from sunflower oil, palm oil, and other close substitutes (Krautgartner et al. 2012). 
Major crushers in the EU-27 include Germany, Spain, Italy, and Benelux countries 
(Krautgartner et al. 2012). Germany and Spain together account more than 40% of the 
total EU-27 soybean crush. 
 
EU Soymeal  
Because the EU is one of the largest livestock and poultry producers in the world, 
the EU is also the world’s largest importer of soymeal. During the 1990s, soymeal was 
relatively cheaper than feed grains making soymeal a cheap protein supplement for 
balanced feed rations in the region. However, after the early 2000s, soymeal production 
declined mainly due to a decreased crush margins for soybeans (Talks 2004).  
A rise in the EU demand for soymeal in the early 2000 was the result of the BSE 
scare in 2000 and the subsequent ban by the EU on the use of meat and bone meal in 
animal feeds the next year. The EU-27 demand for soymeal peaked in 2007/08 due to 
high grain prices leading to a similar spike in soybean imports that year (Lieberz 2008). 
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However, after that time, the demand of soymeal for animal feed use declined in most 
member states (Krautgartner et al. 2010). Soymeal consumption in the EU-27 was 35 
mmt in 2007/08 and only 30 mmt in 2011/12 (Figure 19). Major consumers of soymeal 
in the EU-27 are Germany, Spain, and France. Total soymeal consumption of these 
countries accounts for more than 40 % of total EU-27 soymeal consumption 
(Krautgartner et al. 2011). 
 
Figure 19. EU Soymeal Production, Consumption, and Imports, 1970/71-2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
EU Soyoil  
Before the mid-2000s, the EU-27 had been net exporter of soyoil. During 1900s, 
soyoil imports in the EU were almost zero due to the growth of domestic soyoil 
production (Figure 20). The production of soyoil gradually increased until the early 
2000s and then declined once again due to lower crush margins and high soybean prices. 
In the late 2000s, the EU-27 became a net importer of soyoil although soyoil exports 
again exceeded soyoil imports in 2011/12. Brazil and Argentina are the main exporters 
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of soyoil to the EU-27. EU-27 soyoil imports increased in the mid-2000s because of 
increased demand for biodiesel especially in Germany, Spain, Italy, and Portugal (Bendz 
2006).  
 
Figure 20. EU Soyoil Production, Consumption, Exports and Imports, 1970/71-
2012/13 
 
Source: USDA/FAS, 2013 
 
EU-27 traceability and labeling legislation came into force in 2003 making it 
mandatory to label soyoil produced from biotech soybeans (Bendz 2005). Consumption 
of soyoil in the EU had gradually increased and reached to 3.4 mmt in 2007/08 (Figure 
20). Since that time, however, the EU-27 demand for soyoil has decreased, both for food 
use and for biodiesel use. Crushing plants specifically for soybeans in EU-27 countries 
have been replaced by multi-seed crushing plants (Bendz 2007). The food industry in the 
EU-27 tends to avoid using oil products which are labeled biotech (Krautgartner et al. 
2010). Italy, Romania, and France are the largest producers of soyoil, accounting for 
almost 80 % of total soyoil production in the EU (Krautgartner et al. 2012). In 2012/13, 
EU-27 soyoil consumption was 2.1 mmt and soyoil production was 2.2 mmt (Figure 20).   
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EU Soybean Policies 
Because soybean production is relatively small in the EU-27, few government 
policies have been implemented to support its growth. Soybeans and soymeal have been 
imported into the EU with zero tariffs since the 1960s. The Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), initiated in 1962, aimed to enhance agricultural productivity in the EU and insure 
a stable food supply. However, EU agricultural policies primarily motivated growth in 
the production of other oilseeds such as rapeseed and sunflower seed rather than 
soybeans. Under the CAP reforms implemented in1993/94, the EU began to replace its 
price support policy with direct payments based on historical yields. Moreover, the 1992 
Blair House agreement in response to an EU-US dispute on EU oilseed supports set a 
maximum of 5.482 million ha of EU oilseed area that were eligible for oilseed payments 
(Dufey, Baldock, and Farmer 2006; European Commission 2011). In addition, under the 
Agenda 2000 reforms, compensatory payments for oilseeds were gradually replaced by 
direct payments. 
Following the 2003 CAP reform, the EU introduced the Single Farm Payment 
(SFP) program. Decoupling the SFP from production and the unfavorable production 
conditions for soybeans in much of Europe lead to a decline in the production of 
soybeans. Moreover, a 10% set-aside rule for production area reduced the area planted to 
soybeans. In 2008, the EU-27 passed a biofuels directive that requires use of renewable 
fuels up to 10% of total EU transport fuels by 2020. However, rapeseed oil is the main 
feedstock used to produce biodiesel in EU. Consequently, soybean production has 
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benefited little from that policy. The cultivation of biotech soybeans has been prohibited 
in the EU-27. Several EU-27 regulations and directives relate to biotechnology and food 
safety. In 2004, the EU-27 implemented a regulation requiring traceability systems and 
the labeling of biotech commodities and products produced from biotech commodities. 
Currently, the EU-27 has zero-tolerance policy on imports of unauthorized biotech 
soybeans. Therefore, if small amounts of unauthorized biotech soybeans are found in 
shipments of approved soybeans then the EU-27 could ban its import. In 2011, the EU-
27 relaxed its zero-tolerance policy only for imports of animal feed by allowing the 
presence of EU unapproved biotech commodities in a batch of non-biotech or EU 
approved biotech commodities up to 0.1%. 
 
Factors influencing Competitiveness in EU Soybean Industry  
 For the EU, it is difficult to substitute soybean imports with domestically 
produced soybeans due to unfavorable conditions to grow a large volume of soybeans. In 
recent years, soybean consumption and, therefore, imports have declined as result of 
three major factors (1) high soybean price, (2) decline in demand for soyoil as 
consumers substitute away from soyoil towards rapeseed and other vegetable oils, and (3) 
reduced feed demand. Although some of EU soybean imports have been replaced by 
alternative oilseeds such as rapeseed and sunflower seed, soymeal is one of the most 
important feedstuffs for the EU feed industry given its high protein profile, for which 
very limited substitutes are available (Aramyan, van Wagenberg, Backus 2009).        
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 Soymeal is used primarily as a livestock feed supplement in the EU-27. Soyoil is 
used mostly for margarine production, and cooking and salad oils. Some soyoil is also 
used as a biofuel feedstock. With the introduction of the biotech product labeling 
requirements for soymeal and soyoil, the EU import demand for soybeans and soybean 
products has declined. Furthermore, there have been changes in the sources of EU-27 
imports of soybeans and soymeal. Soybean imports from the United States have declined 
while imports of biotech-free soybeans from Brazil, Paraguay, and Canada have 
increased. EU-27 imports of Argentine soymeal have declined in favor of biotech-free 
soymeal from Brazil. 
 
Historical Soybean Checkoff Expenditures  
 Since 1970/71, U.S. soybean farmers spent a total of over $1,380 million in 
checkoff funds on both supply-oriented and demand-oriented programs to enhance the 
probability and their competitiveness. Of that total, 40.5% have been invested in 
international market, 40.9% in production research and 18.6% in domestic market. 
Before the national soybean checkoff program became effective in 1991, annual soybean 
checkoff expenditure was less than $20 million (Figure 21). Between 1970/71 and 
1991/92, about 70% of the total checkoff expenditure was invested in the international 
market and the rest of the total checkoff expenditure was invested in production research 
(Figure 22). Over the same period, the soybean checkoff funds were rarely invested in 
domestic demand promotion activities.  
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 With the implementation of the national soybean checkoff program, annual 
soybean checkoff expenditure grew rapidly to almost $40 million by 1996/1997, $51 
million by 2001/02, $67 million by 2006/07 and $120 million by 2011/12 (Figure 21). 
Over time, a larger share of checkoff funds was allocated to domestic promotion to 
expand domestic use of soybeans, soymeal and soyoil (Figure 22). The shift in the 
allocation away from international market promotion towards domestic promotion 
caused a decline in the international market promotion share from 69.5% in 1991/92 to 
30.2% in 2011/12. Since 2000/01, production research has been the largest part of the 
overall soybean checkoff expenditure.  
 
Figure 21. Total Soybean Checkoff Expenditures, 1970/71-2011/12 
 
Source: author's analysis of USB’s expenditure record 
 68 
 
Figure 22. Share of Soybean Checkoff Expenditures Allocated to International 
Market Promotion, Domestic Market Promotion, and Production 
Research, 1970/71-2011/12 
 
Source: author's analysis of USB’s expenditure record 
 
International Market Promotion Expenditure 
 Between 1970/71 and 2011/12, $559 million were invested in international 
market promotion to boost exports of U.S. soybeans and soybean products. Over the 
same period, checkoff funds invested for foreign market development increased steadily 
from $0.7 million in 1970/71 to $36 million in 2011/12 (Figure 23). In 1970/71, 
soybeans accounted for the largest share of international market promotion with $699 
thousand. However, after the mid-1970s, soybean products share increased until late 
1980s. By 1985/86, soyoil accounted for 42.3% and soymeal accounted for 50.2% of 
international market promotion with soybeans only 8% (Figure 24).  
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Figure 23. Soybean Checkoff Expenditures on International Market Promotion 
Programs, 1970/71-2011/12 
 
Source: author's analysis of USB’s expenditure record 
 
 After the implementation of the national soybean checkoff program, the strategy 
of the international market development reemphasized soybeans rather than soybean 
products. By 2011/12, the soybean share has risen to 58% of international promotion 
expenditure (Figure 24). From $699 thousand in 1970/71, checkoff funds for soybeans 
increased to $21 million in 2011/12 (Figure 23). The expenditure for soyoil reached a 
high of $4.5 million in 1988/89 but declined to $0.5 million in 2007/08. With an 
emphasis on development for new uses of soyoil, checkoff expenditure increased to $1.5 
million in 2011/12. Between 1970/71 and 2011/12, checkoff funds for soymeal grew 
from $33 thousand to $13.8 million.      
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Figure 24. Commodity Shares of International Market Promotion Expenditures, 
1970/71-2011/12 
 
Source: author's analysis of USB’s expenditure record 
 
 In the early 1970s, Japan accounted for the largest share of international market 
promotion, approximately 50% to 60% (Figure 25). Japan share of international market 
promotion expenditure has substantially diminished between mid-1970s and mid-1980s 
mainly because the emphasis in promotion activities began to switch from soybeans to 
soybean products (Figure 24). The share of expenditure in the European Community was 
the largest in 1977/78 with 51%, however, it also decreased to 6.8% in 2011/12 (Figure 
25).  
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Figure 25. Regional Shares of International Market Promotion Expenditures, 
1970/71-2011/12 
 
Source: author's analysis of USB’s expenditure record 
 
In 1970/71, Japan and the European Community accounted for almost 90% of all 
international market promotion expenditure, however, the European Community and 
Japan share declined to 8.1% in 2011/12 (Figure 25). In contrast, since 1980/81, the 
international market promotion expanded into China and the share of expenditure 
increased to 13.5% in 2011/12. The share of expenditure for rest of world increased 
dramatically from 10.8% in 1970/71 to 78.4% in 2011/12 due to the growing emphasis 
on new and emerging markets. 
 
Soybean Production Research Expenditure 
 Between 1970/71 and 2011/12, $565 million were invested in production 
research to enhance soybean yield and to reduce production cost (Figure 26). In 1970/71, 
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soybean farmers invested $0.5 million in domestic production research activities and 
production research expenditure has grown to $52.2 million by 2011/12 (Figure 26). By 
1970/71, about 46.9% of total checkoff research funds went to Cornbelt region, 19.8% to 
Plains regions, 17.2% to Delta region, 8.4% to Atlantic region, 7.8% to Lakes region and 
little or no expenditure to South and Other regions. By 2011/12, about 47.3% of total 
checkoff research funds went to Cornbelt region, 13.4% to Delta regions, 12.4% to 
Plains region, 10.0% to Lakes region, 8.7% to Atlantic region, and 7.5% to South region 
(Figure 26).  
 During the period of 1970/71 through 2011/12, annual expenditures on 
production research in Cornbelt region have increased a hundredfold from $243 
thousand to $24.7 million and annual expenditures on production research in Delta 
region have increased almost 78 times from $89 thousand to $7.0 million (Figure 26). 
Over that period, annual expenditures on production research in Plains region increased 
more than sixtyfold from $103 thousand in 1970/71 to $6.5 million in 2011/12 and 
annual expenditures on production research in Lakes region increased from $40 
thousand in 1970/71 to $5.2 million in 2011/12. Over the same period, annual 
expenditures on production research in Atlantic region increased from $43 thousand to 
$4.5 million and annual expenditures on production research in South region increased 
from almost zero to $3.9 million. 
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Figure 26. Total Production Research Expenditures by Regions, 1970/71-2011/12 
 
Source: author's analysis of USB’s expenditure record 
 
Domestic Promotion Program Expenditure 
 Between 1994/95 and 2011/12, $257 million were invested in domestic 
promotion programs to enhance domestic uses of soybeans and soybean products. Over 
the same period, checkoff funds invested for domestic promotion increased from $1.3 
million in 1994/95 to $31.7 million in 2011/12 (Figure 27). In the 1990s, most domestic 
expenditure funds were invested for promotion demand of soymeal and soyoil. There 
was little investment for soybean promotion. However, after 2000/01, soybean 
promotion share increased until late 2000s. By 2011/12, soyoil accounted for 59% and 
soymeal accounted for 29.4% of domestic promotion with soybeans only 11.6% (Figure 
27).  
 
 74 
 
Figure 27. National Level Expenditures on Domestic Promotion Programs, 1994/95-
2011/12 
 
Source: author's analysis of USB’s expenditure record 
 
 From $406 thousand in 1994/95, checkoff funds for soyoil increased to $18.7 
million in 2011/12 (Figure 27). Between 1994/95 and 1997/98, checkoff funds for 
soymeal grew from $865 thousand to $9.3 million but declined until the early-2000s. 
With an emphasis on development for new uses of soymeal, checkoff expenditure 
increased from $754 thousand in 2001/02 to $9.3 million in 2011/12. The expenditure 
for soybeans reached a high of $5.7 million in 2008/2009 but declined to $3.7 million in 
2011/12.  
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CHAPTER III  
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
 The primary objective of most commodity checkoff programs is to foster the 
growth and profitability of the production of that commodity. Individual producers 
contributing to the program expect that the benefits of downstream checkoff activities 
will transmit upstream to them such that they are individually better off than they would 
have been without the checkoff program. The producer benefits of most federally 
mandated checkoff programs have been analyzed, some on multiple occasions as 
required by the 1996 Farm Bill. In conducting those analyses, however, many 
researchers often make simplifying assumptions about the nature of the upstream 
transmission of the benefits of checkoff programs that could affect the measured returns 
to producers. 
 After considering the various simplifying assumptions made in the analyses of 
the benefits of various checkoff programs, this chapter then provides a graphical analysis 
of the upstream transmission of the benefits of the U.S. soybean checkoff program to 
soybean producers in which the simplifying assumptions made by others are relaxed.  
The chapter then proposes a model to measure the effects of the simplifying assumptions 
on the upstream transmission of the benefits of the soybean checkoff program.   
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Simplifying Assumptions Often Made in the Analyses of Checkoff Programs 
 Among the most common simplifying assumptions made in analyses of 
commodity checkoff programs include: (1) no supply response (inelastic supply), (2) no 
price effects (elastic supply), (3) no government intervention in the related commodity 
markets (free markets), (4) no free riders, (5) no domestic supply chain effects, (6) no 
global supply chain effects, (7) no checkoff investments in production research (only in 
demand promotion), and (8) no promotion programs at multiple levels of the supply 
chain (promotion occurs at only the retail level of the market). 
 
Common Simplifying Assumption #1: No supply response  
 In some analyses of commodity checkoff programs, such as Goddard and 
Conboy (1993) who analyzed the effects of generic promotion of U.S. beef exports to 
Japan using a meat demand system, supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. Under 
this assumption, a checkoff-promotion-induced change in demand can lead only to a 
price effect. That is, there is no supply response and, therefore, no quantity impact of the 
promotion.  Figure 28 illustrates the implications of a checkoff promotion for producer 
benefits in the case of soybeans under the assumption of a perfectly inelastic supply 
curve.  
 Before any checkoff investment to promote the demand for soybeans is made, the 
market is in initial equilibrium at point A where supply equals demand, the soybean 
price is BP, and the quantity of soybeans produced and demanded is Q. The soybean 
supply curve initially is assumed to be perfectly inelastic (BSd in Figure 28). The 
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investment of checkoff funds to promote soybean demand shifts the demand curve from 
BDf to BD’f and raises the soybean price to BP’X which has no effect on soybean sales 
given the inelasticity of the supply curve. Producer surplus increases by the area 
BPACBP’X. If the supply curve is assumed to be more price elastic (such as BSe in 
Figure 28), the same promotion-induced-increase in soybean demand from BDf to BD’f  
drives price to only BP’Y while increasing soybean sales to Q’ and adding the area 
BPABBP’Y to producer surplus. 
 
Figure 28. The Effects of Assuming No Supply Response (inelastic supply) 
 
 
 In general, with the more inelastic demand such as a demand for agricultural 
commodity, the gain in producer surplus with a sloped supply curve is less than the gain 
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in the case of a perfectly inelastic supply curve. The difference in the producer surplus 
between the two scenarios is the area of the rectangle BP’YDCBP’X minus the area of the 
triangle ABD. 
 The inelastic supply curve may be considered to be the short-run supply curve 
while the more elastic supply curve may be considered to be the long-run supply curve.  
Studies of the effects of checkoff-funded demand promotion expenditures for 
commodities like beef often assume (correctly) that supply is inelastic in the short run 
and proceed with the promotion impact analysis but then ignore the longer run 
consequences of promotion on beef price and sales (i.e., supply response is ignored).  
Checkoff promotion over time may have market effects that carryover into the long run 
when production can respond to the price effects of the promotion.  Sustained promotion 
over time compounds the long-run effects. As a consequence, assuming a perfectly 
price-inelastic supply curve can lead to erroneous conclusions about the producer 
benefits of demand enhancement through checkoff promotion.  
 
Common Simplifying Assumption #2: No price response (perfectly elastic supply)  
 Rather than assuming no supply response, some commodity checkoff studies 
assume just the opposite, an infinite supply response with a perfectly elastic supply 
curve. Studies that adopt a single equation approach often assume supply is perfectly 
elastic (e.g., Armah and Epperson 1997; Schmit and Kaiser 1998; Capps and Williams 
2008; Rusmevichientong and Kaiser 2009; and Williams, Capps, and Dang 2010). The 
advantage of this approach is that the researcher avoids the problem of a promotion-
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induced price change and the complication of having to account for the simultaneity in 
supply response, cross-commodity effects, and supply chain impacts. The justification is 
often that the measured quantity effects of the promotion are likely to be too small to 
have any measureable effect on market price. 
 Figure 29 illustrates the implications of a checkoff promotion for producer 
benefits in the case of soybeans under the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply curve   
(BSd) which does not allow for a price response to a promotion-induced shift in the 
demand curve. Before promotion, the initial equilibrium is at again point A with price 
BP and sales of Q. Suppose checkoff expenditures are invested to promote demand 
which shifts the demand curve from BDf to BD’f.  With a perfectly elastic supply curve, 
price is unaffected but sales increase from Q to Q’’.  With a more inelastic supply curve 
(BSe), the same promotion-induced demand shift generates a new equilibrium at point B 
where the supply curve intersects the higher demand curve (BD’f). Soybean sales 
increase from Q to only Q’ rather than to Q” and soybean price rises from BP to BP’. 
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Figure 29. The Effects of Assuming No Price Response (elastic supply) 
 
 
 The implications of relaxing the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply curve 
are clear – price increases and the sales increase is less than with a perfectly elastic 
supply curve. The implications for the measurement of producer benefits are also clear.  
With a less than perfectly elastic supply curve, a checkoff-induced demand increase 
generates additional producer surplus of BPABBP’.  In contrast, with a perfectly elastic 
supply curve, such a demand increase has no effect on producer surplus. Consequently, 
assuming no price response basically assumes that there is no benefit to producers from 
promotion and, thus, could lead to a serious underestimate of the benefit of checkoff 
promotion to producers if the supply curve is, in fact, less than perfectly elastic. 
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Common Simplifying Assumption #3: No government intervention (free markets)  
 Government interventions have played a major role in many countries with 
various objectives such as increasing domestic supplies at reasonable prices, supporting 
farm revenues and income, the protection of domestic production from import 
competition, and the stimulation of exports. Many analyses of checkoff programs ignore 
the fact that farm price levels are supported or otherwise distorted by government 
policies. However, the transmission of the benefits of checkoff expenditures up the 
supply chain to producers can depend critically on the nature of government intervention 
in the agricultural sector. For the cotton checkoff program, for example, Williams et al. 
(2011) found that the U.S. taxpayer was the primary beneficiary of the program in many 
years. Despite substantial investments by cotton producers in the retail promotion of 
cotton products over the years, they found that the deficiency payment, counter-cyclical, 
and marketing loan programs in place over those years meant that the higher cotton 
prices generated by the cotton checkoff expenditures lead to farm program cost savings 
rather than increases in cotton producer revenues. Trade policies and domestic policies 
in other countries can also distort market signals along the global supply chain  
(Williams and Thompson 1984). 
 Figure 30 illustrates the importance of government intervention in the 
transmission of benefits to producers from commodity checkoff programs. Assume in 
Figure 30 that the farm price is supported by a non-recourse loan program or a counter-
cyclical payment, price-loss coverage, a marketing loan, or similar program. Under any 
of those programs, production will be at Q which is in excess of the equilibrium 
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production level of Q’. The market price will be at BP above the equilibrium price of BP’ 
for a non-recourse loan program or at BP’’ below the equilibrium price for the other 
types of government intervention. With a non-recourse loan program, the government 
essentially purchases the quantity DB off the market to keep the price supported at BP.  
With the other government programs, the government pays the farmer the difference 
between the announced price support (BP) and the market price (BP’’). 
 
Figure 30. The Effects of Assuming No Government Intervention to Support Farm 
Price and Revenue 
 
 
 If checkoff expenditures then shift out the demand curve to BDg’, the market 
surplus for the government to purchase disappears under the non-recourse loan program. 
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Under the other programs, the market price rises to the support price level eliminating 
any government payments to farmers.  In either case, neither the production nor the per 
unit revenue earned by the farmer changes so none of the benefit of the checkoff 
program accrues to producers.  Instead, the checkoff program reduces government costs 
so that the taxpayer is the beneficiary of the checkoff program. Obviously, ignoring the 
effects of government intervention in the market in these cases could lead to the 
erroneous conclusion of a positive benefit to producers of the area BP’ABBP when, in 
fact, taxpayers realize all the benefits and none transmit up the supply chain to producers. 
 
Common Simplifying Assumption #4: No Free Riders  
 Another common implicit if not explicit assumption in the analysis of checkoff 
programs is that there are no free riders.  This assumption is sometimes implicitly made, 
for example, in using a single demand function to estimate the relationship between 
demand and checkoff expenditures when imports are an important source of supply in 
the market. More sophisticated empirical approaches to the analysis checkoff programs, 
however, also suffer from a similar problem.  For example, a number of researchers, 
including Kinnucan and Cai (2011) and Beach et al. (2002), have examined the effects 
of checkoff-financed export promotion using a domestic sector model and an export 
demand equation to close the model. Export demand models have long been known to 
seriously underestimate the price elasticity of export demand (Orcutt, 1950; Gardiner 
and Dixit, 1987; and Reimer, Zheng, and Gehlhar, 2012 ). To the extent that such 
models also underestimate the supply response of foreign export competitors to the price 
 84 
 
changes generated by domestic demand promotion, the effects of free riders in 
international markets are also underestimated. 
 
Figure 31. The Effects of Free-riders 
 
 
 Figure 31 illustrates the free rider problem for the U.S. as a soybean exporting 
country and the impact of ignoring or underestimating the free rider effects. Before 
promotion, the initial equilibrium is at again point A with price BP and sales of Q. If the 
export competition facing the U.S. from Brazil and Argentina is ignored, then any 
promotion induced increase in world demand for soybeans would have no effect on 
soybean exports from Brazil and Argentina. Without free riders, the promotion shifts the 
demand curve from BDf to BD’’f. Soybean sales increase from Q to Q’’ and soybean 
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price rises from BP to BP’’. With free riders, the promotion shifts the demand curve 
from BDf to BD’f. Soybean sales increase from Q to only Q’ rather than to Q” and 
soybean price rises from BP to BP’. The increase in U.S. soybean sales in this case 
would likely be less than in the case of no free rider response. Thus, both the value and 
volume of U.S. soybean exports would be lower than in the case of no free rider 
response and likely result in lower gains to U.S. producers than in the case of no free 
rider response. 
 
Common Simplifying Assumption #5: No Domestic Supply Chain Effects  
 Some analyses of checkoff programs ignore the fact that many commodities 
promoted with checkoff funds are components of often lengthy domestic supply chains. 
Consequently, their analyses ignore the potentially important checkoff-promotion-
induced simultaneous interactions among different levels of the supply chain on the 
transmission of benefits to producers.  The case of soybeans and its joint products, 
soymeal and soyoil, provides a clear example of the domestic supply chain problem. 
 Figure 32 represents the U.S. soybean and product chain in which the top set of 
supply and demand curves represent the soybean market, the middle set represents the 
soybean meal market, and the bottom set represents the soybean oil market. Note in the 
top graph that the equilibrium quantity of soybeans processed (BQ) at the equilibrium 
market price (BP) results in a supply of soybean meal and a supply of soybean oil 
represented by the vertical lines marked MS and OS, respectively in the bottom two 
graphs of Figure 32.  The vertical nature of the MS and OS curves in Figure 32 reflects 
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the fact that when soybeans are processed, a fixed amount of meal and oil are produced 
and that the quantity of meal and oil supplied to the market cannot change as their prices 
change unless the volume of soybeans processed changes first. 
 Now, if domestic soybean use is promoted leading to a rightward shift in the 
demand for soybeans from BD to BD’ in the top graph of Figure 32, the consequence is 
not only an initial increase of soybean price to BP’ and an increase in soybean crush to 
BQ’ but also an increase in the supply of soymeal to MS’ in the middle graph of Figure 
32 and of soyoil to OS’ in the lower graph of Figure 32.  The result is lower prices in the 
markets for both joint products (MP’ in the soymeal market and OP’ in the soybean oil 
market). The lower prices for the soybean products reduces the profitability of 
processing soybeans (i.e., soybean crush margin declines) which shifts the soybean 
demand curve back somewhat to the left in the top graph of Figure 32. The process of 
simultaneous interactions between the soybean level of the supply chain and the soybean 
product levels of the supply chain continues until an equilibrium is reached. The 
equilibrium will occur at a soybean demand curve somewhere like BD” between BD and  
BD’. Thus, ignoring the supply chain effects leads to an overestimate of the price, 
quantity, and soybean producer surplus effects of the demand promotion. 
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Figure 32. The Effects of Domestic Supply Chain Interactions 
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Common Simplifying Assumption #6: No Global Supply Chain Effects  
 Just as there are domestic supply chain effects from promoting commodities with 
checkoff funds, there are also global supply chain effects as well.  The same shift of the 
demand curve in Figure 32 from promotion can have effects across the entire global 
soybean and products supply chain as the demand shift affects prices and trade of 
soybeans, meal, and oil.  Failure to account for those effects can also seriously bias the 
calculation of producer benefits from checkoff promotion. 
 
Common Simplifying Assumption #7: Checkoff Investments are Made only in Demand 
Promotion (No Checkoff Investments in Production Research)  
 The analyses of many checkoff programs for beef, dairy products, eggs, mangos, 
and a number of others analyze only the promotion effects of checkoff programs and 
ignore the fact that those programs simultaneously invest in production research with the 
objective of boosting producer profits through technological advances that reduce their 
production costs and/or boost their yields. 
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Figure 33. Market Effects of Simultaneous Checkoff Investments in Demand 
Promotion and Production Research 
 
 
 From a market perspective, if such research-induced technological advances are 
adopted by a majority of producers, the effect is an increase in the market supply of the 
commodity. While analyses of the separate effects of checkoff investments in research 
and in demand promotion may be instructive, such analyses ignore the tendency for the 
two types of investments to push market price in opposite directions when applied at the 
same time as illustrated in Figure 33. Before promotion, the initial equilibrium is at 
again point A with price BP and sales of Q.  On its own, checkoff-funded demand 
promotion would tend to shift demand to BD’f and increase price to BP’ from BP in 
Figure 33.  On the other hand, checkoff-funded research, on its own, would tend to shift 
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out supply to BS’e and reduce price to BP’’. Funded at the same time, however, the price 
increasing effects of demand promotion are muted by the price-reducing effects of 
supply enhancement from research investments. The net effects on price could be higher, 
lower, or just about the same as the initial price (BP) depending on the relative shifts of 
the demand and supply curves as result of checkoff activities. While the two types of 
investments work together to generate more production and sales (from Q to Q’’ in 
Figure 33), they work against each other in their effects on price.  Clearly, ignoring the 
effects of checkoff investments in production research could lead to a serious 
overestimation of the benefits of a checkoff program to producers. Williams, Shumway 
and Love ( 2002) warned about this problem.  More recently, Williams, Capps, and Lee 
(2014) have demonstrated that the investment strategy of the United Soybean Board over 
the years of increasing the share of checkoff funds invested in production research while 
reducing the share invested in demand promotion (domestic and foreign) has slowly 
erased the positive price effects reported for the program in earlier years. 
 
Common Simplifying Assumption #8: Promotion Occurs Only at the Retail Level of the 
Supply Chain (No Promotion Programs at Multiple Levels of the Supply Chain)  
 The soybean checkoff program invests not only in the promotion of soybeans but 
also in the promotion of soybean oil and soybean meal, joint products of the processing 
of soybeans. In fact, the demand for soybeans is derived from the demand for its joint 
products. Some analyses of checkoff programs ignore the fact that many commodities 
promoted with checkoff funds occurs at multiple levels of the supply chains. 
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Consequently, their analyses ignore the potentially important checkoff-promotion-
induced simultaneous interactions among different levels of the supply chain on the 
transmission of benefits to producers.   
 For example, if the demand for soybeans and its joint products are promoted, the 
consequence is higher soybean price, lower soymeal and soyoil prices but more quantity 
of soybeans produced and consumed as shown in the column of graphs on the left side of 
Figure 34. In those graphs, the top set of supply and demand curves represent the 
soybean market, the middle set represents the soybean meal market, and the bottom set 
represents the soybean oil market. Note in the top graph that the quantity of soybeans 
processed (BQ) at the market price (BP) results in a supply of soybean meal and a 
supply of soybean oil represented by the vertical lines marked MS and OS, respectively. 
The vertical nature of the MS and OS curves in Figure 34 reflects the fact that when 
soybeans are processed, a fixed amount of meal and oil are produced and that the 
quantity of meal and oil supplied to the market cannot change as their prices change 
unless the volume of soybeans processed changes first. 
 If the demand for soymeal and soyoil are promoted with checkoff funds, the 
result is a rightward shift of the soymeal and soyoil demand curves from MD to MD’ 
and from OD to OD’, respectively. As a result, prices of soymeal and soyoil increase 
from MP to MP’ and from OP to OP’ in the top left graph of Figure 34. The higher 
prices of joint products results in a rightward shift in the demand for soybeans from BD 
to BD’ in the top left graph of Figure 34.  At the same time, the increased volume of 
soybeans processed increases the supply of soymeal from MS to MS’ and of soyoil from 
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SO to SO’. The result is lower prices in the markets for both joint products. The lower 
prices for the soybean products reduces the profitability of processing soybeans (i.e., 
soybean crush margin declines) which shifts the soybean demand curve back somewhat 
to the left in the top graph of Figure 34. If the demand for soybeans is promoted 
sametime with checkoff funds, the result is a rightward shift of the soybean demand 
curve to BD’’ in the top left graph of Figure 34. As a result, the price of soybeans 
increases from BP’ to BP’’. The process of simultaneous interactions between the 
soybean level of the supply chain and the soybean product levels of the supply chain 
continues until an equilibrium is reached. The equilibrium will occur at a soybean 
demand curve somewhere between BD’ and BD’’. The equilibrium price will occur at 
somewhere between BP’ and BP’’. 
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Figure 34. Market Effects of Promotion Occurs Only at the Retail Level of the 
Supply Chain 
 
 
 Rather than promoting soybeans and soybean products in the multilevel markets, 
the checkoff promotion could focus on promoting the demand for the joint products. In 
the right hand column of graphs in Figure 34, which also represents the markets for 
soybeans and its joint products, the demand for both joint products are assumed to be 
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promoted rather than soybeans. The resulting increased demand for soymeal and soyoil 
are represented by shifts of the soymeal and soyoil demand curves from MD to MD’ and  
in the middle and bottom graphs of the right hand column of graphs in Figure 34. The 
result is an initial increase in prices of soymeal and soyoil to MP’ and OP’. Higher prices 
increase the crush margin for soybean processors and leads to an increase in the demand 
for soybeans for processing (a shift of the soybean demand curve from BD to BD’ in the 
top right panel of Figure 34). The increase in processing, however, increases the supply 
of both soybean meal and soybean oil to SM’ and SO’, respectively, in the right hand 
column of graphs in Figure 34. The increase in the soymeal and soyoil supply moderates 
the initial joint prices increase to some extent resulting in a somewhat lower prices like 
MP’’ and OP’’. The lower prices for the soybean products shifts the soybean demand 
curve back somewhat like BD” between BD and BD’ to the right in the top graph of 
Figure 34. The equilibrium soybean price will occur at somewhere like between BP and 
BP’. Thus, ignoring the promotion programs at multiple levels of the supply chain 
effects leads to an overestimate of the price, quantity, and soybean producer surplus 
effects of the demand promotion. 
 
The Conceptual Model of World Soybean and Product Markets 
 An analysis of the simultaneous effects of the soybean checkoff investments in 
U.S. soybean production research and in the promotion of the domestic and foreign 
demands for soybeans and soybean products requires an empirical model that accounts 
for the way in which U.S. and world soybean and soybean product markets function.  
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Once that model is developed, it can be used to analyze the implications of the many 
simplifying assumptions made in the analyses of checkoff programs for the transmission 
of benefits to producers. 
 The conceptual model of world soybean markets to be used in the analysis in 
later chapters is based on the work by Williams (1985) and updated versions of that 
model (Williams 1999; Williams, Shumway, and Love 2002; Williams, Capps, and 
Bessler 2009; Williams et al. 1998; and Williams, Capps, and Lee, 2014). The world 
soybean and products market model developed to be used in this analysis will include 
three soybean and soybean product exporting regions (U.S., Brazil, and Argentina) and 
four soybean and soybean product importing regions (China, Japan, EU, and a rest-of-
the-world region).  The soybean, soymeal and soyoil markets in the model are linked 
within each region and between regions. The model allows for the simultaneous 
determination of the supplies, demands, prices, and trade of soybeans, soymeal, and 
soyoil in all regions. For each region, soybean, soymeal and soyoil sectors contain 
behavioral relationships specifying the manner in supply and demand responds to 
changes in key variables including the prices of soybeans and soybean products, prices 
of competing commodities, technology, weather, income, livestock production, 
government policy, etc. as appropriate. Soybean checkoff expenditures impact the 
appropriate supply and demand functions in the model. 
 Figure 35 provides a conceptual representation of the world soybean market. For 
graphical simplicity, the model considers only two exporting regions, the U.S. and other 
exporting countries (RX), and an importing country region (IM). Also, exchange rates, 
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transportation costs, and government interventions are ignored for analytical simplicity.  
Finally, we assume perfectly competitive markets. 
 The top row of graphs in Figure 35 represents soybean markets while the middle 
row represents soymeal markets and the bottom row represents soyoil markets. The 
supply of soybeans in each country (BSUS, BSRX, and BSIM for the U.S., other exporting 
countries, and importing countries, respectively) is upward sloping, indicating that a 
higher soybean price leads to an increase in the quantity of soybeans supplied to the 
market over time. Soybeans are mainly processed by the soybean crushing industry to 
produce soymeal and soyoil.  Small amounts of soybeans are also demanded for feed, 
food, and inventory purposes. The crush demand for soybeans in each country (BDUS, 
BDRX, and BDIM for the U.S., other exporting countries, and importing countries) is 
downward sloping implying that a higher soybean price reduces the quantity of soybeans 
demanded for processing. The crush demand for soybeans also is affected by other 
variables such as the prices of soybean products and processing capacity in the 
corresponding country. Soybean excess supply (BES) and soybean excess demand (BED) 
are calculated as the difference between domestic soybean supply and demand schedules 
in the respective regions. 
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Figure 35. The Graphical Representation of the World Soybean Market  
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 The horizontal summation of the excess supplies of soybeans by exporting 
countries is the world soybean excess supply (ΣBES).  The horizontal summation of the 
excess demands for soybeans by importing countries is the world soybean excess 
demand (ΣBED). The equilibrium world soybean price (BPW) and equilibrium volume 
of trade (BQ
T
W) are determined at the intersection of ΣBES and ΣBED. Given the price 
of soybeans, the volume of soybean crushed in the U.S. is BQ
D
US is crushed, and exports 
are the difference between U.S. soybean production and consumption (BQ
S
US – BQ
D
US). 
In importing countries, BQ
S
IM is volume of soybeans produced in those countries,  
BQ
D
IM is the volume consumed, and imports are the difference between consumption 
and production (BQ
D
IM – BQ
S
IM).  
 In all countries, soybeans are crushed to produce soyoil and soymeal. Extraction 
rates may vary across countries depending upon the oil and protein content of the 
soybeans and crushing technology. In each importing and exporting country/region in 
the model, once the crush volume of soybeans is determined, the volume of soymeal and 
soyoil produced is proportionally fixed. The vertical nature of the soybean meal and oil 
supply curves in Figure 35 is a graphical device to indicate that the quantity of soybean 
products supplied can only change in any country or region when the soybean price 
increases if soybean crushers first respond to the change in the soybean price by 
demanding more soybeans to produce additional soybean products. When that occurs, 
the vertical soybean meal and oil curves then shift to reflect the effects of the soybean 
price change on soybean crush and, therefore, the volume produced of soymeal and 
soyoil. 
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 In soymeal and soyoil exporting countries/regions, the differences between the 
domestic supplies and demands for each soybean product are their excess supplies (MES 
and OES).  Excess demands for soybean products in importing countries/regions are the 
differences between their respective domestic demands and supplies (MED and OED). 
Given the derived demand nature of soybeans, the crush demand for soybeans in each 
country/region shifts left or right depending on changes in the prices of the soymeal and 
soyoil joint products. Higher world soymeal or soyoil prices, for example, enhance the 
profitability of crushing soybeans and, thus, increase the domestic crush demand for 
soybeans.  
 In the world soymeal market, the horizontal summation of soymeal excess 
supplies from exporting countries is the world soymeal excess supply curve (ΣMES in 
Figure 35).  The horizontal summation of the excess demands for soymeal by importing 
countries is the world soymeal excess demand curve (ΣMED). The equilibrium world 
soymeal price (MPW) and the equilibrium volume of soymeal traded (MQ
T
WD) are 
determined at the intersection of ΣMES and ΣMED. Given the equilibrium price of 
soymeal (MPW), MQ
D
US of soymeal is consumed domestically in the U.S., MQ
S
US is 
volume of soymeal produced in the U.S., and the difference (MQ
D
IM – MQ
D
US) is the 
volume of U.S. soymeal exported. For importing countries, MQ
S
IM is the volume of 
soymeal produced domestically, (MQ
D
IM) is the volume of soymeal consumed in those 
countries, and the difference (MQ
D
IM – MQ
S
IM) is volume of soymeal imported by those 
countries.  
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 The same derivation also applies to the U.S., importing and other exporting 
country soyoil markets. The horizontal summation of soyoil excess supplies from all 
exporting countries is the world soyoil excess supply curve (ΣOES) in Figure 34. The 
horizontal summation of excess soyoil demands by importing countries is the world 
soyoil excess demand curve (ΣOED). The equilibrium world soyoil price (OPW) and the 
equilibrium world volume of soyoil traded (OQ
T
W) are determined at the intersection of 
ΣOES and ΣOED. Given OPW, OQ
D
US is volume of soyoil consumed in the U.S., OQ
S
US 
is the volume produced in the U.S., and difference (OQ
S
US – OQ
D
US) is volume of U.S. 
soyoil exported.  For importing countries, OQ
S
IM is the volume of soyoil produced 
domestically, (OQ
D
IM) is the volume of soyoil consumed in those countries, and the 
difference (OQ
D
IM – OQ
S
IM) is volume of soyoil imported by those countries. 
 
Graphical Analysis of Checkoff Expenditure Effects 
 Soybean checkoff expenditures are made to: (1) enhance U.S. soybean 
production through investments in production research, (2) promote domestic U.S. 
demands for soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean oil, and (3) promote foreign demands 
for soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil. As depicted in Figure 35, production research 
investments of soybean checkoff funds are intended to expand the U.S. area under 
soybean production as well as to boost soybean productivity leading to a rightward shift 
of the U.S. soybean supply curve (shift (a) shown in Figure 35).  Domestic promotion of 
soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil intend to shift out the U.S. demands for the three 
commodities (shifts (b), (d), and (f) shown in Figure 35). The international marketing 
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investments of soybean checkoff funds are intended toshift out the demand for all three 
products in importing countries (shifts (c), (e), and (g) in Figure 35).  The net effect of 
all shifts (a) through (g) in Figure 35 on U.S. and world markets is graphically 
intractable and depends critically on various factors, including the price elasticities of 
supply and demand in importing and exporting countries, the size of the respective 
checkoff investments (and, thus, the shifts of the corresponding curves), and the 
responsiveness of supply and demand in the U.S. and importing countries to checkoff 
investments (i.e., the relative checkoff investment elasticities).  
 To provide some insights into the likely market effects of the various types of 
checkoff investments, this section graphically analyzes the effects of each independently 
of the others.  The analysis of the simultaneous effects of all checkoff investments at all 
levels of the market requires an empirical analysis.  Following this discuss, a conceptual 
model capable of analyzing those simultaneous effects is proposed. 
 
Soybean Checkoff Expenditures in Soybean Markets  
 The market effects of soybean checkoff expenditures are complicated since 
investments are made to enhance soybean production as well as to promote both 
domestic and foreign soybean demand. Figure 36 shows illustrates the effects of 
checkoff investments only in soybean production research. Figure 36 as well as 
subsequent figures in this chapter represent “soybean products” rather than soymeal and 
soyoil separately when distinguishing between the effects on the two joint product 
markets is not of interest. 
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Soybean Checkoff Investments in U.S. Soybean Production Research 
 A checkoff investment in production research leads to either cost-reducing or 
yield enhancing effects on soybean production shown as a shift to the right and/or down 
of the U.S. soybean supply curve (BSUS) and, therefore, of the U.S. excess supply of 
soybeans which shifts the world excess supply of soybeans (ΣBES in Figure 36) to the 
right. As a consequence, the world price of soybeans declines and the world trade in 
soybeans increases. The lower world soybean price results in an increase in the quantity 
of soybeans crushed and, therefore, in the supply of soybean products in all countries.  
  
Figure 36. Checkoff Expenditure Invested in Production Research  
 
 
 The subsequent increase in the domestic production of soybean products in all 
countries results in an increase in the U.S. excess supply of soybean products by the U.S. 
and other exporting countries and a decline in the excess demand for soybean products 
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by importing countries. The consequence is an unambiguous decline in the prices of 
soybean products and an ambiguous change in the world volume of soybean product 
trade. The soybean product price decline reduces the crush margin in all countries and 
shifts crush demand curves to the left in all countries somewhat, moderating the soybean 
price decline to some extent (not shown in Figure 36). Thus, while soybean-checkoff-
funded soybean production research is expected to increase U.S. soybean exports at a 
lower price, the prices of soybean products also decline and soymeal consumption 
increases in all countries with an indeterminate effect of soybean product exports. 
 
Soybean Checkoff Investments in the Promotion of U.S. Soybean Demand  
 Soybean checkoff expenditures to boost domestic soybean demand shifts the 
domestic demand for soybean curve (BDUS in Figure 37) to the right (shift (b) in Figure 
37).  Consequently, the world excess supply of soybeans (ΣBES) declines which 
pressures the world price of soybeans upward. The higher soybean price squeezes the 
crush margin in importing countries resulting in a decline in the crush volume in those 
countries while the crush volume in the U.S. increases. 
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Figure 37. Checkoff Expenditure Invested in U.S. Soybean Demand Promotion  
 
 
 The changes in soybean crush volume will affect the production and prices of 
soybean products in each country. In the U.S., the increase in soybean crush increases 
soybean product supply and U.S. excess supplies of soybean products.  Just the opposite 
happens in importing countries with a decline in the volume of soybeans crush and, 
therefore, a decline in the domestic production of soybean products and increase in the 
excess demand for soybean products.  Consequently, exports of soybean products 
unambiguously increase but the effect on the price of soybean products is indeterminate. 
Thus, the domestic promotion of U.S. soybean demand increases the soybean price, 
expands the domestic use of soybeans, and substitutes increased exports of soybean 
products for the reduced exports of soybeans. 
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Soybean Checkoff Investments in the Foreign Demand for Soybeans 
 Soybean checkoff investments in promoting the foreign demand for soybeans has 
the opposite effects on U.S. domestic soybean demand and exports and U.S. soybean 
product exports from that of the promotion of the domestic demand for soybeans.  The 
foreign promotion of soybean demand shifts the foreign demand for soybeans (BDIM in 
Figure 38) to the right (shift (c) in Figure 38).  The result is an increase in world soybean 
excess demand (ΣBED to ΣBED’) which results in higher world price of soybeans.  
 
Figure 38. Checkoff Expenditure Invested in Promoting Foreign Soybean Demand  
 
 
 The higher world soybean price results in the shortfall in soybean crush demand 
in each country. Consequently, the U.S. crush volume of soybean declines while the 
demand for soybeans in an importing country increases. The result is an increase in 
productions of soybean products in an importing country and a simultaneous decline in 
soybean product production in the U.S. Thus, U.S. soybean product export supplies 
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decline at the same time that the soybean product import demand in an importing 
country declines. The result is an unambiguous decline in world soybean product trade 
and an indeterminate effect on the price of soybean products. So the promotion of the 
demand for soybeans in an importing country tends to trade off increased U.S. soybean 
exports for reduced U.S. soybean product exports. 
 
Soybean Checkoff Expenditure Investment in Soybean Product Markets  
 Soybean checkoff expenditure to promote U.S. soybean products demand shifts 
the soybean products demand curve (PDUS in Figure 39) to the right (shift (d) in Figure 
39) which reduces U.S. soybean products exports and pressures the soybean products 
price upwards. The leftward shift of excess supply of soybean products export country 
leads to a higher world soybean products price. The higher soybean products price 
increases the crush margin in all countries resulting in a rightward shift of the soybean 
demand curve in all countries. The soybean price increases with an indeterminate effect 
on U.S. soybean exports.  At the same time, as the soybean crush demand increases in 
each country, the production of soymeal in all countries increases as well.  The result is a 
smaller increase in the soybean products price and domestic consumption and a smaller 
decline in soymeal exports than originally shown.  
 The analysis of soybean checkoff expenditures to promote the foreign demand 
for soybean products is similar to that of the promotion of domestic demand except that 
the result is a decrease in domestic consumption of soymeal and an increase in U.S. 
exports of soymeal (shift (e) in Figure 40).   
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Figure 39. Soybean Checkoff Expenditures to Promote U.S. Soybean Products 
Demand  
 
         
Figure 40. Soybean Checkoff Expenditures to Promote Foreign Soybean Products 
Demand  
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CHAPTER IV  
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATION, DATA, AND VALIDATION 
 
 To measure the returns to soybean checkoff program investments in research and 
demand promotion and to analyze the effects of the simplifying assumption used in other 
checkoff analyses on the transmission of benefits to producers, the first step is to isolate 
the effects of those investments in domestic and foreign soybean and soybean product 
markets from those of other events that may have affected those same markets over the 
years. For this purpose, a world model of soybeans and soybean product trade which 
includes soybean checkoff research, domestic promotion, and foreign demand promotion 
stock variables as explanatory variables is first constructed. The world soybean and 
soybean products model developed is presented and the econometric estimates of the 
model parameters are discussed, the data used are described, and the model is validated 
through simulation analysis.  In the next chapter, the results of simulating the model over 
the 1980/81-2012/13 period under alternative assumptions regarding soybean checkoff 
research and domestic and international market promotion investments are reported. The 
results used to analyze the implications of those assumptions for the calculation of the 
transmission of the benefits to producers. 
 
The Structural Model of World Soybean and Products Markets  
 The analysis of the transmission of returns to producers from the soybean 
checkoff program and the impacts of alternative assumptions on those returns in this 
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study utilizes a 194-equation, annual econometric, non-spatial, price equilibrium 
simulation model of world soybean and soybean product markets. The model develop 
and presented here is based on the world soybean and products model known as 
SOYMOD developed by Williams (1981) and used over the years to analyze various 
issues related to world soybean and products markets (see, for example, Williams and 
Thompson 1984, Williams 1985, Williams 1994, Williams 1999, Williams Shumway, 
and Love 2002, and Williams, Capps, and Bessler 2009, and Williams, Capps, and Lee 
2014 for more details on SOYMOD). Because it has its roots in the early work of Houck, 
Ryan, and Subotnik (1972), SOYMOD is similar in form and specification to the world 
oilseed models utilized by FAPRI/CARD (2014), Meilke and Griffith (1983), and 
Meilke, Wensley, and Cluff (2001). 
 The model developed in this study allows for the simultaneous determination of 
the supplies, demands, prices, and trade of soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil in seven major 
world trading regions: (1) the United States, (2) Brazil, (3) Argentina, (4) the European 
Union, (5) Japan, (6) China, and (7) a Rest-of-the-World region which accounts for the 
effects of primarily smaller, new demand growth areas in world soybean markets. The 
domestic market of each region in the model is divided into four simultaneous blocks of 
equations: (1) a soybean block, (2) a soybean meal block, (3) a soybean oil block, and (4) 
an excess supply or excess demand block (Figure 41).   
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Figure 41. Structure of World Soybean and Soybean Products Model 
 
 Source: Williams, Capps, and Bessler 2009
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 For each region, the first three blocks contain behavioral relationships specifying 
the manner in which soybean supply (acreage planted, acreage harvested, soybean yields, 
and production), soybean domestic demand (crush and stocks), and the supply, 
consumption, and stocks of soybean meal and soybean oil behave in response to changes 
in variables like prices of soybeans and products, prices of various competing 
commodities, technology, income, livestock production and prices, government policy, 
etc. as appropriate. 
 For the U.S., the soybean block contains regional rather than national acreage 
planted, acreage harvested, yield, and production equations (equation (1) in Figure 41) 
for seven U.S. production regions (Atlantic, Cornbelt, Delta, Lakes, Plains, South, and 
Other) to represent the soybean supply relationship and account for interregional 
competition within the United States: 
 
(1) ASkt  =  ASkt(SP
e
 , RSkt, αkt ), 
(2) HSkt  =  HSkt(ASkt),  
(3) YSkt  =  YSkt(RSkt, Θkt ), 
(4) SSkt  = YSkt    HSkt  
 
where k = U.S. production region 1, ..., 7; t = time period; AS = soybean acreage planted; 
HS = soybean acreage harvested; YS= soybean yield; SS = soybean production; RS = 
soybean research stock variable; α and θ are appropriate shift variables and SPe = 
expected real soybean farm price defined for each region as: 
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(5) SP
e
 = MAX(SPt-1, LSt)  D5901 + MAX(SPt-1, 0.85  TSt + 0.15  MAX(SPt-1, LSt))  
D0212 
 
where SP = the real farm soybean price; LS = the real soybean loan rate; TS = real 
soybean target price; D5901 = indicator variable which equals 1 for 1959/60 through 
2001/02 and 0 otherwise; and  D0212 = indicator variable which equals 1 for 2002/03 
through 2012/13 and 0 otherwise. 
 For other countries and regions in the model where soybean production is 
important (Brazil, Argentina, and China), the soybean block contains one national 
harvested acreage equation and a corresponding soybean production identity: 
 
(6) HSit  =  HSit(SPe , αit ), 
(7) SSit  = YSit    HSit  
 
where i = non-U.S. soybean producing country (Brazil, Argentina, China); t = time, and 
PSe = expected real soybean price defined for each country as the lagged soybean price. 
The specification of the domestic demand functions (D) in the soybean, soybean meal, 
and soybean oil blocks of each country in the model (corresponding to equations (2), (5), 
and (8) for the United States and equations (15), (18), and (21) for importing regions in 
Figure 41) include promotion stock variables, referred to as “goodwill” variables (G), to 
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capture the effects of soybean check-off funded promotion activities in each region 
where such activities have been conducted: 
 
(8) Dist  =  Dist(Pist, Gist, ßist) 
 
where i = only the U.S. and importing countries (Japan, the EU-27, China, and the Rest-
of-the-world; s = commodity (soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean oil); t = time period; 
P = domestic market price; Gis = promotion stock variables, and β represents appropriate 
shift variables. 
 Simultaneous interaction of soybean and soybean product markets within each 
region in SOYMOD is insured through the endogenous soybean crush margin (equations 
(10) and (23) in Figure 41) which is the own price variable in the crush demand 
equations ((2) and (15) in Figure 41). The fourth block in each domestic market 
(equations (11)-(13) and (24)-(26) in Figure 41) of the model includes net excess supply 
relationships for exporting regions and net excess demand relationships for importing 
regions specified as the residual differences between their respective domestic supply 
and demand schedules. 
 The soybean and soybean product markets of the trading countries in the model 
are linked through international price and trade flow relationships. The prices of 
soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil in exporting and importing regions are linked through 
price transmission equations (equations (27)-(29) in Figure 42) following Bredahl, 
Meyers, and Collins (1979) which account for the effects of exchange rates as well as 
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tariffs, export subsidies, border taxes, transportation costs, etc. and other factors (the Zij) 
that drive a wedge between prices in each world region. International market clearing 
conditions (equations (30)-(32) in Figure 41) require equality of the world excess supply 
and demand for soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil in each time period. 
 The U.S. portion of the model includes seven production regions and the full 
model includes seven world trading countries/regions. The U.S. component of the model 
also includes a sub-model of the U.S. corn market which features regional acreage and 
production as well as national consumption (feed, food, other), inventory, price, and net 
export demand relationships and operates at both the farm and wholesale levels. The U.S. 
corn market relationships are included in SOYMOD given the importance of corn as a 
substitute in regional soybean production and as a complement in national livestock feed 
demand. 
 
Model Parameter Estimation  
 The model parameters are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimator using annual data for 1960/61 through 2012/13 where data are available for 
that full period. A longer time period is used for some equations where data are available, 
such as the regional U.S. acreage planted, acreage harvested, and yield equations. 
Normalization by an exogenous price index maintains linear homogeneity in prices. Two 
or three-stage least squares procedures sometimes are used in the estimation of 
simultaneous systems. In this case, however, the large size of the model and associated 
endogenous and exogenous variables and the limited number of annual observations for 
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a number of equations resulted in a greater number of predetermined variables than 
observations. Given that the efficiency gained in parameter estimation with the use of 
2SLS and 3SLS is actually consistent with a large number of data points, OLS is the 
estimator of choice in this analysis. Because the time period of the data available across 
equations is highly non-uniform, a system estimator like 3SLS could not be used to 
estimate the behavioral equation parameters in the model.   
 The following discussion describes equations and estimation results with 
parameters estimates and various regression statistics, including standard errors, Durbin-
h and Durbin Watson statistics, and the corrected R
2
 for the equations in each 
country/region in the model. Variable definitions are in the Appendix A. 
 
U.S. Sub Model  
 The soybean supply component of the U.S. sub-model consists of behavioral 
equations for acreage planted, acreage harvested, and yield in seven U.S. production 
regions (Cornbelt, Delta, South, Plains, Lakes, Atlantic and Other). The model also 
includes identities explaining production, and expected prices in each of the seven 
regions (Table 1). 
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Table 1. The U.S. Soybean Supply Component of the World Soybean Model  
 
Regional and Total U.S. Acreage Planted 
 
(1) ASOYSAC = -425.3898 + 796.9325*ASOYPCC/UFPI67(-1) − 471.8455*ACORPPC/UFPI67(-1) − 752.3993*AOATPPC/UFPI67(-1) +  
 (416.87)       (92.40)                                               (199.64)                                              (336.47) 
0.7125*ASOYSAC(-1) − 620.6839*D1011 + 1035.851*D82 + 310.320*DASOYSA +  
(0.04)                                (136.13)                   (194.59)             (126.58)                           
∑ 𝐴𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑛12𝑛=1 *LOG(ASOYRESDF/UFPI67)    
   Adj. R
2
=0.9411    Dh=0.2191  ASOYSACn=1.3566, 2.4871, 3.3914, 4.0697, 4.5219, 4.7480, 4.7480, 4.5219, 4.0697, 3.3914, 2.4871, 
                                                                                                1.3566  (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period   
  
(2) CSOYSAC = -3819.739  + 1374.160*CSOYPCC/UFPI67(-1) − 2644.954*CCORPPC/UFPI67(-1) + 0.7185*CSOYSAC(-1) − 1062.961*D03T05 
  (1759.81)     (358.29)                                               (785.08)                                             (0.05)                               (529.12)                                                     
 − 5055.051*DRGHT07 + 3939.797*D73 + 2056.838*D7879 + ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑛2𝑛=1 *LOG(CSOYRESDF/UFPI67)    
                                 (885.23)                          (877.52)               (674.63)                                                                                                          
  Adj. R
2
=0.9894    Dh=0.2328  CSOYSACn=439.482, 439.482 (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period   
  
(3) DSOYSAC = -1701.628 + 829.9335*DSOYPCC/UFPI67(-1) − 267.8094*DCORPPC/UFPI67(-1) − 236.1900*DWHEPPC/UFPI67(-1)  
                   (1048.42)   (207.29)                                               (104.15)                                              (292.06)                                                         
+ 0.7720*DSOYSAC(-1) + 1455.756*D49T82 − 687.27*DRGHT07 + 1061.104*D9308 − 1487.107*D01 +  
                                 (0.04)                                 (307.35)                   (430.44)                        (302.45)                  (436.94) 
+ ∑ 𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑛4𝑛=1 *LOG(DSOYRESDF/UFPI67)    
 Adj. R
2
=0.9746    Dh=0.0041  DSOYSACn=34.7887, 52.1831, 52.1831, 34.7887 (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period  
  
 
(4) LSOYSAC = -553.4381 + 783.7250*LSOYPCC/UFPI67(-1) − 1248.894*LCORPPC/UFPI67(-1)  − 1018.265* LBARPPC/UFPI67(-1)    
                   (707.36)     (166.30)                                               (526.14)                                              (426.74)                                                                    
+ 0.8471*LSOYSAC(-1) + 113.7729*DFB96 − 590.3213*DLBW − 1417.723*DRGHT07  
    (0.07)                                 (191.12)                   (148.27)                    (389.78)                                                                                                              
+ ∑ 𝐿𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑛12𝑛=1 *LOG(LSOYRESDF/UFPI67)    
    Adj. R
2
=0.9840    Dh=-0.0665  LSOYSACn=6.2245, 11.4115, 15.5612, 18.6734, 20.7482, 21.7856, 21.7856, 20.7482, 18.6734,  
                                                                                               15.5612, 11.4115, 6.2245  (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period  
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Table 1 Continued. 
 
(5) OSOYSAC = -89.6529 + 94.9415*OSOYPCC/UFPI67(-1) − 104.8972*OCORPPC/UFPI67(-1) + 0.7702*OSOYSAC(-1) + 
81.0652*DOSOYSA1  
      (37.71)     (17.96)                                               (39.62)                                               (0.05)                                (18.45)                                                
− 58.2743*DOSOYSA2 + ∑ 𝑂𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑛29𝑛=1 *LOG(OSOYRESDF/UFPI67)    
    (13.17) 
  Adj. R
2
=0.9890    DW=2.1468  Dh=-0.4462  OSOYSACn=0.0992, 0.1945, 0.2770, 0.3557, 0.4275, 0.4925, 0.5506, 0.6019, 0.6464,  
                                                                                                                            0.6840, 0.7148, 0.7388, 0.7559, 0.7661, 0.7695, 0.7661, 0.7559, 0.7388,  
                                                                                                                            0.7148, 0.6840, 0.6464, 0.6019, 0.5506, 0.4925, 0.4275, 0.3557, 0.2770, 
                                                                                                                            0.1945, 0.0992  (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period   
                                                                                                                                                                             
(6) PSOYSAC = -1367.743 + 507.6680*PSOYPCC/UFPI67(-1) − 521.6744*PCORPPC/UFPI67(-1) − 894.0700*OWHEPPC/UFPI67(-1)  
      (832.40)     (189.78)                                              (580.01)                                            (403.66)                                                                        
+ 0.8485*PSOYSAC(-1) + 930.9177*DFB96 + 1088.262*D60T64 − 306.4439*D71T79 − 746.2320*DPSOYSA1  
    (0.03)                                (169.99)                     (369.33)                     (185.63)                     (149.22)                                                                  
− 3099.740*DPSOYSA2 − 1561.810*DPSOYSA3 +  ∑ 𝑃𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑛10𝑛=1 *LOG(PSOYRESDF/UFPI67)    
        (264.79)                            (218.91)                                                                                                                             
  Adj. R
2
=0.9959    DW=1.9022  Dh=0.3662  PSOYSACn=12.7067, 22.8720, 30.4960, 35.5787, 38.1201, 38.1201, 35.5787,  
                                                                                                                            30.4960, 22.8720, 12.7067  (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period  
 
(7) SSOYSAC = -2260.208 + 1603.485*SSOYPCC/UFPI67(-1) − 1492.635*SCORPPC/UFPI67(-1)  + 0.6505*SSOYSAC(-1) + 1631.154*D62T82 
       (345.44)     (161.64)                                              (339.49)                                              (0.04)                               (227.96)                                      
 − 708.7166*D1011+ 861.8043*D78T84 − 458.3851*D6465 + + ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑛12𝑛=1 *LOG(SSOYRESDF/UFPI67)    
          (203.22)                 (219.20)                      (223.20)                                                                                                                          
  Adj. R
2
=0.9860    DW=2.2964  Dh=-1.1022  SSOYSACn=3.5309, 6.4734, 8.8274, 10.5928, 11.76982, 12.3583, 12.3583, 11.7698, 
                                                                                                                            10.5928, 8.8274, 6.4734, 3.5309  (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period
    
Regional and Total U.S. Acreage Harvested 
  
(8) ASOYSHC = -5823.78 + 0.9986*ASOYSAC + 2.8620*TIME 
                              (872.4)      (0.01)              (0.44)                                                                         Adj. R
2
=0.9960    DW=1.9084 
 
(9) CSOYSHC = -117.442 + 0.9945*CSOYSAC  
                              (114.50)   (0.004)                                                                                          Adj. R
2
=0.9992    DW=2.1294 
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(10) DSOYSHC = -22.6499 + 0.9753*DSOYSAC   
                                (50.40)      (0.01)                                                                                         Adj. R
2
=0.9977    DW=2.0655 
(11) LSOYSHC = -18.4087 + 0.9870*LSOYSAC  
                               (22.78)       (0.003)                                                                                         Adj. R
2
=0.9995    DW=1.5767 
 
(12) OSOYSHC = -3.8308 + 0.9881*OSOYSAC − 22.8495*D60T64 
                                (1.30)      (0.002)              (2.33)                                                                              Adj. R
2
=0.9997    DW=2.0802 
 
(13) PSOYSHC = -28.5613 + 0.9835*PSOYSAC  
                               (19.98)      (0.002)                                                                                           Adj. R
2
=0.9997    DW=1.8874 
 
(14) SSOYSHC = -107.024 + 0.9698*SSOYSAC  
                               (30.40)       (0.01)                                                                                                             Adj. R
2
=0.9980    DW=1.6011 
 
Regional Soybean Yields  
 
(15) ASOYSYC = 4.7275 − 0.0568*LA_NINA − 1.3991*EL_NINO + 3.6799*D88T12 + ∑ 𝐴𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑛2𝑛=1 *LOG(ASOYRESDF/UFPI67)   
        (4.13)    (0.85)                          (0.84)                         (1.29)                                                                                                                  
  Adj. R
2
=0.6059    DW=2.1706   ASOYSYCn=0.8830, 0.8830 (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period  
  
 
(16) CSOYSYC = 8.4462 − 2.5615*LA_NINA + 0.5193*EL_NINO + 4.4863*D75T02 + 3.4821*D92T02 + 12.6560*D04T12 + 4.3935*DCOYSYC 
   (2.81)     (0.60)                         (0.57)                         (0.89)                    (0.95)                      (1.55)                      (1.00)         
 + ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑛2𝑛=1 *LOG(CSOYRESDF/UFPI67)   
  Adj. R
2
=0.9299    DW=2.1378   CSOYSYCn=0.8817, 0.8817 (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period   
  
(17) DSOYSYC = 14.0867 − 0.4133*LA_NINA − 0.4822*EL_NINO + 11.4088*D02T12 + ∑ 𝐷𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑛5𝑛=1 *LOG(DSOYRESDF/UFPI67) 
        (2.30)        (0.88)                         (0.88)                        (1.23)                                                            
  Adj. R
2
=0.7577    DW=1.8646   DSOYSYCn=0.1265, 0.2023, 0.2276, 0.2023, 0.1265 (t-values=1.4829)  
                                                                                                                             for n=lag period   
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(18) LSOYSYC = -5.7083 − 1.1449*LA_NINA + 0.9331*EL_NINO + ∑ 𝐿𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑛8𝑛=1 *LOG(LSOYRESDF/UFPI67) 
       (2.69)      (1.08)            (1.03)                                                                                                                 
  Adj. R
2
=0.7927    DW=1.7371    LSOYSYCn=0.2258, 0.3951, 0.5080, 0.5645, 0.5645, 0.5080, 0.3951, 0.2258 
                                                                                                           (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period  
 
 (19) OSOYSYC = 28.2843 − 1.1205*LA_NINA − 2.2830 *EL_NINO + 7.6005*D03T12+ ∑ 𝑂𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑛17𝑛=1 *LOG(LSOYRESDF/UFPI67) 
    (1.29)      (1.12)                         (1.10)                          (1.50)                            
              Adj. R
2
=0.7329    DW=2.1140    OSOYSYCn=0.0139, 0.0261, 0.0367, 0.0456, 0.0530, 0.0587, 0.0628, 0.0652, 0.0660, 
                                                                                                           0.0652, 0.0628, 0.0587, 0.0530, 0.0456, 0.0367, 0.0261, 0.0139 
                                                                                                                            (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period   
 
(20) PSOYSYC = -2.1790 − 2.0285*LA_NINA + 1.0856 *EL_NINO + ∑ 𝑃𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑛2𝑛=1 *LOG(PSOYRESDF/UFPI67)   
                                (2.02)      (0.99)            (0.99) 
  Adj. R
2
=0.8099    DW=1.8225   PSOYSYCn=2.0922, 2.0922 (t-values=1.4829) for n=lag period  
                                                                                                                                   
(21) SSOYSYC = 23.1708 − 0.7777*LA_NINA + 0.2240*EL_NINO + 7.8780*D02T12 + ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑌𝐶𝑛5𝑛=1 *LOG(SSOYRESDF/UFPI67)   
        (1.11)       (1.06)                          (1.06)                         (1.45)                                                                
              Adj. R
2
=0.5728    DW=1.8044   SSOYSYCn=0.0478, 0.0764, 0.0860, 0.0764, 0.0478 (t-values=1.4829)  
                                                                                                                            for n=lag period   
 
Regional and Total U.S. Production  
 
(22) ASOYSPC=ASOYSYC*ASOYSHC 
(23) CSOYSPC=CSOYSYC*CSOYSHC 
(24) DSOYSPC=DSOYSYC*DSOYSHC 
(25) LSOYSPC=LSOYSYC*LSOYSHC 
(26) OSOYSPC=OSOYSYC*OSOYSHC 
(27) PSOYSPC=PSOYSYC*PSOYSHC 
(28) SSOYSPC=SSOYSYC*SSOYSHC 
(29) USOYSPC=(CSOYSPC+LSOYSPC+PSOYSPC+ASOYSPC+SSOYSPC+DSOYSPC+OSOYSPC)/1000 
 
Regional Market Price (Farm Level)  
(30) ASOYPFC = -0.0369 + 1.0092*USOYPFC − 0.7978*D08  
                               (0.07)     (0.01)            (0.20)                                                                    Adj. R
2
=0.9946    DW=2.2691 
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(31) CSOYPFC = -0.0639 + 1.0167*USOYPFC + 0.5774*D76  
                              (0.02)      (0.003)              (0.07)                                                                                Adj. R
2
=0.9993    DW=1.3665 
 
(32) DSOYPFC = 0.1756 + 0.9766*USOYPFC − 1.3083*D07  
                             (0.07)       (0.01)                         (0.21)                                                                             Adj. R
2
=0.9934    DW=1.5733 
 
(33) LSOYPFC = 0.0093 + 0.9803*USOYPFC + 1.0047*D76  
                             (0.04)      (0.01)                        (0.12)                                                                                   Adj. R
2
=0.9978    DW=1.5705 
 
(34) OSOYPFC = -0.1394 + 1.0144*USOYPFC  
                              (0.08)       (0.01)                                                                                             Adj. R
2
=0.9921    DW=2.3219 
 
(35) PSOYPFC = -0.0945 + 0.9798*USOYPFC + 0.8864*D76  
                             (0.03)     (0.004)                         (0.08)                                                                         Adj. R
2
=0.9990    DW=2.3987 
 
(36) SSOYPFC = -0.0481 + 1.0091*USOYPFC  
                              (0.05)      (0.01)                                                                                                           Adj. R
2
=0.9969    DW=2.3005 
 
Regional Expected Farm Price  
 
(37) ASOYPCC=MAX(LAG(ASOYPFC),ASOYPLC)*D5901+MAX(LAG(ASOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
        +0.15*MAX(LAG(ASOYPFC),ASOYPLC))*D0212 
(38) CSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(CSOYPFC),CSOYPLC)*D5901+MAX(LAG(CSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
        +0.15*MAX(LAG(CSOYPFC),CSOYPLC))*D0212  
(39) DSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(DSOYPFC),DSOYPLC)*D5901+MAX(LAG(DSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
        +0.15*MAX(LAG(DSOYPFC),DSOYPLC))*D0212 
(40) LSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(LSOYPFC),LSOYPLC)*D5901+MAX(LAG(LSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
        +0.15*MAX(LAG(LSOYPFC),LSOYPLC))*D0212 
(41) OSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(OSOYPFC),OSOYPLC)*D5901+MAX(LAG(OSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
        +0.15*MAX(LAG(OSOYPFC),OSOYPLC))*D0212 
(42) PSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(PSOYPFC),PSOYPLC)*D5901+MAX(LAG(PSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
        +0.15*MAX(LAG(PSOYPFC),PSOYPLC))*D0212 
(43) SSOYPCC=MAX(LAG(SSOYPFC),SSOYPLC)*D5901+MAX(LAG(SSOYPFC),0.85*USOYPTC 
        +0.15*MAX(LAG(SSOYPFC),SSOYPLC))*D0212 
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 The estimated parameters for the area planted equations in all seven regions are 
significant with correct signs, no serial correlation, and high adjusted R-squares 
(equations (1)-(7) in Table 1). In all seven regions, soybean acreage planted is 
significantly influenced by the expected soybean farm price. The estimated short-run and 
long-run own-price elasticities across regions are within the inelastic range, ranging 
from a low of 0.111 for the Cornbelt region to a high of 0.783 for the South region 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Estimated U.S. Soybean Acreage and Yield Elasticities
a 
U.S. 
Productio
n 
Region 
U.S. Planted Acreage  U.S. Yield 
Soybean Farm Price 
 
Research Stock 
 
Research Stock 
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run 
Atlantic 0.5607*** 1.9503***  0.0034* 0.0119*  0.0198*** 0.0688*** 
Corn Belt 0.1106*** 0.3928***  0.0080*** 0.0284***  0.0132*** 0.0471*** 
Delta 0.2681*** 1.1758***  0.0055** 0.0240**  0.0076*** 0.0334*** 
Lakes 0.2512*** 1.6425***  0.0042** 0.0275**  0.0154*** 0.1007*** 
Other 0.5120*** 2.2282***  0.0107*** 0.0465***  0.0057*** 0.0246*** 
Plains 0.1406** 0.9280**  0.0075*** 0.0494***  0.0141*** 0.0930*** 
South 0.7827*** 2.2394***  0.0083*** 0.0224***  0.0043*** 0.0123*** 
a Elasticities evaluated at the means of the data based on the coefficients used in the simulation model. *** = 
significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
 
 This range of elasticities makes intuitive sense because producers in the Cornbelt 
region participate extensively in government programs which considerably reduces their 
responsive to movements in the market prices of soybeans and other crops. At the same 
time, corn is the only real substitute in production for soybeans in that region. On the 
other hand, producers in the South plant a much larger range of crops and tend to move 
more quickly out of the production of one crop and into the production of another given 
changes in relative prices. In the regional soybean area planted equations, prices of 
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substitute crops include corn price in the Cornbelt, corn and wheat prices in the Delta, 
corn price in the South region, corn and wheat prices in the Plains region, corn and 
barley prices in the Lakes region, corn and oats prices in the Atlantic region, and corn 
price in the Other region are found to be statistically significant.  
 Soybean checkoff research stock variables (RSk) are also arguments of the 
regional soybean planted equations (equations (1)-(7) in Table 1). The RSk are 
formulated based on two main results from previous research on the returns to research: 
(1) research benefits are not immediate so that a lag exists from the time the 
expenditures are made and possible real time adoption of results in the field and (2) 
research results from many years ago may still yield benefits for a number of years into 
the future. Consequently, the RSk are formed as weighted averages of historical soybean 
checkoff expenditures on production research at the national and state level measured in 
constant dollars to account for the time lag in the impact of research expenditure. In 
general, for any U.S. region k: 
 
(9) 𝑅𝑆𝑘 =  ∑𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑡−𝑟
∗
𝑠
𝑟=𝑖
,      ∑𝑟
𝑠
𝑟=𝑖
= 1 
 
 where ISt
*
 = ISt/pt is the constant-dollar research investment in year t, ISt is the 
nominal-dollar research investment in year t, pt is the corresponding research price index, 
λr is the weight on the constant dollar research expenditures lagged r years, i is the 
number of years before the first impact, and s is the lag length over which research 
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investments are expected to impact farm decisions. The RSk are proxies for the quantity 
of effective research in each region (k). 
 Because research expenditures tend to reduce production costs and/or increase 
yields, two sets of research stock variables are developed – one set for use in the regional 
acreage equations (equations (1)-(7) in Table 1) and the second for use in the regional 
yield equations (equations (15)-(21) in Table 1). Cost-reducing production research 
expenditures affect soybean production by shifting the acreage planted function to the 
right while yield-enhancing production research expenditures affect soybean production 
by shifting the yield function to the right. 
 To determine which of several alternative weighting schemes and lag structures 
on production research investment is preferred for purposes of defining the acreage and 
yield research stock variables, a series of model specifications were tested, balancing fit 
and forecasts (or parsimony) in possible models. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
was used as the model selection metric. The model specification that minimized the AIC 
criterion for both regional acreage and yield was a second-degree polynomial distributed 
lag model with both head and tail restrictions and a delay of one period between actual 
expenditures of (real) check-off production research dollars and new technology 
adoption and use in the field across all seven U.S. soybean production regions. The 
optimal lag length, however, differed substantially by production region for both acreage 
and yield functions.   
 For regional soybean acreage, the longest lag length was determined for the 
Other region at 29 periods followed by the Atlantic, Lakes and South regions at 12 
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periods, the Plains region at 10 periods, the Delta region at four periods, and the 
Cornbelt region at two periods. Besides the real regional research expenditures and the 
expected regional real soybean farm prices as defined in equation (5), other explanatory 
variables in the seven regional acreage equations (the αkt in equation (1) above) included 
the expected real prices of competing crops in each region as appropriate, and soybean 
acreage in the previous year. Equations (37)-(43) in Table 1 are the expected regional 
soybean farm prices equations. Crop year data over the time period 1959/60 to 2012/13 
were used. 
 For regional soybean yields, the longest optimal lag length was determined for 
the Other region at 17 periods followed by the Lakes region at 8 periods, the Delta and 
South region at 5 periods, and the Atlantic, Cornbelt, and Plains regions at two periods. 
Besides the real regional research expenditures, other explanatory factors of the regional 
yield equations (the Θkt in equation (3) above) included weather effects (El Niño and La 
Niña). 
 The estimated elasticities of regional soybean acreage and yields with respect to 
the regional soybean research stock variables are provided in Table 2. With few 
exceptions, the research stock elasticities are statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
short-run and long-run research stock elasticities of regional soybean planted acreage are 
all quite small ranging from 0.0034 in the Atlantic region to 0.0107 in the Other region 
(short-run) and from 0.0119 in the Atlantic region to 0.0494 in the Plains region (long-
run). The short-run and long-run research stock elasticities of regional soybean yields are 
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somewhat higher ranging from 0.0043 in the South region to 0.0198 in the Atlantic 
region (short-run) and from 0.0123 in the South to 0.1007 in the Lakes region (long-run). 
 The soybean acreage harvested is determined in the model by soybean acreage 
planted (equations (8)-(14) in Table 1). The regional harvested acreage estimation results 
indicate that, on average, about 98.5% of planted acres are harvested. Soybean 
production in each region is defined in the model as acreage harvested times yield 
(equations (22)-(28) in Table 1). Total U.S. soybean production (USOYSPC) is the sum 
of soybean production in all of the regions (equations (29) in Table 1). Also, regional 
soybean farm prices are linked in the model to the national soybean farm price 
(USOYPFC) (equations (30)-(36) in Table 1). A coefficient of the national soybean farm 
price in each of the equation is close to one implies that in the long-run regional soybean 
farm prices and the national soybean farm price were nearly equal. 
 Soybean crush demand (USOYDCC) is significantly influenced by the crush 
margin (USOYGCC), soybean processing capacity (UOISCPC), the availability of 
soybeans for processing (as measured by the sum of beginning soybean stocks 
(USOYHTC-1) and soybean production (USOYSPC)), and soybean checkoff 
expenditures represented by the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures to promote U.S. 
soybean demand (equation (1) in Table 3). The promotion stock variables used as a 
regressor in this equation and those used in the soybean demand equations in importing 
countries as well as in the soymeal and soyoil demand equations in the U.S. and in 
importing countries were constructed following Williams (1999), Williams, Shumway, 
and Love (2002), Williams, Capps, and Bessler (2009), and Williams, Capps, and Lee 
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(2014) as weighted averages of the respective inflation- and exchange-rate-adjusted 
expenditures on promotion activities in each region. 
 To capture diminishing marginal returns to domestic and foreign checkoff 
promotion expenditures, a square root transformation each was used for each promotion 
stock variable. In most evaluations of the effectiveness of promotion campaigns, a 
logarithmic transformation of promotion expenditures is used to capture diminishing 
marginal returns. However, because of the presence of zero promotion expenditures for 
some commodities in some years in some regions, a square root transformation was used 
in this study following the work of Williams, Capps, and Bessler (2009), Williams, 
Capps, and Lee (2014), and others.  
 To account for the time lag in the impact of the promotion investments on the 
soybean, soybean meal, and soybean oil demands in each region, Williams (1999) and 
Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002) used a second order polynomial inverse lag (PIL) 
formulation based on Mitchell and Speaker (1986). The Almon polynomial distributed 
lag (PDL) is an alternative lag formulation commonly used in the analysis of advertising 
effectiveness (see, for example, Williams, Capps, and Bessler (2009) and Williams, 
Capps, and Lee (2014)). Other lag models have been employed in the literature on 
checkoff promotion programs, including moving averages and unrestricted lags of 
varying lengths. 
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Table 3. The U.S. Soybean Demand Component of the World Soybean Model  
 
Soybean Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(1) USOYDCC = 96.6819 + 34.12*USOYGCC/UWPI67R + 0.1729*UOISCPC + 0.3167*(LAG(USOYHTC)+USOYSPC)  
                              (23.8)      (15.1)                                            (0.04)                        (0.03)                                                                                                           
+ 4.9496*LAG(SQRT(USOYEXP)) + 154.3876*D88T07 + 63.5100*D97T01 + 57.2607*D7071 + 88.5448*D0812  
                                 (0.8)                                                      (13.3)                       (18.1)                       (25.2)                     (28.4)                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                  Adj. R2=0.9939    DW=2.2944  
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
(2) USOYHEC = -96.2691 − 77.6716*USOYPFC/UFPI67 + 69.1946*UCORPPC/UFPI67 + 0.1150*USOYSPC − 0.3409*USOYHGC  
                               (63.00)      (16.92)                                       (35.26)                                         (0.01)                        (0.12)                                                           
+ 0.3508*LAG(USOYHEC) + 171.1127*D60T94 + 149.5038*DSUSOYP + 219.9866*D0506  
                                 (0.05)                                       (21.63)                      (25.40)                           (32.11)          Adj. R2=0.9040    Dh=0.0375 
 
(3) USOYPWC = 0.1440 + 1.0223*USOYPFC + 1.102*D7287 + 1.2137*D10  
                             (0.08)   (0.01)                       (0.17)                  (0.26)                                                 Adj. R2=0.9922    DW=2.0800  
 
(4) USOYGCC=USOMQ*USOMPWC/1000+USOOQ*USOOPWC/100−USOYPFC 
 
(5) USOYHEC=USOYHTC−USOYHGC 
 
(6) USOYHTC=LAG(USOYHTC)+USOYSPC+USOYMMC-USOYDCC−USOYMEC−USOYDZC 
 
Soybean Meal Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
  
(7) USOMSPC=USOMQ*USOYDCC 
 
(8) UHPMDDC = -821.1583 − 31.3650*UHIPMPWC/UWPI67R + 9.7083*UYDA/UCPI67 + 3.2031*UCORDFC  
                                 (758.4)        (4.3)                                                  (0.53)                                   (0.2)                                                                        
+ 72.0192*LAG(SQRT(USOMEXP)) + 972.0786*D75T84 + 938.2113*D88T91 − 1069.300*D97T10 + 2230.950*DUHPMDD 
      (13.3)                                                   (223.1)                        (351.0)                       (345.4)                      (302.3) 
                                                                                                                                                                         Adj. R2=0.9949    DW=1.5994 
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Table 3 Continued. 
  
(9) UCOMDPC = 0.0398 − 0.0547*(USOMDPC+UPEMDPC)*UCOMPWC/(USOMDPC*USOMPWC+UPEMDPC*UPEMPWC) 
                              (0.01)      (0.02)                                                                                                                                                                                    
 + 0.7572*(.8103*UCOMSPC)/(USOMSPC+.8103*UCOMSPC+1.124*UPEMSPC) + 0.3706*LAG(UCOMDPC)  
      (0.08)                                                                                                                                (0.07)                                       
+ 0.0049*D67T93  − 0.0332*D6080 
                                   (0.002)                    (0.01)                                                                                                     Adj. R2=0.9791    Dh=-0.2065 
 
 
(10) USOMDPC=1−UCOMDPC−UPEMDPC 
 
(11) UHPMDDC=USOMDDC/USOMDPC 
 
(12) USOMPWC=(UHPMPWC−UCOMDPC*UCOMPWC−UPEMDPC*UPEMPWC)/USOMDPC 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
(13) USOMHEC = 231.0272 − 0.7531*USOMPWC/UWPI67R + 0.3298*LAG(USOMHEC) + 292.9165*LAG(EMBARGO) − 81.4235*D60T70  
                                  (98.91)       (0.24)                                             (0.07)                                      (39.25)                                         (17.43)                        
+ 236.3429*D82 − 53.7256*D91T04 + 112.1968*DUSOMH  
      (38.87)               (14.10)                     (17.43)                                                               Adj. R2=0.8362    Dh=-0.1440  
  
(14) USOMDDC=LAG(USOMHEC)+USOMMMC+USOMSPC-USOMDZC-USOMHEC-USOMMEC 
 
Soybean Oil Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
  
(15) USOOSPC=USOOQ*USOYDCC 
 
(16) UOLODDC = 1390.356 − 48.7039*UOLOPWC/UWPI67R + 20.9764*ULAOPWC/UWPI67R + 10.0755*UYDA/UCPI67  
                                  (364.3)        (10.6)                                               (6.90)                                               (0.3 )                                                         
+ 31.4586*LAG(SQRT(USOOEXP)) − 2554.645*DUECRIS + 554.1306*D69T82 + 1053.619*D89T95 − 1124.589*D12 
     (8.09)                                                    (238.5)                           (140.2)                       (201.0)                       (401.3)                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                 Adj. R2=0.9943    DW=2.1965  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
(17) UCOODPC = 0.0205 − 0.0179* (USOODPC+UPEODPC)*UCOOPWC/(USOODPC*USOOPWC+UPEODPC*UPEOPWC)  
                                 (0.01)      (0.01)                                                                                                                                                   
+ 0.1625*UCOOSPC/(USOOSPC+UPEOSPC) + 0.7362*LAG(UCOODPC) + 0.0238*D6004 − 0.0260*D66  
                                 (0.05)                                                                    (0.07)                                      (0.01)                   (0.01)                            
                                                                                                                                                 Adj. R2=0.9828    Dh=-0.3389  
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Table 3 Continued. 
 
(18) USOODPC=1−UCOODPC−UPEODPC 
 
(19) USOODDC=UOLODDC*USOODPC  
 
(20) UOLOPWC=UCOODPC*UCOOPWC+UPEODPC*UPEOPWC+USOOPWC*USOODPC 
 
(21) USOOHEC = 509.4553 − 45.1976*USOOPWC/UWPI67R + 0.1095*USOOSPC − 1.0236*USOOMGC + 2.111*USOOHGC  
                                 (436.7)      (19.57)                                              (0.02)                          (0.51)                          (2.20)                                                 
+ 0.4566*LAG(USOOHEC) − 0.3354*LAG2(USOOHEC) − 740.836*D96T98 − 799.82*D01T03 − 803.7*D0412 
                                  (0.10)                                     (0.10)                                       (184.6)                    (195.2)                   (229.2)                                      
                                                                                                                                                   Adj. R2=0.8705    Dh=0.6821  
 
(22) USOOMEC=USOOMTC−2.20462*USOOMGC 
 
(23) USOOHEC=USOOHTC−USOOHGC 
 
(24) USOOHTC=LAG(USOOHTC)+USOOSPC+USOOMMC−USOODZC−USOOMTC−UOLODDC*USOODPC 
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 The lag formulation and lag length used for each demand equation for each 
commodity (soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil) in each relevant region of the model (U.S., 
EU15/27, Japan, China, and the Rest-of-the-World) were selected using the process 
described earlier for production research expenditures. Although the PIL does not 
require specifying the lag length, it is conceptually an infinite lag.  Thus, the use of the 
PIL lag formulation imposes the assumption on the model that advertising expenditures 
in one period have infinitely long impacts over time on consumption.  Consequently, in 
testing for lag length, the PIL model was not included leaving the PDL formulation, 
moving averages, and simple lags of varying lengths as the potential lag formulations to 
be considered.  
 The search for the pattern and time period over which soybean checkoff 
promotion expenditures influence soybean and soybean product demand in each region 
in the model involved a series of nested OLS regressions. For each lag formulation 
considered, lags of up to 10 years were considered and for the PDL up to fourth degree 
polynomials with alternative choices of head and tail restrictions. Based on a composite 
set of criteria, including the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz statistic, 
and  heuristic measures
1
  (i.e., the number of significant parameters and the number of 
expected signs on own-price demand response), a second order PDL of one lag with 
head and tail restrictions was selected for U.S. soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil demand 
functions. 
                                                 
1
 The heuristic aspect of the composite criteria may be viewed as ad hoc but is equivalent to restricting the class of models to be only 
those consistent with underlying theory.  This procedure is commonly encountered in the literature, especially in analyses where 
equilibrium displacement models are used and only parameter values consistent with theory are utilized. 
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 For foreign market demands, simple, one-year lags of the square root 
transformation of the respective demand promotion expenditure variables were selected 
using the same criteria. Before being transformed in this way, however, the demand 
promotion expenditure variables for the U.S. and foreign markets were first deflated by 
the wholesale price index in the respective regions. The foreign demand promotion 
expenditure variables were converted from U.S. dollars to foreign currency using the 
respective exchange rates. 
 The crush margin (USOYGCC) used in the U.S soybean demand equation is 
defined in the model as the soymeal extraction rate (USOMQ) multiplied by soymeal 
wholesale price plus the soyoil extraction rate (USOOQ) multiplied by soyoil wholesale 
price minus the soybean farm price (equation (4) in Table 3). Dummy variables 
(D88T07, D97T01, D7071, and D0812) are also added to capture the unobservable 
effects (equation (1) in Table 3). 
 As expected, the results show that crush margin is statistically significant at the 5% 
level and the promotion stock is statistically significant at the 1% level implying that a 
higher crush margin and a larger amount of the demand promotion expenditures increase 
soybean crush demand (equation (1) in Table 3). The estimated elasticity of soybean 
crush demand with respect to gross soybean crush margin is 0.014, indicating that 
soybean crush demand is not highly responsive to crush margin. The estimated elasticity 
of soybean crush demand with respect to promotion stock of soybean checkoff 
expenditures for soybeans is 0.023 (Table 4). Soybean processing capacity and the 
availability of soybeans for processing are also statistically significant at the 1% level 
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implying that larger facilities and more available resources increase soybean crush 
demand (equation (1) in Table 3). Those variables in equation (1) in Table 3 account for 
99.4% of the variation in the U.S soybean demand equation. The value of Durbin-
Watson is 2.2944, approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
 Soybean private ending stocks (USOYHEC) are an identity in the model 
calculated as total ending stocks (USOYHTC) minus government ending stocks 
(USOYHGC) (equation (5) in Table 3). Note that private ending stocks of soybeans also 
were estimated to be a function of the soybean farm price, the expected farm price of 
corn, soybean production, beginning private stocks of soybeans and government soybean 
ending stocks (equation (2) in Table 3). Dummy variables (D60T94, DSUSOYP, and 
D0506) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. In simulation, this equation 
was re-normalized on the soybean price. A higher soybean price was found to 
significantly reduce private ending stocks of soybeans while a higher corn price was 
found to significantly increase those stocks. The soybean production, beginning private 
stocks of soybeans, and government soybean ending stocks are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. A larger soybean production and larger beginning private stocks of 
soybeans were found to reduce private ending stocks of soybeans while a larger 
government soybean ending stocks were found to increase those stocks. Those variables 
in equation (2) in Table 3 account for 90.4% of the variation in the soybean private 
ending stocks equation. The value of Durbin-h is 0.0375, approximately equal to 0, 
indicating no serial correlation. 
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 The national wholesale price of soybeans (USOYPWC) is estimated in the model 
as a function of the national farm price of soybeans (equation (3) in Table 3). Dummy 
variables for year 1972, 1987 and 2010 are also added to capture the unobservable effect. 
The coefficient of the national farm price of soybeans is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. On average, the wholesale price was found to 2.23% higher than the national 
soybean farm price. 
 Total soybean ending stocks (USOYHTC) are calculated in the model as the sum 
of the total beginning stocks of soybeans, soybean production, and soybean imports 
minus the sum of soybean crush, soybean exports and seed, feed, and other use of 
soybeans (equation (6) in Table 3). This is the market clearing identity in the U.S. 
soybean model. 
  
Table 4. Estimated Domestic Price and Promotion Stock Elasticities of U.S. and 
Foreign Demand
a
 
 Domestic Price (S)  Promotion Stock 
 Soybeans
b
 Soymeal
c
 Soyoil
c
  Soybeans Soymeal Soyoil 
U.S. 0.014** -0.095*** -0.035***  0.023*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
EU  0.055*** -0.128*** -0.085***  0.027* 0.030* 0.035** 
Japan 0.012* -0.133*** -0.031  0.035* 0.044** 0.047*** 
China 0.059* -0.120* -0.027***  0.044*** 0.041* 0.029** 
ROW -1.00 -0.80 -0.80  0.048* 0.048* 0.049* 
a All elasticities evaluated at the mean of the data. *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, * 
= significant at the 10% level. 
b Elasticities of domestic demand with to respect to the gross soybean crushing margin for the U.S., EU-15/27, Japan, 
and China and elasticity of import demand with respect to soybean price for the Rest of the World (ROW). 
c Direct price elasticities of domestic demand for U.S., EU-15/27, Japan and China and direct import demand elasticity 
for ROW. In the U.S., the domestic demand is for high protein meal including soymeal.  
 
 Soymeal production (USOMSPC) is defined in the model to equal the soymeal 
extraction rate times soybeans crushed (equation (7) in Table 3). To analyze soymeal 
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demand, the demand for high protein meal is first estimated as a function of a high 
protein meal price, personal disposable income, feed demand for corn, and the stock of 
soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion of soymeal demand (equation (8) in 
Table 3). Dummy variables (D88T91, D97T10, and DUHPMDD) are also added to 
capture the unobservable effect. A higher high protein meal price significantly decreases 
a high protein meal use while a higher personal disposable income, greater feed demand 
for corn and stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for soymeal significantly increases 
a high protein meal use. The estimated elasticity of high protein meal demand with 
respect to the high protein meal price is -0.095 and the estimated elasticity of high 
protein meal demand with respect to the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for 
soymeal promotion is 0.032 (Table 4). Those variables in equation (8) in Table 3 
account for 99.5% of the variation in the demand equation for high protein meal. The 
value of Durbin-Watson is 1.5994, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial 
correlation. This equation is re-normalized on the high protein meal price for the 
simulations conducted in the next chapter. 
 High protein meal use (UHPMDDC) includes both cottonseed meal and peanut 
meal as close substitutes for soymeal. Therefore, to determine the demand for soymeal in 
the model, the cottonseed meal share of U.S. high protein meal use (UCOMDPC) is first 
estimated as a function of the wholesale price of cottonseed meal relative to the 
wholesale prices of soymeal and peanut meal weighted by consumption shares, the 
soybean protein equivalent of high protein meal production, defined as sum of the 
soybean protein equivalents of cottonseed meal, soymeal, and peanut meal, and the 
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cottonseed meal share of a high protein meal use lagged one period (equation (9) in 
Table 3). Dummy variables (D67T93 and D6080) are also added to capture the 
unobservable effect. All variables but D67T93are statistically significant at the 1% level 
indicating that a higher wholesale price of cottonseed meal decreases the cottonseed 
meal share of U.S. high protein meal use and a larger high protein meal production 
increases the share. Then, the soymeal share of U.S. high protein meal use is calculated 
to be one minus the endogenous cottonseed meal share of high protein meal use and the 
exogenous (and very small) peanut meal share of high protein meal use (equation (10) in 
Table 3). High protein meal use is calculated in the model as soymeal consumption 
divided by the soymeal share of high protein meal use (equation (11) in Table 3). The 
wholesale price of soymeal (USOMPWC) is calculated in the model as the wholesale 
price of high protein meal minus the weighted average of the wholesale prices of 
cottonseed meal and peanut meal (equation (12) in Table 3) 
 The ending stocks of soymeal (USOMHEC) also were estimated to be a function 
of wholesale real price of soymeal, beginning stocks of soymeal and dummy variable for 
U.S. embargo of U.S. soybean and product exports in 1972 (equation (13) in Table 3). 
Dummy variables (D60T70, D82, D91T04 and DUSOMH) are also added to capture the 
unobservable effects. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. A higher 
soymeal price was found to significantly reduce ending stocks of soymeal while a larger 
beginning stocks of soymeal was found to significantly increase those stocks. The U.S. 
embargo of U.S. soybean and product exports were found to increase stocks of soymeal 
in 1972. Those variables in equation (13) in Table 3 account for 83.6% of the variation 
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in the soymeal ending stocks equation. The value of Durbin-h is 0.1440, approximately 
equal to 0, indicating no serial correlation. 
 The consumption of soymeal (USOMDDC) is determined in the market clearing 
condition for the soymeal market as the sum of beginning soymeal stocks, soymeal 
imports, and soymeal production minus soymeal exports, soymeal ending stocks, and 
other use of soymeal. U.S. exports of soymeal are explained later in the global soymeal 
market clearing condition (equation (14) in Table 3). 
 Soyoil production (USOOSPC) is determined in the model as the soyoil 
extraction rate times the volume of soybeans crushed (soybean crush demand) (equation 
(15) in Table 3).  
 To analyze U.S. soyoil demand, U.S. oleic/linoleic oil use (UOLODDC) first is 
estimated as a function of a weighted average price of oleic/linoleic oils (soyoil, 
cottonseed oil, and peanut oil), a weighted average price of lauric oils (coconut oil and 
palm kernel oil), U.S. personal disposable income, and the stock of soybean checkoff 
expenditures for U.S. domestic soyoil promotion (equation (16) in Table 3). A dummy 
variable, DUECRIS, capture the effect of recent U.S. recession during 2008-2010. 
Dummy variables (D69T82, D89T95, and D12) are also added to capture the 
unobservable effects. All estimated coefficients are statistically significant (p<0.01) and 
their signs and magnitudes are all consistent with a priori expectations. An increase in 
the weighted average oleic/linoleic oil price decreases oleic/linoleic oil use while a 
higher personal disposable income and larger stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for 
soyoil increase the U.S. consumption of oleic/linoleic oils. The result also found that the 
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recent U.S. recession during 2008-2010 decreased oleic/linoleic oil use. The estimated 
elasticity of oleic/linoleic oil demand with respect to the weighted average price of 
oleic/linoleic oils is -0.095 (Table 4).  The estimated elasticity of oleic/linoleic oil 
demand with respect to the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for soyoil promotion 
is 0.035 (Table 4). Those variables in equation (16) in Table 3 account for 99.4% of the 
variation in the U.S. oleic/linoleic oil use equation. The value of Durbin-Watson is 
2.1965, approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
.  After estimating the total demand for oleic linoleic oils, the cottonseed oil share 
of that demand (UCOODPC) is then estimated as a function of the wholesale price of 
cottonseed oil relative to the wholesale prices of soyoil and peanut oil weighted by their 
consumption shares, the cottonseed oil production relative to the production of peanut oil 
and soyoil, and the cottonseed oil share of oleic/linoleic oil use in the previous period 
(equation (17) in Table 3).  Dummy variables (D6004 and D66) are also added to 
capture the unobservable effects. The wholesale price of cottonseed oil was significant at 
10% and negative sign indicates that a higher wholesale price of cottonseed oil reduces 
the cottonseed oil share of oleic/linoleic oil use. The cottonseed oil production and the 
cottonseed oil share in the previous period were significant at 1% and positive signs 
indicate that a larger production and a higher level of the cottonseed oil share in the 
previous period increase the cottonseed oil share of oleic/linoleic oil use. Those variables 
in equation (17) in Table 3 account for 98.3% of the variation in the cottonseed oil share 
equation. The value of Durbin-h is -0.3389, approximately close to 0, indicating no serial 
correlation. 
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 The soyoil share of oleic/linoleic oil use (USOODPC) is then calculated in the 
model as equal to one minus the endogenous cottonseed oil share and the exogenous 
(and very small) peanut oil share of oleic/linoleic oil use (equation (18) in Table 3). 
Then U.S. soyoil use (USOODDC) is calculated in the model as the total oleic/linoleic 
oil use times the soyoil share of oleic/linoleic oil use (equation (19) in Table 3). The 
wholesale price of oleic/linoleic oil (UOLOPWC) is calculated in the model as the 
weighted average of the wholesale prices of soyoil, cottonseed oil, and peanut oil 
(equation (20) in Table 3). 
 The private ending stocks of soyoil (USOOHEC) also were estimated to be a 
function of wholesale real price of soyoil, government PL480 exports of soyoil, 
government stocks of soyoil, beginning stocks of soyoil, and beginning stocks of soyoil 
lagged one year (equation (21) in Table 3). Dummy variables (D96T98, D01T03, and 
D0412) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. Private ending stocks of 
soyoil are found to be significantly (p<0.05) and negatively influenced by the changes in 
the wholesale price of soyoil as well as by government PL480 exports of soyoil. 
However, government stocks of soyoil are found to be insignificant at the 0.1% level. 
Changes in soyoil production on the other hand significantly (p<0.01) but positive 
impact changes in private soyoil ending stocks. Those variables in equation (21) in Table 
3 account for 87.1% of the variation in the private soyoil ending stocks equation. The 
value of Durbin-h is 0.6821. Note that this equation is re-normalized on price for the 
simulations conducted in the next chapter. 
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  Commercial exports of soyoil (USOOMEC) are calculated as the difference 
between total U.S. oil exports and exogenous government (PL480) exports of soyoil 
adjusted from thousands of tons to millions of pounds to be consistent with the other 
soyoil export data (equation (22) in Table 3). Total U.S. soyoil exports are explained 
later in the global soyoil market clearing condition. 
 Private stock of soyoil (USOOHEC) are explained in the mode as the difference 
between total soyoil stock and government stocks of soyoil (equation (23) in Table 3). In 
turn, total soyoil stocks (USOOHTC) are explained as the difference between the U.S. 
supply of soyoil (the sum of U.S. beginning stocks of soyoil, U.S. soyoil production, and 
exogenous imports minus the U.S. demand for soyoil (the sum of domestic soyoil 
consumption (USOODDC=USOLODDC*USOODPC), U.S. total soyoil exports, and an 
exogenous other uses of soyoil (equation (24) in Table 3). 
 In the major production regions, soybeans compete with corn. Therefore, the 
model also includes U.S. corn sector. Equations for regional and total corn acreage 
planted, regional and total corn acreage harvested, regional market price, corn demand 
were estimated similar to soybean sector.     
  The corn supply component of the U.S. sub-model consists of behavioral 
equations for acreage planted, acreage harvested, and yield in eight U.S. production 
regions (Cornbelt, Delta, South, Plains, Lakes, Atlantic ,Other and Residual). The model 
also includes identities explaining production, and expected prices in each of the eight 
regions (Table 5). 
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 The estimated parameters for the area planted equations in all eight regions are 
significant with correct signs, no serial correlation, and high adjusted R-squares 
(equations (1)-(8) in Table 5). In all eight regions, corn acreage planted is significantly 
influenced by the expected corn farm price. In the regional corn area planted equations, 
the statistically significant prices of substitute crops include soybean price in the 
Cornbelt region, soybean and rice prices in the Delta region, soybean price in the South 
region, soybean price in the Plains region, soybean and barley prices in the Lakes region, 
soybean and oats prices in the Atlantic region, soybeans and wheat prices in the Other 
region and soybeans and wheat prices in the Residual region. The indicator variable 
(DPIK) for the 1982 U.S. payment-in-kind (PIK) program is included in all regional corn 
area planted equations but the equation for the Delta region, the variable is found to be 
significantly (p<0.01) and negatively influenced by the changes in the corn area planted 
in each region. In equations for corn area planted in the Atlantic region and the Plains 
region, indicate variable (NORFLEC) for percent of acres required in the normal flex 
program under the 1990 farm bill is included. The variable is found to be significantly 
(at least p<0.1) and negatively influenced by the changes in the corn area planted in each 
region. The indicator variable (UCORARP) for the corn acreage reduction program 
requirement is included in all regional corn area planted equations but equations for the 
Other and the Residual regions, the variable is found to be significantly and negatively 
influenced by the changes in the corn area planted in each region. Time trend and 
dummy variables are also added in the equation for each region to capture the 
unobservable effects. 
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 The corn acreage harvested is determined in the model by corn acreage planted 
(equations (10)-(17) in Table 5). The regional harvested acreage estimation results 
indicate that, overall, more than 90% of planted acres are harvested. However, only 77.4% 
of planted acres are harvested in the Other region (equations (14) in Table 5) and only 
64.9% of planted acres are harvested in the Residual region (equations (17) in Table 5). 
Both regions plant corn in relatively small acres compared to acres of corn planted in 
other regions. The estimated parameters for the corn acreage harvested equations in all 
eight regions are significant with correct signs, no serial correlation, and high adjusted 
R-squares. 
 Corn production in each region is defined in the model as acreage harvested 
times yield (equations (19)-(26) in Table 5). Total U.S. corn production (UCORSPC) is 
the sum of corn production in all of the regions (equations (27) in Table 5). Also, 
regional corn farm prices are linked in the model to the national corn farm price 
(UCORPFC) (equations (28)-(35) in Table 5). A coefficient of the national corn farm 
price in each of the equation is close to one implies that in the long-run regional corn 
farm prices and the national corn farm price were nearly equal. 
 The expected corn farm price, PC
e
, defined for each region as: 
 
(10) PC
e
 = MAX(PCt-1, LCt  (1- RCt))  D5973 + MAX(PCt-1, TCt  (1- RCt))  D7490 + 
MAX(PCt-1, TCt  (1- RCt - NFt) + LCt  NFt)  D9195 + MAX(PCt-1, LCt)  D9601 + 
MAX(PSt-1, 0.85  TCt + 0.15  MAX(PSt-1, LSt))  D0212 
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where LC = the corn average loan rate; TC = corn target price; RC = corn acreage 
reduction program requirement rate; NF = percent of acres required in the normal flex 
program; D5973 = indicator variable which equals 1 for 1959/60 through 1973/74 and 0 
otherwise; D7490 = indicator variable which equals 1 for 1974/75 through 1990/91 and 
0 otherwise; D9195 = indicator variable which equals 1 for 1991/92 through 1995/96 
and 0 otherwise; D9601 = indicator variable which equals 1 for 1996/97 through 
2001/02 and 0 otherwise; and  D0212 = indicator variable which equals 1 for 2002/03 
through 2012/13 and 0 otherwise. Equations (36)-(43) in Table 5 are the expected 
regional corn farm prices equations. The national corn farm price (UCORPPC) is the 
weighted average of corn farm price in all of the regions (equations (44) in Table 5). 
 Total corn demand includes both feed use and food use. Therefore, both uses are 
estimated separately. Corn demand for feed use (UCORDFC) is first estimated as a 
function of the wholesale price of corn, farm price of hogs, and grain consuming animal 
units (equation (45) in Table 5). Dummy variables (D60T72 and D09T12) are also added 
to capture the unobservable effects. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. As expected, the results show that a higher wholesale price of corn reduces corn 
demand for feed use while a higher farm price of hogs and a larger number of grain 
consuming animal units increase corn demand for feed use. Those variables in equation 
(45) in Table 5 account for 93.7% of the variation in the corn demand for feed use 
equation. The value of Durbin-Watson is 2.0271, approximately equal to 2, indicating no 
serial correlation. 
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Table 5. The U.S. Corn Component of the World Soybean Model 
 
Regional and Total U.S. Acreage Planted 
 
(1) ACORSAC = -557.5309 + 1031.606*ACORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 253.019*ASOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) − 1190.33*AOATPPC/LAG(UFPI67) 
                                 (277.6)      (220.4)                                                     (116.9)                                                   (366.0)               
 + 0.9260*LAG(ACORSAC) − 698.484*DPIK − 6.4886*UCORARP − 13.5029*NORFLEX − 631.839*DACORS1  
                                 (0.05)                                       (213.6)                (3.73)                            (6.77)                            (124.5)               
+ 377.6361* DACORS2  
                                 (138.80)                                                                                                                        Adj. R2=0.9289    Dh=0.2444 
  
(2) CCORSAC = 25912.89 + 6544.666*CCORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 2022.57*CSOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) + 0.2608*LAG(CCORSAC)  
                            (2987.13)     (1455.74)                                                 (711.3)                                                  (0.07)                 
− 187.646*UCORARP − 12405.1*DPIK − 10168.2*D61 + 2939.353*D77T84 − 2764.46*DCCORS  
                                 (24.86)                           (1445.0)               (1344.2)            (628.0)                       (556.5) 
                                                                                                                                                                               Adj. R2=0.8318    Dh=0.6557 
  
(3) DCORSAC = 385.5977 + 455.7042*DCORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 194.721*DSOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) − 48.7536*DRICPPC/LAG(UFPI67)  
                              (161.6)        (134.3)                                                    (74.25)                                                    (25.85)   
+ 0.7455*LAG(DCORSAC) − 6.3385*UCORARP + 1410.126*D07 + 463.196*DDCORSA  
     (0.04)                                     (2.4945)                       (139.4)               (52.45)                 Adj. R2=0.9420    Dh=-0.1698 
  
(4) LCORSAC = 7396.440 + 4441.309*LCORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 710.603*LSOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) − 2049.011*LBARPPC/LAG(UFPI67) 
                             (1226.85)     (814.47)                                                 (310.14)                                                 (705.43)       
+ 0.3956*LAG(LCORSAC) − 109.823*UCORARP − 4584.758*DPIK − 2948.36*D6061 + 1695.28*D77T85 + 894.263*DLCORS 
   (0.07)                                       (13.16)                          (615.18)                (460.01)                (268.28)                   (352.34)                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                Adj. R2=0.8890    Dh=-0.4382 
 
(5) OCORSAC = 291.3514 + 627.5862*OCORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 101.4770*OSOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) − 153.761*OWHEPPC/LAG(UFPI67)  
                              (154.1)        (95.31)                                                    (44.29)                                                     (52.06)                                             
+ 0.8007*LAG(OCORSAC) − 341.068*DPIK − 195.052*D60T70 + 222.6691*D77T81 + 246.5734*D8497 
    (0.05)                                      (85.41)                 (44.15)                     (48.09)                       (56.82)                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                Adj. R2=0.9650    Dh=1.0178 
 
(6) PCORSAC = -171042 + 4835.942*PCORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 854.577*PSOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) + 0.5710*LAG(PCORSAC) − 4642.32*DPIK  
                           (31982.6)   (1176.2)                                                   (396.9)                                                  (0.08)                                     (860.7)                            
− 50.2303*UCORARP − 62.0088*NORFLEX + 88.1054*TIME − 1481.28*D85T87 − 2264.58*DPCORS  
    (22.24)                           (27.51)                           (16.40)                 (546.6)                    (537.4)                                                  
                                                                                                                                                                             Adj. R2=0.9413    Dh=-0.1370 
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Table 5 Continued. 
 
(7) SCORSAC = 706.5924 + 2054.194*SCORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 490.5360*SSOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) + 0.6898*LAG(SCORSAC)  
                             (367.14)     (355.13)                                                   (172.80)                                                 (0.04)                                                     
− 1058.528*DPIK − 15.1979*UCORARP − 827.6628*DSCORS1 + 1107.025*DSCORS2 
    (328.34)                  (5.48)                           (201.85)                          (200.60)                   Adj. R2=0.9047    Dh=-0.6499 
  
(8) TCORSAC = -17454 + 710.3939*TCORPPC/LAG(UFPI67) − 127.5255*OSOYPCC/LAG(UFPI67) − 329.2298*OWHEPPC/LAG(UFPI67)  
                             (4334.1)  (142.66)                                                   (61.89)                                                    (68.60)                               
+ 0.9185*LAG(TCORSAC) − 497.8490*DPIK + 8.9044*TIME − 287.5030*D01T06 − 313.9572*DSTCORS  
    (0.06)                                     (109.10)                 (2.21)                  (54.11)                       (48 .14)                                     
                                                                                                                                                                   Adj. R2=0.9729     Dh=0.2641 
  
(9) UCORSAC=(ACORSAC+CCORSAC+DCORSAC+LCORSAC+OCORSAC+PCORSAC+SCORSAC+TCORSAC)/1000 
 
Regional and Total U.S. Acreage Harvested 
  
(10) ACORSHC = -154.1743 + 0.8895*ACORSAC + 110.0273*D03T12 
                                 (53.95)        (0.02)                  (30.95)                                                                           Adj. R2=0.9867    DW=1.7547 
 
(11) CCORSHC = -44111.1 + 0.9520*CCORSAC + 22.3608*TIME 
                               (6573.5)      (0.02)                (3.44)                                                                            Adj. R2=0.9885    DW=1.8338 
 
(12) DCORSHC = -3220.83 + 0.9771*DCORSAC + 1.5898*TIME 
                               (589.0)     (0.008)                (0.30)                                                                  Adj. R2=0.9970    DW=1.8007 
 
(13) LCORSHC = -55827.5  + 0.9152*LCORSAC + 27.6145*TIME 
                              (8113.3)       (0.04)                 (4.24)                                                                                        Adj. R2=0.9636    DW=1.8513 
 
(14) OCORSHC = -5343.14 + 0.7739*OCORSAC + 2.4595*TIME + 223.4563*D6061 
                               (1550.5)      (0.03)                (0.78)                  (64.85)                                      Adj. R2=0.9367    DW=1.6207 
 
(15) PCORSHC = -50268.2 + 0.9776*PCORSAC + 554.2467*D81T00 + 24.4498*TIME 
                             (21206.7)    (0.05)              (170.42)                     (11.02)                                                  Adj. R2=0.9834    DW=1.7174 
 
(16) SCORSHC = -10100.7 + 0.9280*SCORSAC + 4.9344*TIME − 1638.570*D77 − 533.4324*D9811 
                              (2118.4)     (0.02)               (1.04)                  (92.54)            (63.73)                 Adj. R2=0.9908    DW=1.9735 
 
(17) TCORSHC = -335.0729 + 0.6487*TCORSAC + 214.8242*D81T00  
                               (40.64)        (0.02)                 (21.49)                                                              Adj. R2=0.9691    DW=1.8500 
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(18) UCORSHC=(ACORSHC+CCORSHC+DCORSHC+LCORSHC+OCORSHC+PCORSHC+SCORSHC+TCORSHC)/1000 
 
Regional and U.S. Production  
 
(19) ACORSPC=ACORSYC*ACORSHC 
(20) CCORSPC=CCORSYC*CCORSHC 
(21) DCORSPC=DCORSYC*DCORSHC 
(22) LCORSPC=LCORSYC*LCORSHC 
(23) OCORSPC=OCORSYC*OCORSHC 
(24) PCORSPC=PCORSYC*PCORSHC 
(25) SCORSPC=SCORSYC*SCORSHC 
(26) TCORSPC=TCORSYC*TCORSHC 
(27) UCORSPC=(ACORSPC+CCORSPC+DCORSPC+LCORSPC+OCORSPC+PCORSPC+SCORSPC+TCORSPC)/1000 
 
Regional Market Price (Farm Level)  
 
(28) ACORPFC = 0.0667 + 1.0639*UCORPFC + 0.2361*D96T98  
                              (0.04)      (0.02)                          (0.08)                                                                             Adj. R2=0.9887    DW=1.9383 
 
(29) CCORPFC = -0.0318 + 1.0167*UCORPFC − 0.0211*D80T85  
                               (0.01)   (0.003)            (0.01)                                                                                            Adj. R2=0.9998    DW=1.8609 
 
(30) DCORPFC = 0.2031 + 0.9872*UCORPFC + 0.8111*D85 − 0.6626*D0710  
                               (0.06)   (0.02)                          (0.18)              (0.14)                                               Adj. R2=0.9775    DW=1.8939 
 
(31) LCORPFC = -0.0427 + 0.9862*UCORPFC − 0.112*D80 − 0.1034*D96T98  
                                (0.01)    (0.01)                          (0.05)              (0.03)                                               Adj. R2=0.9985    DW=2.0341 
 
(32) OCORPFC = 0.0790 + 1.1178*UCORPFC − 0.3158*D73T75 − 0.5577*D0812  
                             (0.04)   (0.01)                          (0.06)                     (0.09)                                 Adj. R2=0.9931    DW=1.8893 
 
(33) PCORPFC = -0.0175 + 0.9825*UCORPFC + 0.2850*D82 + 0.0522*D92T95  
                              (0.01)   (0.004)            (0.03)              (0.02)                                                      Adj. R2=0.9992    DW=1.5920 
 
(34) SCORPFC = 0.1078 + 1.0302*UCORPFC + 0.0811*D96T06 + 0.3443*D08 − 0.5629*D10  
                              (0.03)   (0.01)                         (0.03)                      (0.09)      (0.09)                 Adj. R2=0.9953    DW=1.5615 
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(35) TCORPFC = 0.2414 + 0.9785*UCORPFC + 0.1053*D92T05 + 0.1866*D8509  
                              (0.02)   (0.01)                          (0.02)                     (0.06)                               Adj. R2=0.9958    DW=1.5243 
 
Regional Expected Farm Price  
(36) ACORPPC=MAX(LAG(ACORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(ACORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(ACORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100-
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(ACORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601 
+MAX(LAG(ACORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MAX(LAG(ACORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(37) CCORPPC=MAX(LAG(CCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(CCORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(CCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 -
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(CCORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601 
+MAX(LAG(CCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MAX(LAG(CCORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(38) DCORPPC=MAX(LAG(DCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(DCORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(DCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 -
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(DCORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601 
+MAX(LAG(DCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MAX(LAG(DCORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(39) LCORPPC=MAX(LAG(LCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(LCORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(LCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 -
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(LCORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601 
+MAX(LAG(LCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MAX(LAG(LCORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(40) OCORPPC=MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(OCORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100-
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601 
+MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MAX(LAG(OCORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(41) PCORPPC=MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(PCORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 -
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601 
+MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MAX(LAG(PCORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(42) SCORPPC=MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(SCORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 -
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601 
+MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MAX(LAG(SCORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(43) TCORPPC=MAX(LAG(TCORPFC),UCORPLC*(1-UCORARP/100))*D5973+MAX(LAG(TCORPFC), UCORPTC*(1-
UCORARP/100))*D7490+MAX(LAG(TCORPFC),UCORPTC*(1-UCORARP/100 -
NORFLEX/100)+NORFLEX/100*UCORPLC)*D9195+MAX(LAG(TCORPFC),UCORPLC)*D9601+MAX(LAG(TCORPFC),UCORPTC*.85+MA
X(LAG(TCORPFC),UCORPLC)*.15)*D0212 
(44) UCORPPC=(CCORSPC*CCORPPC+LCORSPC*LCORPPC+ACORSPC*ACORPPC+DCORSPC*DCORPPC+     
SCORSPC*SCORPPC+PCORSPC*PCORPPC+TCORSPC*TCORPPC+OCORSPC*OCORPPC)/ (UCORSPC*1000) 
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Table 5 Continued. 
 
U.S. Corn Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
  
(45) UCORDFC = -2872.842 − 803.9319*UCORPWC/UWPI67R + 39.1739*UHOGPFC/UFPI67 + 93.6365*UGCAUA − 640.7848*D60T72  
                               (867.45)       (134.36)                                        (12.86)                                         (7.98)                          (86.72) 
− 799.6046*D09T12  
    (145.04)                                                                                                                  Adj. R2=0.9374    DW=2.0271  
 
(46) UCORDOC = 41442.97 − 192.1923*UCORPWC/UWPI67R + 143.0643*UWHEPFC/UFPI67 + 1.0734*UYDA/UCPI67  
                               (10922.4)      (62.82)                                              (46.92)                                            (0.22)       
+ 0.8689*LAG(UCORDOC) − 21.3364*TIME + 215.4102*D8306 + 890.2176*D07T11 − 395.0986*D0811  
    (0.02)                                       (5.60)                   (54.62)                     (58.91)                       (68.14)                                                
                                                                                                                                                                    Adj. R2=0.9981    Dh=0.4693 
 
(47) UCORMEC = -2613.938 + 3.8396*UCORPXA*XECUSA + 0.3979*LAG(UCORMEC) − 0.3471*RCORMEC  
                                  (410.42)     (1.14)                                           (0.08)                                       (0.08)                         
+ 21.7164*(JGCAUA/1000+EGCAUA) + 305.8553*D75T80 − 491.7897*D8512 + 643.6149*D94  
     (3.12)                                                        (79.38)                      (136.97)                   (171.64 ) 
                                                                                                                                                                   Adj. R2=0.9295    Dh=0.3916 
 
(48) UCORHOC = -1839.07 − 264.4900*UCORPWC + 0.3646*UCORSPC + 0.4280*LAG(UCORHCC) + 0.4098*LAG(UCORHOC)  
                                  (185.62)   (26.21)                              (0.02)                         (0.09)                                       (0.03)                                                                                
− 462.6438*DFB02 + 882.0963*D60T88 + 616.0774*D8192 + 1169.174*D8285 − 643.8321*D07T10  
     (100.60)                   (88.97)                       (134.43)                  (144.44)                    (123.71)     
                                                                                                                                                                             Adj. R2=0.9486    Dh=-0.3727 
(49) UCORPFC = 0.0332 + 0.9061*UCORPWC  
                               (0.05)     (0.02)                                                                                                          Adj. R2=0.9824    DW=2.1079  
 
(50) UCORPXA = 30.9727 + 41.9329*UCORPWC − 34.0872*XECUSA + 19.6713*D7282 + 25.1935*D0509 − 49.8119*D12 
                             (10.66)     (1.13)              (10.55)                          (5.31)        (5.45)            (8.60) 
                                                                                                                                                                 Adj. R2=0.9830    DW=2.0096 
 
(51) UCORHOC=UCORHTC−UCORHCC  
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 Corn demand for food use (UCORDOC) is significantly influenced by the 
wholesale price of corn, wholesale price of wheat, personal disposable income, and corn 
demand for food use lagged one year (equation (46) in Table 5). Time trend and dummy 
variables (D8306, D07T11, and D0811) are also added to capture the unobservable 
effects. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results show that a 
higher wholesale price of corn reduces corn demand for food use while a higher 
wholesale price of wheat and a higher personal disposable income increase corn demand 
for food use. Those variables in equation (46) in Table 5 account for 99.8% of the 
variation in the corn demand for food use equation. The value of Durbin-h is 0.4693, 
approximately close to 0, indicating no serial correlation. 
 The corn exports (UCORMEC) were estimated to be a function of the export 
price of U.S. corn multiplied by EU-US exchange rate, corn exports by non-U.S. corn 
exporting countries, grain consuming animal units in EU and Japan, and U.S. corn 
exports lagged one year (equation (47) in Table 5). All variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The results show that a higher the EU import price of U.S. 
corn and greater numbers of grain consuming animal units in EU and Japan increase 
corn exports while greater corn exports by non-U.S. corn exporting countries decrease 
corn exports. Dummy variables (D75T80, D8512, and D94) are also added to capture the 
unobservable effects. Those variables in equation (47) in Table 5 account for 93% of the 
variation in the corn exports equation. The value of Durbin-h is 0.3916, approximately 
close to 0, indicating no serial correlation. 
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 Corn private ending stocks (USOYHOC) are an identity in the model calculated 
as total ending stocks minus government ending stocks (equation (51) in Table 5). Note 
that private ending stocks of corn also were estimated to be a function of the wholesale 
price of corn, corn production, government beginning stocks, beginning private stocks of 
corn and indicator variable to capture the effects of the 1990 farm bill during 2002-2006 
which equals 1 for 2002/03 through 2006/07 and 0 otherwise. (equation (48) in Table 5). 
Dummy variables (D60T88, D8192, D8285, and D07T10) are also added to capture the 
unobservable effects. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. A higher 
wholesale price of corn was found to significantly reduce private ending stocks of corn 
while a larger corn production was found to significantly increase those stocks. The 
results also show that larger government beginning stocks and beginning private stocks 
of corn increase private ending stocks while the 1990 farm bill decrease those stocks. 
Those variables in equation (48) in Table 5 account for 94.9% of the variation in the 
corn private ending stock equation. The value of Durbin-h is -0.3727, approximately 
close to 0, indicating no serial correlation. 
 The national farm price of corn (UCORPFC) is estimated in the model as a 
function of the national wholesale price of corn (equation (49) in Table 5). The 
coefficient of the national wholesale price of corn is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. On average, the farm price was found to 9.4% lower than the national soybean 
wholesale price. The national wholesale price of corn accounts for 98.2% of the 
variation in the national farm price of corn. 
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 The U.S. export price of corn (UCORPXA) is linked in the model to the national 
wholesale price of corn (converted from bushels to tons) (equation (50) in Table 5). 
Dummy variables (D7282, D0509, and D12) are also added to capture the unobservable 
effects. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. A higher wholesale 
price of corn was found to significantly increase an export price of corn while a higher 
EU-US exchange rate was found to significantly decrease the export price. Those 
variables in equation (50) in Table 5 account for 98.3% of the variation in the export 
price of corn equation. The value of Durbin-Watson is 2.0096, approximately equal to 2, 
indicating no serial correlation. 
 Total corn ending stocks (UCORHTC) are calculated in the model as the sum of 
the total beginning stocks of corn, corn production, and corn imports minus the sum of 
feed and food use of corn, corn exports and seed and other use of corn (equation (52) in 
Table 5). 
 
European Union (15/27) Sub Model  
 In the EU 15/27 sub-model, soybean crush demand (ESOYDCC) is specified to 
be a function of the crush margin, the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for the 
promotion of soybeans in the EU 15/27, an indicator variable (DECRIS) to capture the 
effects of the economic crisis in the EU during 2008-2012 which equals 1 for 2008/09 
through 2012/13 and 0 otherwise, and an indicator variable (BEBANM) to capture the 
effects of a ban on the use of meat and bone meal in animal feeds which equals 1 for 
2000/01 through 2002/03 and 0 otherwise (equation (1) in Table 6). The crush margin is 
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calculated as the sum of the EU 15/27 soymeal extraction rate multiplied by the EU 
15/27 soymeal import price and the EU 15/27 soyoil extraction rate multiplied by the EU 
15/27 soyoil export price minus the EU 15/27 import price of soybeans (import and 
export prices are based on CIF Rotterdam). Dummy variables (D7172, DESOYDC1, 
DESOYDC2, and DESOYDC3) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The 
promotion expenditures are deflated by EU 15/27 wholesale price index and the 
expenditures are converted from dollars to Special Drawing Right (SDR). Since there are 
zero promotion expenditures in some years, a square root transformation is used to 
capture diminishing marginal returns instead of using a logarithmic transformation. All 
variables but the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. A higher crush margin and the ban on the use of meat and bone meal in 
animal feeds were found to increase soybean crush demand while the economic crisis in 
the EU during 2008-2012 were found to decrease soybean crush demand. The stock of 
soybean checkoff expenditures is statistically significant at the 10% level. As expected, 
the results show that the crush margin and the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures 
for soybean promotion in the EU 15/27 are positively related to the EU 15/27 soybean 
crush demand. The estimated elasticities of the EU 15/27 soybean demand with respect 
to the EU 15/27 gross soybean crush margin and the stock of soybean checkoff 
expenditures to promote soybeans in the EU 15/27 are 0.055 and 0.027, respectively 
(Table 4). The results indicate that EU 15/27 crush demand is almost four times more 
elastic with respect to crush margin than U.S. crush demand. This may reflect the trend 
in the EU 15/27 that changing the plants from soybeans to rapeseed or multi-seed 
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crushing plants. In addition, crush demand in the EU 15/27 is found to have a similar 
response to the promotion stock as that in the U.S. 
 The EU15/27 import price of soybeans (ESOYPIA, CIF Rotterdam) is linked in 
the model to the U.S. wholesale price of soybeans (converted from bushels to tons) 
(equation (2) in Table 6). A dummy variable (D06T12) is also added to capture the 
unobservable effects. The EU15/27 import price of soybeans are found to be 
significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes in the U.S. wholesale 
price of soybeans. Those variables in equation (2) in Table 6 account for 95.9% of the 
variation in the EU15/27 import price of soybeans. The value of Durbin-Watson is 
2.2724, approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
 In the EU-soybean market clearing condition, EU 15/27 net imports of soybeans 
is (ESOMMIC) determined as the sum of soybean crush, the (exogenous) EU 15/27 
ending stocks of soybeans, and EU 15/27 seed, feed and other use of soybeans minus the 
sum of the EU 15/27 soybean beginning stocks of soybeans and the small (exogenous) 
volume of EU 15/27 soybean production (equation (3) in Table 6). 
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Table 6. The EU 15/27 Component of the World Soybean Model 
EU 15/27 Soybean Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
  
(1) ESOYDCC = 13093.34 + 4.2611*((ESOMQ*ESOMPIA+ESOOQ*ESOOPXA-ESOYPIA)*XECUSA/ECWPI2*1000) 
                               (251.5)      (0.55)                             
+ 137.6906*LAG(SQRT(ESOYEXPR)) − 1731.52*DECRIS + 1989.251*DEBANM − 5535.009*D7172 − 2368.13*DESOYDC1  
                                  (78.5)                                                        (208.9)                      (263.1)                           (283.0)                   (304.6)                                                       
+ 1203.453*DESOYDC2 − 652.3122*DESOYDC3 
                                 (117.5)                               (232.1)                                                                               Adj. R2=0.9676    DW=2.2525 
  
 
(2) ESOYPIA = 44.8508 + 29.7026*USOYPWC + 61.8033*D06T12 
                           (13.14)   (2.07)                             (12.92)                                                                Adj. R2=0.9590    DW=2.2724 
 
(3) ESOYMIC = ESOYDCC + ESOYDZC + ESOYHEC - LAG(ESOYHEC) - ESOYSPC 
 
EU 15/27 Soybean Meal Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(4) ESOMSPC = ESOMQ*ESOYDCC 
 
(5) ESOMDDC = 8430.979 − 1158.264*(ESOMPIA*XECUSA/ECWPI2) + 0.7873*LAG(ESOMDDC) + 270.7432*LAG(SQRT(ESOMEXPR))  
                               (1132.6)      (146.0)                                                              (0.03)                                       (157.9)                                      
− 2434.332*DEPRECAP93 + 3291.410*DESOMDD1 − 1950.32*DESOMDD2  
    (378.8)                                   (454.2)                               (420.2)                                 Adj. R2=0.9883    Dh=-0.4729     
 
(6) ESOMPIA = -13.2177 + 1.1329*USOMPWC − 39.2104*D8812 + 35.9432*D9406 
                             (7.31)        (0.03)                           (11.26)                   (10.13)                                Adj. R2=0.9702    DW=2.3856 
 
(7) ESOMMIC = ESOMDDC + ESOMDZC + ESOMHEC - LAG(ESOMHEC) - ESOMSPC  
 
EU 15/27 Soybean Oil Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(8) ESOOSPC = ESOOQ*ESOYDCC 
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Table 6 Continued. 
 
(9) ESOODDC = 998.3777 −26.4739*(ESOOPXA*XECUSA/ECWPI2) + 0.4407*LAG(ESOODDC) + 33.1813*LAG(SQRT(ESOOEXPR))  
                              (109.0)        (6.84)                                                                (0.05)                                    (13.43)                  
+ 335.3159*DEBIOFUEL + 767.4776*DEGERBF + 276.8694*D92T94 + 535.3035*D7310 − 329.26*D8511 
     (66.99)                                (73.23)                            (73.23)                       (97.48)                   (82.49)                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                  Adj. R2=0.9536    Dh=-0.2733 
     
 
(10) ESOOPXA = 38.1232 + 20.0751*USOOPWC + 97.6002*D05T11 − 180.0264*D74 
                              (16.80)     (0.69)                              (18.16)                      (34.05)                                Adj. R2=0.9786    DW=1.8403 
 
(11) ESOOMXC = LAG(ESOOHEC) + ESOOSPC - ESOODDC - ESOODZC – ESOOHEC 
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 The EU-27 soymeal production (ESOMSPC) is defined as the EU-27 soymeal 
extraction rate times the volume of EU-27 soybean crush (equation (4) in Table 6). 
 The EU-27 soymeal demand (ESOMDDC) is estimated as a function of the EU-
27 import price of soymeal, lagged EU-27 soymeal demand, and the stock of soybean 
checkoff expenditures for EU-27 soymeal promotion (equation (5) in Table 6). Dummy 
variables (DEPRECAP93, DESOMDD1, and DESOMDD2) are also added to capture 
the unobservable effects. The promotion expenditures are deflated by EU 15/27 
wholesale price index and the expenditures are converted from dollars to SDR. Since 
there are zero promotion expenditures in some years, a square root transformation is 
used to capture diminishing marginal returns instead of using a logarithmic 
transformation. The signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are consistent 
with prior expectations. As expected, EU-27 soymeal demand is significantly (p<0.01) 
and inversely related to the EU-27 soymeal import price but significantly (p<0.1) and 
positively related to the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for EU-27 soymeal 
promotion. The estimated elasticity of the EU-27 soymeal demand with respect to the 
EU-27 soymeal import price and the promotion stock of soybean checkoff expenditures 
for EU 15/27 soymeal promotion are -0.128 and 0.030. According to the rich existence 
of substitute good such as rapeseed meal or canola meal, the EU 15/27 soymeal demand 
is more elastic with respect to soymeal price than U.S. soymeal demand. Soymeal 
demand in the EU 15/27 is found to a have similar response to the promotion stock as 
that in the U.S. Those variables in equation (5) in Table 6 account for 98.8% of the 
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variation in the EU15/27 soymeal demand. The value of Durbin-h is -0.4729, 
approximately close to 0, indicating no serial correlation.    
 The EU15/27 import price of soymeal (ESOMPIA, CIF Rotterdam) is linked in 
the model to the U.S. wholesale price of soymeal (equation (6) in Table 6). Dummy 
variables (D8812 and D9406) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The 
EU15/27 import price of soymeal is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively 
influenced by the changes in the U.S. wholesale price of soymeal. Those variables in 
equation (6) in Table 6 account for 97.0% of the variation in the EU15/27 import price 
of soymeal. The value of Durbin-Watson is 2.3856, approximately close to 2, indicating 
no serial correlation. 
 The EU 15/27 net imports of soymeal (ESOMMIC) is determined in the EU 
15/27 soymeal market clearing condition as the sum of EU 15/27 soymeal use, EU 15/27 
other use of soymeal, and EU 15/27 ending stocks of soymeal minus the sum of the EU 
15/27 beginning stocks of soymeal and EU 15/27 soymeal production (equation (7) in 
Table 6).  
 The EU 15/27 soyoil production (ESOOSPC) is calculated in the model as the 
EU-27 soyoil extraction rate times the EU 15/27 soybeans crush (equation (8) in Table 
6). 
 The EU 15/27 soyoil demand (ESOODDC) is explained in the model as a 
function of the EU 15/27 price of soyoil (export), the stock of soybean checkoff 
expenditures for soyoil demand promotion in the EU 15/27, and indicate variables for 
biodiesel use promotion policies (equation (9) in Table 6). The promotion expenditures 
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are deflated by EU 15/27 wholesale price index and the expenditures are converted from 
dollars to SDR. Since there are zero promotion expenditures in some years, a square root 
transformation is used to capture diminishing marginal returns instead of using a 
logarithmic transformation. EU 15/27 soyoil demand is significantly (p<0.01) and 
inversely related to the EU 15/27 soyoil price but significantly (p<0.05) and positively 
related to the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for soyoil promotion in the EU 
15/27. The indicate variable, DEBIOFUEL, is include in the equation to capture the 
effects of the period that EU 15/27 encouraged the use of biodiesel over the last decade 
in 2000s which equals 1 for 2000/01 through 2012/13 and 0 otherwise and DEBIOFUEL 
had a positive impact on EU-27 soyoil demand. The indicate variable, DEGERBF, is 
used to capture the effects of the period that biodiesel promotion policy in Germany in 
the mid-2000s which equals 1 for 2005/06 through 2007/08 and 0 otherwise. During that 
period, EU-27 soyoil demand was significantly increased. The estimated elasticities of 
EU-27 soyoil demand with respect to the EU-27 soyoil price and to the stock of soybean 
checkoff expenditures to promote EU-27 soyoil demand are -0.085 and 0.035 (Table 4). 
The EU 15/27 soyoil demand is more elastic with respect to soyoil price than U.S. soyoil 
demand. Soyoil demand in the EU 15/27 is found to a have similar response to the 
promotion stock as that in the U.S. Those variables in equation (9) in Table 6 account for 
95.4% of the variation in the EU 15/27 soyoil demand equation. The value of Durbin-h 
is -0.02733, approximately close to 0, indicating no serial correlation.     
 The EU15/27 export price of soyoil (ESOOPXA, CIF Rotterdam) is linked in the 
model to the U.S. wholesale price of soyoil (equation (10) in Table 6). Dummy variables 
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(D05T11 and D74) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The EU15/27 
export price of soyoil is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by 
the changes in the U.S. wholesale price of soyoil. Those variables in equation (10) in 
Table 6 account for 97.9% of the variation in the EU15/27 export price of soyoil. The 
value of Durbin-Watson is 1.8403, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial 
correlation. 
 EU-27 net soyoil exports (ESOOMXC) are determined in the EU-27 soyoil 
market clearing condition as the sum of EU-27 soyoil beginning stocks and soyoil 
production minus the sum of EU-27 soyoil use, other use of soyoil, and soyoil ending 
stocks (equation (11) in Table 6). 
 
Japan Sub Model  
 Japan produces only a small volume of soybeans compared to the volume of 
soybeans crushed. In addition, nearly all soybeans produced in Japan are food grade 
soybeans intended for the production of tofu and other Japanese food products. Little of 
the domestic soybean production in Japan is actually processed for the oil and meal. 
Consequently, Japanese soybean production is treated as an exogenous variable in the 
model. 
 Japanese soybean crush demand (JSOYDCC) is a function of the Japanese crush 
margin delated by the Japanese wholesale price index, the stock of soybean checkoff 
expenditures for soybean promotion in Japan, and lagged crush demand (equation (1) in 
Table 7). The promotion expenditures are deflated by the Japanese wholesale price index 
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and the expenditures are converted from dollars to Yen. Since there are zero promotion 
expenditures in some years, a square root transformation is used to capture diminishing 
marginal returns instead of using a logarithmic transformation. The lagged crush volume 
is used as proxy for the Japanese crush capacity. The signs and magnitudes of all 
estimated coefficients in this equation are consistent with a priori expectations. The 
Japanese crush margin is calculated in the same way as the crush margins in the U.S. and 
all other countries (the soymeal extraction rate multiplied by the soymeal plus the soyoil 
extraction rate multiplied by the soyoil price minus the price of soybeans). The Japanese 
crush margin and lagged crush demand are statistically significant at 10% level and 
lagged crush demand is statistically significant at 1% level. As expected, the Japanese 
soybean crush demand is positively related to both the Japanese soybean crush margin 
and the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures to promote Japanese soybean crush 
demand. The estimated elasticities of Japanese soybean demand with respect to the gross 
Japanese soybean crush margin and to the promotion stock of soybean checkoff 
expenditures to promote Japanese soybean crush demand are 0.012 and 0.035, 
respectively. The results indicate that Japan crush demand is found to have similar 
responses to crush margin and the promotion stock of soybean checkoff expenditures as 
those in the U.S.       
 The unit import price of soybeans (JSOYPUA) is linked in the model to the U.S. 
wholesale price of soybeans adjusted from bushels to metric tons (equation (2) in Table 
7). The unit import price of soybeans was used rather than an import price because the 
former was available while another was not. Dummy variables (D71T98 and D99T03) 
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are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The Japanese unit import price of 
soybeans is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes 
in the U.S. wholesale price of soybeans. Those variables in equation (2) in Table 7 
account for 97.5% of the variation in Japanese unit import price of soybeans. The value 
of Durbin-Watson is 1.7407, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
  Japanese net imports of soybeans (JSOYMIC) is determined in the Japanese 
soybean market clearing condition as the sum of the Japanese soybean crush demand, 
seed, feed and other use of soybeans (exogenous), and ending stocks of soybeans 
(exogenous) minus the sum of Japanese beginning stocks of soybeans (exogenous) and 
the Japanese soybean production (exogenous) (equation (3) in Table 7). 
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Table 7. The Japan Component of the World Soybean Model 
 
Japan Soybean Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
  
(1) JSOYDCC = 324.2435 + 6.0132*(JSOMQ*JSOMPUA+JSOOQ*JSOOPUA-JSOYPUA)*XJAUSA/JWPI85/1000 + 0.7553*LAG(JSOYDCC)  
                            (158.7)        (3.27)                                                                                                                                          (0.05)                             
+ 0.4630*LAG(SQRT(JSOYEXPR)) + 419.5308* D74T01 + 259.3955*DJSOYDC + 807.7098*D02  
     (0.23)                                                  (62.14)                        (86.10)                             (157.0)     
                                                                                                                                                              Adj. R2=0.9410    Dh=-0.4883 
                      
  
(2) JSOYPUA = 106.4110 + 41.8791*USOYPWC − 94.0059*D71T98 − 58.8506*D99T03  
                            (19.59)     (1.84)                             (10.39)                     (13.83)                             Adj. R2=0.9745    DW=1.7407 
 
(3) JSOYMIC = JSOYDCC + JSOYDZC + JSOYHEC - LAG(JSOYHEC) - JSOYSPC 
 
Japan Soybean Meal Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(4) JSOMSPC = JSOMQ*JSOYDCC 
 
(5) JSOMDDC = 1717.758 − 10.3889*(JSOMPUA*XJAUSA/JWPI85/1000) + 0.5520*LAG(JSOMDDC) + 0.6279*LAG(SQRT(JSOMEXPR))  
                             (261.43)       (1.77)                                                                      (0.06)                                      (0.26)                                       
+ 384.4388*D01T11  + 224.565*D7276 − 310.9052*D74  
     (69.44)                       (93.71)                    (114.98)                                                    Adj. R2=0.9671    Dh=0.4638  
     
 
(6) JSOMPUA = 24.7730 + 1.1869*USOMPWC − 93.3954*D72 − 32.0520*D84T90 + 46.7747*D03T11 
                              (8.41)   (0.04)                         (16.59)                (6.90)              (7.11)                         Adj. R2=0.9751    DW=2.0444 
 
(7) JSOMMIC = JSOMDDC + JSOMDZC + JSOMHEC - LAG(JSOMHEC) - JSOMSPC  
 
 
Japan Soybean Oil Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(8) JSOOSPC = JSOOQ*JSOYDCC 
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Table 7 Continued. 
 
(9) JSOODDC = 87.8013 − 0.1497*(JSOOPUA*XJAUSA/JWPI85/1000) + 0.8464*LAG(JSOODDC) + 0.2147* LAG(SQRT(JSOOEXPR))  
                             (30.29)     (0.08)                                                                     (0.04)                                     (0.03)                      
+ 36.7814*D96T03 − 52.9913*DJSOODD − 117.2686*D74 
    (10.18)                      (10.05)                          (23.73)                                                Adj. R2=0.9518    Dh=-0.1843 
     
  
(10) JSOOPUA= -126.0805 + 22.6056*USOOPWC + 2.7059*D71T99*JTRPREWTO/XJAUSA + 4.8715*D00T12*JTRAFTWTO/XJAUSA  
                               (72.96)       (2.32)                             (0.53)                                                               (0.70)                                                   
+ 981.4840*D8586 
    (84.70)                                                                                                                        Adj. R2=0.9067    DW=1.7492 
  
(11) JSOOMIC = JSOODDC + JSOODZC + JSOOHEC - LAG(JSOOHEC) – JSOOSPC 
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 Japanese soymeal production (JSOMSPC) is calculated in the model as the 
Japanese soymeal extraction rate times the Japanese soybean crush demand (equation (4) 
in Table 7). 
 Japanese soymeal demand (JSOMDDC) is specified in the model as a function of 
the Japanese import price of soymeal in U.S. dollars multiplied by the Japan Yen/U.S. 
dollar exchange rate deflated by the Japanese wholesale price index and a stock of 
soybean checkoff expenditures for soymeal (equation (5) in Table 7). The promotion 
expenditures are deflated by the Japanese wholesale price index and the expenditures are 
converted from dollars to Yen. Since there are zero promotion expenditures in some 
years, a square root transformation is used to capture diminishing marginal returns 
instead of using a logarithmic transformation. The signs and magnitudes of all estimated 
coefficients are consistent with expectations. Japanese demand for soymeal is estimated 
to be significantly (p<0.01) and negatively related to the real Japanese price of soymeal 
and significantly (p<0.05) and positively relate to the stock of real soybean checkoff 
expenditures for the promotion of Japanese soymeal. The estimated elasticities of 
soymeal demand with respect to the real import price of soymeal and to the real stock of 
soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion of Japanese soymeal demand are -
0.133 and 0.044, respectively (Table 4). Japanese soymeal demand is less elastic with 
respect to soymeal price than U.S. soymeal demand. Soymeal demand in Japan is found 
to a have similar response to the promotion stock as that in the U.S. Those variables in 
equation (5) in Table 7 account for 96.7% of the variation in Japanese soymeal demand. 
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The value of Durbin-h is 0.4638, approximately close to 0, indicating no serial 
correlation.     
 Japanese unit import price (JSOMPUA) of soymeal is linked in the model to the 
U.S. wholesale price of soymeal (equation (6) in Table 7). Dummy variables (D72, 
D84T90 and D03T11) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The Japanese 
unit import price of soymeal is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively 
influenced by the changes in the U.S. wholesale price of soymeal. Those variables in 
equation (6) in Table 7 account for 97.5% of the variation in the Japanese unit import 
price of soymeal. The value of Durbin-Watson is 2.0444, approximately equal to 2, 
indicating no serial correlation. 
    Japanese net imports of soymeal (JSOMMIC) are determined in the Japanese 
soymeal market clearing condition as the sum of Japanese soymeal use, other use, and 
ending stocks minus Japanese soymeal beginning stocks and soymeal production 
(equation (7) in Table 7).  
 Japanese soyoil production (JSOOSPC) is defined in the model as the exogenous 
Japanese soyoil extraction rate times the crush volume of Japanese soybeans (equation 
(8) in Table 7). 
 Japanese soyoil demand (JSOODDC) is specified in the model as a function of 
the Japanese import price of soyoil (in U.S. dollars per metric ton) multiplied by the 
Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate and deflated by the Japanese wholesale price 
index, lagged Japanese soyoil demand, and the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures 
for the promotion of Japanese soyoil demand (equation (9) in Table 7). The promotion 
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expenditures are deflated by the Japanese wholesale price index and the expenditures are 
converted from dollars to Yen. Since there are zero promotion expenditures in some 
years, a square root transformation is used to capture diminishing marginal returns 
instead of using a logarithmic transformation. The regression results indicate that 
Japanese soyoil demand is significantly (p<0.1) and negatively related to the real 
Japanese import price of soyoil and significantly (p<0.01) and positively related to the 
stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion of Japanese soyoil demand 
with estimated elasticities of -0.031 and 0.047, respectively (Table 4). The results 
indicate that Japan soyoil demand is found to have similar responses to price of soyoil 
and the promotion stock of soybean checkoff expenditures as those in the U.S. Those 
variables in equation (9) in Table 7 account for 95.2% of the variation in the Japanese 
soyoil demand equation. The value of Durbin-h is -0.1843, approximately equal to 0, 
indicating no serial correlation. 
       Japanese import price of soyoil (JSOOPUA) is linked in the model to the U.S. 
wholesale price of soyoil (equation (10) in Table 7). Variables for exchange rates and 
tariffs on imports of soyoil are included in the equation. Since Japan implemented tariff 
on imports of soyoil to protect domestic industry (17,000 yen/ton until 1999 and 10,900 
yen/ton after 2000), two indicate variables, JTRPREWTO and JTRAFTWTO, were 
generated. JTRPREWTO equals 1 for the period until 1999/2000 and 0 otherwise and 
JTRAFTWTO equals 1 for the period after 1999/2000 and 0 otherwise. A dummy 
variable (D8586) is also added to capture the unobservable effects. Japanese import price 
of soyoil is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes 
 166 
 
in the U.S. wholesale price of soyoil. Those variables in equation (10) in Table 7 account 
for 90.7% of the variation in the Japanese import price of soyoil. The value of Durbin-
Watson is 1.7492, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
 Japanese net imports of soyoil (JSOOMIC) are explained in the model by the 
Japanese soyoil market clearing identity as the sum of Japanese soyoil use, other use, 
and ending soyoil stocks minus the sum of Japanese soyoil beginning stocks and soyoil 
production equation (11) in Table 7). 
 
China Sub Model  
 Given that China is a major force in world soybean markets, the Chinese 
production of soybeans is endogenized in the model. Chinese soybean acreage harvested 
(HSOYSHC) is specified as a function of last year’s acreage harvested and the Chinese 
farm prices of soybeans and corn (equation (1) in Table 8). Corn is the major substitute 
in production for soybeans in most areas of Chinese soybean production. Dummy 
variables (D90T92, DHSOYSH, and D9300) are also added to capture the unobservable 
effects. All variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. As expected, a higher 
farm price of soybeans was found to increase soybean acreage harvested while a higher 
farm price of corn was found to decrease soybean acreage harvested. Those variables in 
equation (1) in Table 8 account for 82.7% of the variation in the Chinese soybean 
acreage harvested. The value of Durbin-Watson is 1.9978, approximately equal to 2, 
indicating no serial correlation.  
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 Chinese soybean production (HSOYSPC) is calculated in the model as the 
(exogenous) Chinese soybean yield times the Chinese soybean acreage harvested 
(equation (2) in Table 8). 
 Chinese soybean crush demand (HSOYDCC) is specified to be a function of the 
Chinese crush margin deflated by the Chinese wholesale price index (HIPPI05), China 
crush demand lagged one year, the availability of soybeans for crushing in China, the 
stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion of Chinese soybean demand, 
and time trend (equation (3) in Table 8). The promotion expenditures are deflated by the 
Chinese wholesale price index and the expenditures are converted from dollars to yuan. 
Since there are zero promotion expenditures in some years, a square root transformation 
is used to capture diminishing marginal returns instead of using a logarithmic 
transformation. The lagged crush demand variable is used as a proxy for crush capacity 
and time trend variable is used as a proxy for crushing technology development. The 
Chinese crush margin is calculated as the (exogenous) Chinese soymeal extraction rate 
multiplied by the Chinese wholesale price of soymeal plus the (exogenous) Chinese 
soyoil extraction rate multiplied by the Chinese wholesale price of soyoil minus an 
import price of soybeans. 
 Because Chinese soybean crush was almost entirely from domestic production 
until the opening of Chinese soybean market in 1996 and thereafter depended primarily 
on imports, Chinese domestic soybean production and imports are used as proxy 
variables for the availability of soybeans in China for crushing during those two periods 
of time. All variables but crush margin are statistically significant at the 1% level. Crush 
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margin is statistically significant at the 10% level. As expected, the results show that a 
higher crush margin and a larger stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for promotion 
of China soybean demand tend to increase China’s soybean demand. The time trend 
variable also has a positive impact on crush demand implying that technological 
developments in crushing have allowed larger amounts of soybean crushed. The 
estimated elasticities of Chinese soybean crush demand with respect to the real China 
soybean crush margin and the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion 
of the demand for soybeans in China are 0.059 and 0.044, respectively (Table 4). The 
promotion elasticity for China is somewhat higher than for Japan (0.035) and the EU-27 
(0.027). 
 Chinese import price of soybeans (HSOYPIA) is linked in the model to the U.S. 
wholesale price of soybeans converted from bushels to metric tons and multiplied by the 
China yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate (equation (4) in Table 8). A dummy variable 
(D05T07) is also added to capture the unobservable effects. The Chinese import price of 
soybeans is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes 
in the U.S. wholesale price of soybeans. Those variables in equation (4) in Table 8 
account for 95.6% of the variation in the Chinese import price of soybeans. The value of 
Durbin-Watson is 1.8321, approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation.  
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Table 8. The China Component of the World Soybean Model 
 
China Soybean Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(1) HSOYSHC = 2470.474 + 84.7717*LAG(HSOYPFA/HFPI85) − 177.7912*LAG(HCORPFA/HFPI85) + 0.6943*LAG(HSOYSHC)  
                             (754.13)     (22.59)                                                   (47.58)                                                      (0.09)                                                                                                                         
− 768.9675*D90T92 − 883.3901*DHSOYSH + 1287.968*D9300 
                                 (232.10)                      (199.24)                           (272.56)                                                 Adj. R2=0.8266    DW=1.9978   
  
(2) HSOYSPC = HSOYSYC * HSOYSHC 
 
(3) HSOYDCC = -655772.9 + 51.1667*(HSOMQ*HSOMPWA+HSOOQ*HSOOPWA-HSOYPIA)/HIPPI05 + 0.4812*LAG(HSOYDCC)  
                              (125295)       (26.43)                                                                                                                      (0.04)                                                           
+ 155.6095*LAG(SQRT(HSOYEXPR)) + 0.4344*HSOYMIC*DPSWTO + 0.1686*HSOYSPC*DPREWTO + 329.3210*TIME  
     (38.16)                                                        (0.03)                                           (0.03)                                                (62.65)                        
− 1649.025*D88T91 + 1157.563*D0410 − 2330.305*DHSOYDC 
      (338.26)                   (446.81)                   (266.32)                                               Adj. R2=0.9992    Dh=-0.6017   
  
  
(4) HSOYPIA = -177.2439 + 43.1279*USOYPWC*XCHUSA + 658.0709*D05T07 
                            (86.10)      (1.76)                                                (135.57)                                        Adj. R2=0.9556    DW=1.8321 
 
(5) HSOYPFA = 130.9177 + 1.1715*HSOYPIA + 623.2601*D0206 − 722.7466*D0407 
                             (70.48)      (0.04)            (146.58)                  (154.22)                                    Adj. R2=0.9739    DW=1.9595 
 
(6) HSOYMIC = HSOYDCC + HSOYDZC + HSOYHEC - LAG(HSOYHEC) - HSOYSPC 
 
China Soybean Meal Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(7) HSOMSPC = HSOMQ*HSOYDCC 
 
(8) HSOMDDC = -10984.12 − 45.2338*HSOMPWA/HGDPI05 + 0.4268*LAG(HSOMDDC) + 60.6665* LAG(SQRT(HSOMEXPR))  
                                 (4833.8)      (26.2)                                               (0.1)                                         (34.9)                                                   
+ 5.8048*HGDP05 + 0.0100*HPOP + 2269.637* DHSOMDD1 − 1207.050*DHSOMDD2 − 1926.712*DHSOMDD3  
     (0.8)                        (0.004)                (343.8)                                  (375.1)                        (443.2)                  
− 3340.737*D0608 
     (453.7)                                                                                                                    Adj. R2=0.9985    Dh=-0.7317    
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Table 8 Continued. 
  
(9) HSOMPWA = 608.8966 + 1.2423*USOMPWC*XCHUSA + 396.1549*D80T88 + 633.8578*D0607 
                               (149.5)        (0.09)                                    (128.6)                        (166.8) Adj. R2=0.9242    DW=1.8054 
 
(10) HSOMMXC = LAG(HSOMHEC) + HSOMSPC - HSOMDDC - HSOMHEC - HSOMDZC 
 
China Soybean Oil Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(11) HSOOSPC = HSOOQ*HSOYDCC 
 
(12) HSOODDC = -40849.2 − 20.6742*HSOOPWA/HGDPI05 + 278.8939* LAG(SQRT(HSOOEXP)) + 38.2904*HPOP/1000 + 2389.858*D80T83  
                                  (2021.6)   (6.5)                                                  (116.9)                                                     (1.61)                             (505.1)        
− 1770.350*D99T01 − 2297.148*D90T05 
      (455.0)                     (303.2)                                                                                 Adj. R2=0.9711    DW=1.9418     
 
(13) HSOOPWA = 1108.454 + 34.2431*USOOPWC*XCHUSA − 1856.580*D83T86 − 1262.119*D02T11 
                                 (375.05)     (2.31)                                      (494.37)                    (425.98)  Adj. R2=0.9277    DW=2.020 
 
(14) HSOOMIC = HSOODDC + HSOOHEC + HSOODZC  - LAG(HSOOHEC) -  HSOOSPC  
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 Chinese farm price of soybeans (HSOYPFC) is estimated in the model as a 
function of the Chinese import price of soybeans (equation (5) in Table 8). Dummy 
variables (D0206 and D0407) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The 
coefficient of the Chinese import price of soybeans is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. On average, the farm price was found to 17.2% higher than the Chinese import 
price of soybeans. 
 Chinese imports of soybeans (HSOYMIC) are determined in the model as sum of 
the Chinese soybean crush, seed, feed and other use, and (exogenous) ending stocks 
minus the sum of Chinese soybean beginning stocks and soybean production (equation 
(6) in Table 8). 
 Chinese soymeal production (HSOMSPC) is calculated in the model as the 
(exogenous) Chinese soymeal extraction rate times Chinese soybean crush (equation (7) 
in Table 8). 
 Chinese soymeal demand (HSOMDDC) is specified in the model to be a function 
of the lagged Chinese soymeal demand, the Chinese wholesale price of soymeal adjusted 
for inflation by the Chinese GDP deflator, the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures 
for the promotion of Chinese soymeal demand, the real Chinese GDP index, and Chinese 
national population (equation (8) in Table 8). Dummy variables (DHSOMDD1, 
DHSOMDD2, DHSOMDD3, and D0608) are also added to capture the unobservable 
effects. The promotion expenditures are deflated by the Chinese GDP deflator and the 
expenditures are converted from dollars to yuan. Since there are zero promotion 
expenditures in some years, a square root transformation is used to capture diminishing 
 172 
 
marginal returns instead of using a logarithmic transformation. As expected, Chinese 
soymeal demand is found to be significantly (p<0.1) but negatively related to the real 
Chinese wholesale price of soymeal and significantly (p<0.1) and positively related to 
the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion of Chinese soymeal use 
with elasticities of -0.120 and 0.041, respectively. Those elasticities are found to be 
similar to Japanese elasticities. However, soymeal demand in China is found to be more 
elastic with respect to the soymeal price and the promotion stock than that in the U.S. 
Those variables in equation (8) in Table 8 account for 99.9% of the variation in the 
Chinese soymeal demand. The value of Durbin-h is -0.7317, approximately close to 0, 
indicating no serial correlation.     
  Chinese wholesale price of soymeal (HSOMPWA) is linked in the model to the 
U.S. wholesale price of soymeal adjusted from tons to metric tons and multiplied by the 
Chinese yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate (equation (9) in Table 8). Dummy variables 
(D80T88 and D0607) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The coefficient 
of the U.S. wholesale price of soymeal is statistically significant at the 1% level. On 
average, the farm price was found to 24.2% higher than the Chinese wholesale price of 
soymeal. Those variables in equation (9) in Table 8 account for 92.4% of the variation in 
the Chinese wholesale price of soymeal. The value of Durbin-Watson is 1.8054, 
approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation.   
 Chinese net exports of soymeal (HSOMMXC) are determined in the model in the 
Chinese soymeal clearing condition as the sum of the Chinese soymeal beginning stocks 
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and soymeal production minus the sum of Chinese soymeal use, other use, and ending 
stocks (equation (10) in Table 8). 
 Chinese soyoil production (HSOOSPC) is calculated in the usual way in the 
model as the Chinese (exogenous) soyoil extraction rate times Chinese soybean crush 
(equation (11) in Table 8). 
 Chinese soyoil demand (HSOODDC) is specified as a function of the wholesale 
price of soyoil deflated by the Chinese GDP deflator, Chinese population, and the stock 
of soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion of Chinese soyoil demand (equation 
(12) in Table 8). Dummy variables (D80T83, D99T01 and D90T05) are also added to 
capture the unobservable effects. The promotion expenditures are deflated by the 
Chinese GDP deflator and the expenditures are converted from dollars to yuan. Since 
there are zero promotion expenditures in some years, a square root transformation is 
used to capture diminishing marginal returns instead of using a logarithmic 
transformation. Chinese soyoil demand is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and 
positively influenced by the changes in Chinese population. The estimated parameter of 
the real wholesale price of soyoil is statistically significant (p<0.01) and negative as 
expected while those of both the promotion stock and Chinese population are 
statistically significant (p<0.05) and positive as expected. The estimated elasticities of 
Chinese soyoil demand with respect to the real Chinese price of soyoil and to the 
promotion stock are -0.027 and 0.029, respectively (Table 4). The Chinese soyoil 
demand is less elastic with respect to soyoil price than other soyoil importing countries, 
EU 15/27 and Japan. Those variables in equation (12) in Table 8 account for 97.1% of 
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the variation in the Chinese soyoil demand equation. The value of Durbin-Watson is 
1.9418, approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation.     
 The Chinese wholesale price of soyoil (HSOOPWA) is linked in the model to the 
exchange rate adjusted U.S. wholesale price of soyoil (equation (13) in Table 8). 
Dummy variables (D83T86 and D02T11) are also added to capture the unobservable 
effects. The Chinese wholesale price of soyoil is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and 
positively influenced by the changes in the exchange rate adjusted U.S. wholesale price 
of soyoil. Those variables in equation (13) in Table 8 account for 92.8% of the variation 
in the Chinese wholesale price of soyoil. The value of Durbin-Watson is 2.020, 
approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
 Chinese net imports of soyoil (HSOOMIC) is determined in the Chinese soyoil 
market clearing condition as the sum of Chinese soyoil consumption, and ending stocks 
of soyoil, Chinese other use minus the sum of Chinese soyoil beginning stocks and 
soyoil production (equation (14) in Table 8).   
 
Rest-of-the-World (ROW) Region Sub Model  
 The Rest-of-the-World (ROW) importing region includes the net imports of 
soybean trading countries except the U.S., the EU-15/27, Japan, China, Brazil, and 
Argentina. The ROW net soybean import data are calculated as the sum of the net 
imports of soybeans by the EU-15/27, Japan, and China minus the net exports of 
soybeans by the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina. 
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 In the model, ROW net imports of soybeans (RSOYMIN) are specified to be a 
function of U.S. wholesale price of soybeans, the index of the real GDP of developing 
countries (RGDP85), the indicate variable (DRWTOAF) for the WTO period which 
equals to 1 for 2001/02 through 2012/13 and 0 otherwise, the indicate variable 
(DROILSK) for 1st Oil Crisis which equals to 1 for 1974/75, 1975/76, 1977/78, 1979/80, 
1981/1982 and 0 otherwise, the indicate variable (DRECCRIS1) for the global economic 
recession which equals to 1 for 2011/12 and 0 otherwise, the indicate variable 
(DRECCRIS2) for the international monetary crisis which equals to 1 for 1971/72 and 
2008/09 and 0 otherwise, the stock of checkoff expenditures to promote the demand for 
soybeans in ROW countries, and lagged ROW net soybean imports (equation (1) in 
Table 9). Dummy variables (DRSOYM1, DRSOYM2, DRSOYM3, DRSOYM4, D89 
and D05) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The promotion 
expenditures are deflated by RGDP85. Since there are zero promotion expenditures in 
some years, a square root transformation is used to capture diminishing marginal returns 
instead of using a logarithmic transformation. 
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Table 9. The Rest-of-the-World (ROW) Component of the World Soybean Model 
 
ROW Soybean Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
  
(1) RSOYMIN = 7734.349 − 1238.78*USOYPWC + 0.0973*LAG(RSOYMIN) + 8.1929*LAG(SQRT(RSOYEXPR)) + 9547.285*RGDP85  
                              (200.5)         (c)                                 (0.02)                                     (4.8)                                                     (288.0)        
+ 2193.810*DRWTOAF − 1652.211*DROILSK − 13337.88*DRECCRIS1 − 6007.311*DRECCRIS2 − 3320.645*DSRSOYM1  
     (239.9)                              (176.6)                           (367.6)                               (235.2)                              (112.9)                                
+ 2183.893*DSRSOYM2 + 1035.674*DSRSOYM3 + 780.6948*DSRSOYM4 + 400.1637*D89 − 7303.148*D05 
     (145.7)                                (118.5)                              (186.7)                               (320.2)                (342.1)         
                                                                                                                                                                  Adj. R2=0.9958    Dh=-1.1237    
  
 
ROW Soybean Meal Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(2) RSOMSPN = .795*RSOYMIN*.8 
 
(3) RSOMDDN = 13066.92 − 66.503*USOMPWC + 0.9542*LAG(RSOMDDN) + 15.0844*LAG(SQRT(RSOMEXPR)) − 8634.966*DRMECRIS . 
                               (421.6)         (c)                                (0.02)                                        (8.6)                                                        (937.8)                  
+ 11223.81*D0406 + 28967.66*D0912 − 6057.975*DRSOMD1 − 6153.924*DRSOMD2 + 4977.812*D0002  
     (773.3)                    (746.6)                      (483.8)                            (327.5)                             (722.0)                               
+ 2464.732*DRSOMD3 + 3690.465*DRSOMD4 + 1875.450*DRSOMD5 
    (333.4)                             (589.2)                              (498.0)                                      Adj. R2=0.9922    Dh=-0.8586     
     
  
(4) RSOMMIN = RSOMDDC - RSOMSPN  
 
ROW Soybean Oil Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(5) RSOOSPN = .179*RSOYMIN*.8 
 
 
(6) RSOODDN = 4165.777 − 149.27*USOOPWC + 7.2967*LAG(SQRT(RSOOEXPR)) + 4119.500*RGDP85 + 1822.918*DRSOOD1  
                               (199.5)        (c)                                (4.14)                                                   (169.0)                         (184.1)                                                                   
+ 3198.127*D01T07 + 3477.659*D0910 − 1608.669*DRSOOD2 − 1208.870*DRSOOD3 
     (200.5)                       (348.4)                     (188.1)                             (158.3)          Adj. R2=0.9747    DW=2.0362     
 
(7) RSOOMIN = RSOODDC – RSOOSPN 
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 The price elasticity is constrained to be -1 because the ROW is the residual 
region in the model and because developing country imports tend to be highly 
responsive to changes in price. The estimated elasticity of ROW soybean demand with 
respect to the soybean checkoff promotion is 0.048 (p<0.1) which is the most highest 
among that of other countries in the model. The ROW net imports of soybeans is found 
to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes in the real GDP of 
developing countries. Estimation results showed that DRWTOAF is significantly 
(p<0.01) and positively influenced RSOYMIN implying that the trade liberalization 
driven by WTO after 2001/12 led to an increase of imports of soybeans.  
Results also showed that DROILSK, DRECCRIS1 and DRECCRIS2 are significantly 
(p<0.01) and negatively influenced RSOYMIN implying that the global economic 
downturn led to a decrease of imports of soybeans. 
 ROW soymeal production (RSOMSPN) is calculated as the assumed soymeal 
extraction rate of 79.5% times 80% of the net imports of ROW soybeans (which assumes 
that 20% of ROW soybean imports are for food, seed, or other uses) (equation (2) in 
table 9).  
 ROW soymeal demand (RSOMDDN) is specified to be a function of the U.S. 
wholesale price of soymeal, the stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for the 
promotion of soymeal demand in ROW countries, and the indicate variable 
(DRMECRIS) for the international monetary crisis in Asia which equals to 1 for 
1998/1999 and 0 otherwise. Dummy variables (DRSOMD1, DRSOMD2, DRSOMD3, 
DRSOMD4, D0406, D0912 and D0002) are also added to capture the unobservable 
 178 
 
effects. The promotion expenditures are deflated by RGDP85. Since there are zero 
promotion expenditures in some years, a square root transformation is used to capture 
diminishing marginal returns instead of using a logarithmic transformation. Similar to 
soybean estimation, the price elasticity is constrained to be -0.8 because the ROW is the 
residual region in the model and because developing country imports tend to be highly 
responsive to changes in price. The stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for the 
promotion of ROW soymeal demand is a statistically significant (p<0.1) explanatory 
variable in the ROW soymeal demand equation with an elasticity of 0.048 which is the 
most highest among that of other countries in the model (Table 4). Those variables in 
equation (3) in Table 9 account for 99.2% of the variation in ROW soymeal demand.       
 ROW net soymeal imports (RSOMMIN) are determined in the ROW soymeal 
market clearing condition as the ROW soymeal use minus ROW soymeal production 
(equation (4) in table 9).  
 ROW soyoil production (RSOOSPN) is calculated as the assumed soyoil 
extraction rate of 17.9% times 80% of the net imports of ROW soybeans (which, again, 
assumes that 20% of ROW soybean imports are not processed but rather are used for 
food, seed, or other uses) (equation (5) in table 9).  
 ROW soyoil use (RSOODDN) is a function of the U.S. wholesale price of soyoil, 
a stock of soybean checkoff expenditures for soyoil, the index of the real GDP of 
developing countries (RGDP85), and lagged ROW soyoil demand (equation (6) in table 
9). Dummy variables (DRSOOD1, DRSOOD2, DRSOOD3, D01T07 and D0910) are 
also added to capture the unobservable effects. All variables but the stock of soybean 
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checkoff expenditures are statistically significant at the 1% level. The promotion 
expenditures are deflated by RGDP85. Since there are zero promotion expenditures in 
some years, a square root transformation is used to capture diminishing marginal returns 
instead of using a logarithmic transformation. Similar to the case for the ROW soymeal 
demand, the price elasticity of soyoil demand with respect to the U.S. soyoil price was 
constrained to be -0.8 because the ROW is the residual region in the model and because 
developing country imports tend to be highly responsive to changes in price. The stock 
of soybean checkoff expenditures for the promotion of ROW soyoil demand is a 
statistically (p<0.1) significant explanatory variable in the ROW soyoil demand equation 
with an elasticity of 0.049 which is the most highest among that of other countries in the 
model (Table 4).  
 ROW net soyoil imports (RSOOMIN) are determined in the ROW soyoil market 
clearing condition as the difference between ROW soyoil use and ROW soyoil 
production (equation (7) in table 9). 
 
Brazil Sub Model  
 Because Brazil is a major world soybean producer, Brazilian soybean supply is 
determined endogenously in the model. Brazilian soybean acreage harvested 
(BSOYSHC) is specified to be a function of the lagged, dollar-denominated, Brazilian 
export price of soybeans converted  to Brazilian currency by the Brazilian currency/U.S. 
dollar exchange rate and adjusted for inflation by the Brazilian wholesale price index, 
lagged Brazilian soybean acreage harvested, and a time trend (equation (1) in Table 10). 
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Dummy variables (D01T04 and D09T12) are also added to capture the unobservable 
effects. The estimated coefficients of all regressors are statistically significant (p<0.01) 
with expected signs. A high adjusted R-square (0.9938) indicates an excellent fit of the 
equation to the data. Brazilian soybean acreage harvested is found to be significantly and 
positively influenced by the changes in the Brazilian export price of soybeans.   
 Brazilian soybean production (BSOYSPC) is determined in the model as the 
(exogenous) Brazilian soybean yield times Brazilian soybean acreage harvested 
(equation (2) in Table 10). 
 Brazilian soybean crush demand (BSOYDCC) is specified as a function of the 
Brazilian soybean crush margin with the dollar-denominated Brazilian prices of 
soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil (converted to Brazilian currency with the exchange rate 
and deflated by the Brazilian wholesale price index) specified as separate regressors as 
return (weighted average of soymeal and soyoil prices) and cost (soybean price), lagged 
Brazilian soybean crush demand (equation (3) in Table 10). The estimated coefficients 
the real weighted average of soymeal and soyoil prices is positive as expected and 
statistically significant (p<0.05) while that of the real soybean price is negative as 
expected and statistically significant (p<0.1). Those variables in equation (3) in Table 10 
account for 99.4% of the variation in the EU15/27 import price of soybeans. The 
Durbin-h statistic indicates the absence of serial correlation. 
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Table 10. The Brazil Component of the World Soybean Model 
 
Brazil Soybean Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(1) BSOYSHC = -197576 + 1.5119*LAG(BSOYPXC*XBZUSA/BWPI85) + 0.8117*LAG(BSOYSHC) + 100.008*TIME + 2251.427*D01T04  
                             (47614.2)   (0.39)                                                                      (0.05)                                     (24.14)                 (342.64)                                                               
+ 1963.130*D09T12 
    (398.96)                                                                                                                     Adj. R2=0.9938    Dh=1.0656   
 
(2) BSOYSPC = BSOYSYC * BSOYSHC 
 
(3) BSOYDCC = 2939.532 + 3.8424*(BSOMQ*BSOMPXC+BSOOQ*BSOOPXC)*XBZUSA/BWPI85 − 3.0952*BSOYPXC*XBZUSA/BWPI85  
                              (745.77)     (1.51)                                                                                                                     (1.83)                                  
+ 0.9085*LAG(BSOYDCC) − 2641.397*D60T90 + 3970.54*D7909 + 2624.084*D8806 − 2858.220*D9596  
                                 (0.02)                                      (517.21)                     (658.27)                (669.99)                  (677.84)                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                  Adj. R2=0.9939    Dh=0.0097     
   
(4) BSOYPXC = -10.6962 + 1.0626*ESOYPIA − 46.0446*D7306  
                               (3.10)     (0.01)                         (6.71)                                                                         Adj. R2=0.9930    DW=2.3061 
 
(5) BSOYMXC = LAG(BSOYHEC) + BSOYSPC - BSOYDCC - BSOYDZC - BSOYHEC  
 
Brazil Soybean Meal Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(6) BSOMSPC = BSOMQ*BSOYDCC 
 
(7) BSOMDDC = 247.4092 − 0.5599*BSOMPXC*XBZUSA/BWPI85 + 0.9500*LAG(BSOMDDC) + 0.5784*BGDP85/1000 + 1005.695*D7206  
                               (276.57)      (0.27)                                                           (0.04)                                       (0.32)                               (268.44)                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                  Adj. R2=0.9944    Dh=-0.5789 
      
 
(8) BSOMPXC = 5.5305 + 0.944*ESOMPIA + 31.5432*D9712 − 35.8473*D02T06 
                            (3.92)      (0.02)                     (8.93)                     (5.64)                                            Adj. R2=0.9830    DW=1.6261 
 
(9) BSOMMEC = LAG(BSOMHEC) + BSOMMMC + BSOMSPC - BSOMDDC - BSOMDZC - BSOMHEC  
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 Table 10 Continued. 
 
Brazil Soybean Oil Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(10) BSOOSPC = BSOOQ*BSOYDCC 
 
(11) BSOODDC = -660.5320 − 0.0482*BSOOPXC*XBZUSA/BWPI85 + 3.0386*BGDP85/1000 + 451.5148*D6061 − 335.4179*D03T05  
                                  (69.85)       (0.02)                                                           (0.05)                                (91.40)                    (74.69)                                                  
+ 740.1704*D09T12  
      (76.15)                                                                                                                 Adj. R2=0.9941    DW=1.6391    
  
 
(12) BSOOPXC = -47.3087 + 1.0372*ESOOPXA + 88.2388*D73T80 
                               (13.07)      (0.02)             (16.23)                                                                          Adj. R2=0.9749    DW=1.5994 
 
(13) BSOOMXC = LAG(BSOOHEC) + BSOOSPC - BSOODDC - BSOODZC - BSOOHEC  
 
 183 
 
 Brazilian soybean export price (BSOYPXC) is linked in the model to the EU-
15/27 soybean import price (equation (4) in Table 10). A dummy variable (D7306) is 
also added to capture the unobservable effects. The Brazilian soybean export price is 
found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes in the EU-
15/27 soybean import price. Those variables in equation (4) in Table 10 account for 99.3% 
of the variation in the Brazilian soybean export price. The value of Durbin-Watson is 
2.3061, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
 Brazilian soybean net exports (BSOYMXC) are determined in Brazilian soybean 
market clearing condition in the model as the sum of Brazilian soybean beginning stocks 
and soybean production minus the sum of soybean crush, seed, feed and other use, and 
(exogenous) ending stocks (equation (5) in Table 10). 
 Brazilian soymeal production (BSOMSPC) is determined in the model to be 
equal to the Brazilian soymeal extraction rate times the Brazilian soybean crush 
(equation (6) in Table 10). 
 Brazilian soymeal demand (BSOMDDC) is specified as a function of the real 
Brazilian price of soymeal, lagged Brazilian soymeal demand, and the real Brazilian 
GDP (equation (7) in table 10). A dummy variable (D7206) is also added to capture the 
unobservable effects. The real Brazilian soymeal price is significantly (p<0.05) and 
negatively related to the demand for Brazilian soymeal with an elasticity of -0.074. 
Those variables in equation (7) in Table 10 account for 99.4% of the variation in the 
Brazilian soymeal demand. The value of Durbin-h is -0.5789, approximately close to 0, 
indicating no serial correlation.      
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 Brazilian soymeal export price (BSOMPXC) is linked in the model to the EU 
soymeal import price of soymeal (equation (8) in Table 10). Dummy variables (D9712 
and D02T06) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The Brazilian soymeal 
export price is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the 
changes in the EU soymeal import price of soymeal. Those variables in equation (8) in 
Table 10 account for 98.3% of the variation in the Brazilian soymeal export price. The 
value of Durbin-Watson is 1.6261, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial 
correlation.  
 Brazilian soymeal exports (BSOMMEC) are determined in the Brazilian soymeal 
market clearing condition as the sum of the Brazilian soymeal beginning stocks, soymeal 
imports, and soymeal production minus Brazilian soymeal demand, other use, and 
(exogenous) ending stocks (equation (9) in Table 10).  
 Brazilian soyoil production (BSOOSPC) is calculated in the model as the 
Brazilian soyoil extraction rate times Brazilian soybean crush (equation (10) in Table 
10).  
 Brazilian soyoil demand (BSOODDC) is specified in the model to be a function 
of the real deflated export price of soyoil (converted from U.S. dollars to Brazilian 
currency) and the real Brazilian GDP (equation (11) in Table 10). Dummy variables 
(D6061, D03T05 and D09T12) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The 
estimated coefficient of the real Brazilian soyoil price is significant (p<0.1) and negative 
with a price elasticity of -0.033. Brazilian soyoil demand is found to be significantly 
(p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes in the real Brazilian GDP. Those 
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variables in equation (11) in Table 10 account for 99.4% of the variation in the Brazilian 
soyoil demand equation. The value of Durbin-Watson is 1.6391, approximately close to 
2, indicating no serial correlation.     
 Brazilian soyoil export price (BSOOPXC) is linked in the model to the EU soyoil 
export price of soyoil (equation (12) in Table 10). A dummy variables (D73T80) is also 
added to capture the unobservable effects. The Brazilian soyoil export price is found to 
be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes in the EU soyoil 
export price of soyoil. Those variables in equation (12) in Table 10 account for 97.5% of 
the variation in the Brazilian soyoil export price. The value of Durbin-Watson is 1.5994, 
approximately close to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
 Brazilian net soyoil exports (BSOOMXC) are determined in the model as the 
sum of Brazilian soyoil beginning stocks and soyoil production minus the sum of 
Brazilian soyoil demand, other use, and (exogenous) ending stocks of soyoil (equation 
(13) in Table 10). 
 
Argentina Sub Model  
 Argentina is also a major world soybean producer. Consequently, Argentina’s 
soybean supply is also determined endogenously in the model. Argentina soybean 
acreage harvested (GSOYSHC) is specified to be a function of the lagged, dollar-
denominated, Argentinian export price of soybeans converted to Argentinian currency 
by the Argentina currency/U.S. dollar exchange rate and adjusted for inflation by the 
Argentina wholesale price index, lagged Argentina soybean acreage harvested, and a 
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time trend (equation (1) in Table 11). The estimated coefficients of all regressor are 
statistically significant (p<0.05) with expected signs. The Durbin-h statistic indicates the 
absence of serial correlation. A high adjusted R-square indicates an excellent fit of the 
equation to the data. Argentina soybean acreage harvested is found to be significantly 
and positively influenced by the changes in the Argentina export price of soybeans. 
Results also show that time trend had significant positive effects on Argentina soybean 
acreage harvested and it explains the steady soybean acreage extension in Argentina. 
 Argentina’s soybean production (GSOYSPC) is determined in the model as the 
Argentina (exogenous) soybean yield times the Argentina soybean acreage harvested 
(equation (2) in Table 11).  
 Argentina soybean crush demand (GSOYDCC) is specified in the model to be a 
function of Argentina’s crush margin, lagged Argentina crush, and the indicate variable 
(DGREEXB) for the period that allowed crushers to import soybeans from Paraguay and 
re-export the soymeal and soyoil which equals 1 for 2004/05 through 2006/07 and 0 
otherwise (equation (3) in Table 11). Argentina crush margin is calculated as the 
(exogenous) Argentina soymeal extraction rate multiplied by Argentina soymeal price 
(converted to Argentina currency from U.S. dollars with the Argentina/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate and divided by one plus export tax rates and then deflated by the 
Argentina wholesale price index) plus the (exogenous) Argentina soyoil extraction rate 
multiplied by the Argentina soyoil price (also converted to Argentine currency from 
dollars and divided by one plus export tax rates and deflated by the Argentina wholesale 
price index) minus the export price of soybeans (which has also been converted to 
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Argentina currency and divided by one plus export tax rates and deflated by the same 
index). Dummy variables (DGPREEX, D7778, and D09) are also added to capture the 
unobservable effects. 
 The indicate variable (DGREEXB) is significant (p<0.01) and positive implying 
that the Argentina action allowed crushers to import soybeans from Paraguay and re-
export the soymeal and soyoil by only paying the value added tax, not the full export tax 
significantly increased soybean crush in Argentina. As expected, the Argentina crush 
margin is a positive and statistically significant (p<0.1) determinant of the Argentina 
soybean crush with an elasticity of 0.01. The results indicate that Argentina soybean 
crush demand is found to have similar responses to crush margin as that in the U.S. 
Those variables in equation (3) in Table 11 account for 98.1% of the variation in the 
Argentina soybean crush demand. The value of Durbin-h is 0.2778, approximately equal 
to 0, indicating no serial correlation. 
 Argentina soybean export price (GSOYPXA) is linked in the model to the EU 
15/27 soybean import price (equation (4) in Table 11). A dummy variable (D7306) is 
also added to capture the unobservable effects. The Argentina soybean export price is 
found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes in the EU 
15/27 soybean import price. Those variables in equation (4) in Table 11 account for 97.8% 
of the variation in the Argentina soybean export price. The value of Durbin-Watson is 
2.0304, approximately equal to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
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Table 11. The Argentina Component of the World Soybean Model 
 
Argentina Soybean Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
  
(1) GSOYSHC = -57483.83 + 1.4079*LAG(GSOYPXA*XARUSA/GWPI85) + 0.9749*LAG(GSOYSHC) + 28.9281*TIME + 834.9026*D00T03  
                               (20064.8)   (0.65)                                                                           (0.02)                                    (10.10)                  (196.58)                                             
− 1523.928*DSGSOYSH 
     (211.16)                                                                                                                     Adj. R2=0.9967    Dh=-0.7390   
  
(2) GSOYSPC = GSOYSYC * GSOYSHC 
 
(3) GSOYDCC = 1398.217 + 16.3279*(GSOMQ*GSOMPXA/(1+GSOMTX)+GSOOQ*GSOOPXA/(1+GSOOTX)− GSOYPXA/(1+GSOYTX))  
                               (430.21)      (8.76)      
*XARUSA/GWPI85 + 0.9150*LAG(GSOYDCC) − 1688.81*DGPREEX + 4807.36*DGREEXB − 2005.348*D7778  
                                        (0.03)                                      (709.2)                        (1151.98)                       (1381.98)                                        
+ 11578.62*D09  
                                (1814.47)                                                                                                                      Adj. R2=0.9809    Dh=0.2778    
  
 
(4) GSOYPXA = 4.4520 + 0.9938*ESOYPIA − 53.6202*D72 + 77.3818*D75  
                                (5.25)    (0.02)                         (15.79)             (15.78)                                    Adj. R2=0.9779    DW=2.0304 
 
(5) GSOYMEC = LAG(GSOYHEC) + GSOYMMC + GSOYSPC - GSOYDCC - GSOYDZC - GSOYHEC  
 
Argentina Soybean Meal Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(6) GSOMSPC = GSOMQ*GSOYDCC 
 
(7) GSOMDDC = 307.0265 − 0.2863*GSOMPXA/(1+GSOMTX)*XARUSA/GWPI85 − 194.1335*D60T73 + 325.8099*D03T08 + 722.7642*D09T12  
                              (36.22)       (0.15)                                                                          (23.28)                      (31.26)               (36.31)  
                                                                                                                                                                 Adj. R2=0.9325    DW=1.2247    
  
 
(8) GSOMPXA = 22.0162 + 0.8133*ESOMPIA − 111.2599*D72 − 49.3562*D0306 + 75.8227*D1012 
                              (6.52)     (0.03)                           (18.89)              (13.55)             (15.42)          Adj. R2=0.9536    DW=1.5927 
 
(9) GSOMMEC = LAG(GSOMHEC) + GSOMMMC + GSOMSPC - GSOMDDC - GSOMDZC - GSOMHEC  
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 Table 11 Continued. 
 
Argentina Soybean Oil Supply, Demand, and Market Clearing Condition 
 
(10) GSOOSPC = GSOOQ*GSOYDCC 
 
(11) GSOODDC = 36.3990 − 0.0371* GSOOPXA/(1+GSOOTX)*XARUSA/GWPI85 + 0.9583*LAG(GSOODDC) + 274.5534*D06  
                                (12.12)      (0.02)                                                                                      (0.01)                                      (25.30)                                           
+ 513.791*D07T10 + 109.8736*D0810 − 347.5238*D12  
                                 (20.08)                     (25.24)                     (32.76)                                                         Adj. R2=0.9986    DW=2.0078    
  
 
(12) GSOOPXA = 12.6907 + 0.9455*ESOOPXA + 308.0443*D7172 + 175.7993*D7577 
                               (17.20)     (0.03)                            (39.67)                      (39.15)                                   Adj. R2=0.9494    DW=1.6318 
 
(13) GSOOMEC = LAG(GSOOHEC) + GSOOSPC - GSOODDC - GSOODZC - GSOOHEC  
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 Argentina’s net soybean exports (GSOYMEC) are determined in the Argentina 
soybean market clearing condition as the sum of Argentina’s soybean beginning stocks 
and production minus the sum of Argentina’s soybean crush, (exogenous) seed, feed and 
other use, and (exogenous) ending stocks (equation (5) in Table 11). 
 Argentina soymeal production (GSOMSPC) is determined in the model as the 
(exogenous) Argentina soymeal extraction rate times the Argentina soybean crush 
(equation (6) in Table 11). 
 Argentina soymeal demand (GSOMDDC) is specified in the model to be a 
function of real soymeal price (converted to Argentina currency from U.S. dollars with 
the Argentina/U.S. dollar exchange rate and divided by one plus export tax rates and 
then deflated by the Argentina wholesale price index) and dummy variables (equation (7) 
in Table 11). The Argentina real soymeal price is negatively and significantly related to 
the Argentina soymeal demand with an estimated elasticity of -0.251. Argentina soymeal 
demand is more elastic with respect to soymeal price than that of the U.S. Those 
variables in equation (7) in Table 11 account for 93.3% of the variation in the Argentina 
soymeal demand equation.    
  Argentina soymeal export price (GSOMPXA) is linked in the model to the EU-
15/27 soymeal import price (equation (8) in Table 11). Dummy variables (D71, D0306 
and D1012) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The coefficient of the 
EU-15/27 soymeal import price is statistically significant at the 1% level. On average, 
the Argentina soymeal export price was found to 18.8% lower than the EU-15/27 
soymeal import price. Those variables in equation (8) in Table 11 account for 95.4% of 
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the variation in the Argentina soymeal export price. The value of Durbin-Watson is 
1.5927, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial correlation.   
 Argentina soymeal exports (GSOMMEC) are determined in the Argentina 
soymeal market clearing condition as the sum of the Argentina soymeal beginning 
stocks, (exogenous, minor) imports, and  production minus the sum of Argentina’s 
soymeal demand, other use,  and (exogenous) ending stocks (equation (9) in Table 11).  
 Argentina soyoil production (GSOOSPC) is determined in the model as the 
(exogenous) Argentina soyoil extraction rate times the Argentina soybean crush 
(equation (10) in Table 11).  
 Argentina soyoil demand (GSOODDC) is explained by the Argentina soyoil 
export price converted from dollars to Argentina currency by the exchange rate and 
deflated by the Argentina wholesale price index and the lagged dependent variable 
(equation (11) in Table 11). Dummy variables (D06, D07T10, D0810 and D12) are also 
added to capture the unobservable effects. The real Argentina soyoil price is found to be 
negatively and significantly (p<0.05) related to the Argentina soyoil demand with an 
estimated elasticity of -0.070. Soyoil demand in Argentina is found to be less elastic 
with respect to the Argentina soyoil price than that in the U.S. Those variables in 
equation (11) in Table 11 account for 99.9% of the variation in the Argentina soyoil 
demand equation. The value of Durbin-Watson is 2.0078, approximately close to 2, 
indicating no serial correlation.     
 Argentina soyoil export price (GSOOPXA) is linked in the model to the EU 
soyoil export price of soyoil (equation (12) in Table 11). Dummy variables (D7172 and 
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D7577) are also added to capture the unobservable effects. The Argentina soyoil export 
price is found to be significantly (p<0.01) and positively influenced by the changes in 
the EU soyoil export price of soyoil. Those variables in equation (12) in Table 11 
account for 94.9% of the variation in the Argentina soyoil export price. The value of 
Durbin-Watson is 1.6318, approximately close to 2, indicating no serial correlation. 
 Argentina net soyoil exports (GSOOMEC) are determined in the Argentina 
soyoil market clearing condition in the model as the sum of the Argentina soyoil 
beginning stocks and  production minus the sum of the Argentina soyoil demand, 
(exogenous) other use, and (exogenous) ending stocks (equation (13) in Table 11). 
 
World Market Clearing Conditions  
 The U.S. soybean export (USOYMEC) are calculated in the model as the sum of 
the EU 15/27 soybean imports, the Japanese soybean imports, the Chinese soybean 
imports, and the ROW soybean imports minus the sum of the Brazil soybean exports and 
the Argentina soybean exports (converted from metric tons to bushels) (equation (1) in 
Table 12). This is the market clearing identity in the world soybean model. 
 
Table 12. World Market Clearing Conditions of the World Soybean Model 
 
(1) USOYMEC=(RSOYMIN-BSOYMXC-GSOYMEC+ESOYMIC+JSOYMIC+HSOYMIC)/27.21555 
 
(2) USOMMEC=(RSOMMIN-BSOMMEC-GSOMMEC+ESOMMIC+JSOMMIC-
HSOMMXC)/0.907185 
 
(3) USOOMTC=(RSOOMIN-BSOOMXC-GSOOMXC-ESOOMXC+JSOOMIC+HSOOMIC)/0.4535925 
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 The U.S. soymeal export (USOMMEC) are calculated in the model as the sum of 
the EU 15/27 soymeal imports, the Japanese soymeal imports, and the ROW soymeal 
imports minus the sum of the Chinese soymeal exports, the Brazil soybean exports and 
the Argentina soybean exports (converted from metric tons to tons) (equation (2) in 
Table 12). This is the market clearing identity in the world soybean model. 
 The U.S. soyoil export (USOOMTC) are calculated in the model as the sum of 
the EU 15/27 soyoil imports, the Japanese soyoil imports, the Chinese soyoil imports, 
and the ROW soyoil imports minus the sum of the Brazil soyoil exports and the 
Argentina soyoil exports (converted from metric tons to tons) (equation (3) in Table 12). 
This is the market clearing identity in the world soybean model. 
  
Data Sources  
 The model described above and used in the analysis in chapter 5 includes 194 
equations and endogenous variables and 462 exogenous variables. In the development of 
the model, two types of data were needed: (1) annual data to support the soybean model 
such as soybean supply, demand, price, policy of each countries and U.S. corn supply, 
demand, price, policy, and (2) annual soybean checkoff expenditures by country, 
commodity (soybean, soymeal, and soyoil), and type (soybean production research, U.S. 
domestic demand promotion, and international marketing promotion).       
 Because soybean and corn supply were analyzed by production region in the 
United States, the data include regional acres planted, harvested, yield and production. 
these data were obtained from USDA-NASS for 1960/61 through 2012/13. Data for U.S. 
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soybean, soymeal, and soyoil use and corn use were taken from USDA-ERS. Supply and 
demand data for other exporting and importing countries in the model were obtained 
from USDA-FAS for 1960/61 through 2012/13. Price data for soybeans and products in 
other countries were obtained from numerous public sources, including FAO, IMF, 
Japan Oil & Fat Importers & Exporters Association and National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. Macroeconomic data such as real GDP, GDP deflator, population, and exchange 
rates were obtained from the World Bank and IMF.     
 Three types of soybean checkoff expenditure data were collected for the analysis: 
(1) USB and QSSB checkoff expenditures on soybean production research, (2) USB and 
QSSB expenditures on the domestic promotion of soybeans and soybean products, and 
(3) USB, QSSB, and USDA expenditures on the international promotion of soybeans 
and soybean products. The USB and QSSB production research expenditures data for 
1970/71 through 2007/08 were provided by Keith Smith and Associates. The production 
research data for 2008/07 through 2011/12 were collected from Smith Bucklin Corp. (a 
management contractor of the USB) and the QSSBs. Expenditures for domestic 
promotion were also obtained from Smith Bucklin Corp. and the QSSB. Expenditures 
for international promotion were obtained from the U.S. Soybean Export Council 
(USSEC), Smith Bucklin Corp., the QSSBs, and the Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) 
of the USDA.  
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Model Validation  
 Validation of the model was conducted with a check of its ability to replicate  
actual data over the sample period using dynamic, within-sample (ex-post) simulation 
statistics and a sensitivity analysis to check the stability of the model. The model was 
first simulated over the common time period across all data types (1980/81 to 2012/13). 
The simulation results (the baseline historical simulation) were then compared with 
actual data using dynamic simulation statistics including the Theil forecast error (i.e., the 
Mean Square Error (MSE) Decomposition Proportion Inequality Coefficients).  
 The Theil forecast error can be split in two kinds of inequality proportions: (1) 
the UM (bias error), US (variance error), and UC (covariance error) which sum to one 
and (2) the UM (bias error), UR (regression error), and UD (disturbance error) which 
also sum to one. A well-developed model requires small UM, US, and UR proportions, 
while UC or UD proportions should be close to one. The Theil forecast error simulation 
validation statistics are reported in Appendix B. Those statistics indicate a highly 
satisfactory fit of the historical, dynamic simulation solution values to actual data 
indicating that the model adequately replicates the structure of the world soybean market. 
 Those statistics are derived as: 
 
(11) UM = (Aµ – Sµ)
2 
/ MSE, 
(12) US = (DR – DP)
2 
/ MSE, 
(13) UC = 2 (1 –  r)  DR  DP  / MSE, 
(14) UR = (DP  – r  DR)
2 
/ MSE, 
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(15) UD = (1 – r 
2
)  DP
2  
/ MSE 
 
where Aµ = mean of actual variable; Sµ = mean of simulated variable; DR = standard 
deviation of actual variable; DP = standard deviation of simulated variable; r = 
correlation coefficient between simulated and actual variable and MSE = mean square 
error.  
 The Theil U statistic is a relative accuracy measure that compares the simulated 
values with the results of naïve expectation. If the Theil’s U statistic is less than one, the 
simulation with the model is superior to the naïve expectation. The Theil statistics 
reported in appendix B are all but one less than 0.3. The one variable with high Theil 
statistic is Japanese soyoil imports which have been extremely small and have fluctuated 
from positive to (small imports) to negative (small exports) over time.    
 
(16) 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 𝑈 =
√1
𝑛
∑ (𝐴𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡)2
𝑇
𝑡=1
√1
𝑛
∑ 𝐴𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1 + √
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑆𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
  The stability of the model depends largely on the model's sensitivity to a single 
shock in checkoff expenditures. Therefore, all nominal expenditures in the model were 
increased by 10% at the first year of the simulation period, then re-simulated over the 
1980/81 to 2012/13. The sensitivity of the model found to be satisfactory because all 
endogenous variables returned to equilibrium, most within 5 years.   
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CHAPTER V  
SCENARIO SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
 
 The primary objective of this study is to measure the effects of various 
simplifying assumptions commonly made in checkoff program analyses on the 
transmission of the benefits to producers using the soybean checkoff program as the case 
for analysis. To measure the effects of various simplifying assumptions on the 
transmission of the benefits of soybean checkoff expenditures to soybean producers, a 
base case of the overall, the net producer returns from the soybean checkoff program are 
first simulated with the overall structure of a partial equilibrium model of the world 
soybean market. The model is then simulated under alternative simplifying assumptions 
as discussed in Chapter 3. The simulation results are then compared to those of the base 
case to measure the effects of the various simplifying assumptions on the transmission of 
the benefits of checkoff expenditures to producers. 
 The first step in the analysis was to isolate the effects of the soybean checkoff 
program expenditures on U.S. and world soybean and soybean product markets from all 
other forces that may have affected those same markets over the years. The results of 
statistically estimating the relationship between those expenditures and the respective 
domestic and foreign soybean demand and supply variables were reported and discussed 
in the previous chapter. In this chapter, the results of using the model of world soybean 
and product markets presented and validated in the previous chapter to simulate the 
effects of specific simplifying assumptions commonly made in the analyses of checkoff 
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programs on the transmission of checkoff benefits to producers are presented. The eight 
most prevalent simplifying assumptions made in checkoff program analyses, and those 
analyzed in this chapter, include the following: 
(a) a perfectly inelastic supply curve (no supply response to a promotion-induced 
demand shift); 
(b) a perfectly elastic supply curve (no price response to a promotion-induced 
demand shift); 
(c) no U.S. government intervention in supporting farm price or per unit revenue; 
(d) no free-rider gains (where Brazil and Argentina are the potential free riders in 
this case). 
(e)  no domestic supply chain effects,  
(f)  no global supply chain effects,  
(g)  no checkoff investments in production research (only in demand promotion), and  
(h)  no promotion programs at multiple levels of the supply chain (promotion occurs 
at only the retail level of the market). 
  
 As a benchmark for comparison, a base case scenario was first simulated with the 
world soybean and soybean products model which measures the effects of the soybean 
checkoff program when all simplifying assumptions are relaxed. In the base case 
scenario, the soybean model was first simulated over the period of 1980/91 through 
2011/12 with all checkoff expenditures set to their actual, historical levels. The model 
was then again simulated over the same period with all checkoff expenditures set to zero.  
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The differences in the simulated values of the endogenous variables in the model (supply, 
demand, prices, trade, etc. across all countries and commodities in the model) between 
the two simulations were calculated and taken as measures of the effects of the soybean 
checkoff program when none of the simplifying assumptions are made.  Because no 
other exogenous variable in the model (e.g., levels of inflation, exchange rates, income 
levels, agricultural and trade policies, etc.) other than checkoff expenditures was allowed 
to change in the second simulation, this process effectively isolates the net effects of the 
soybean checkoff program on the U.S. and world soybean markets, prices, and trade.  
 Additional simulations of the model were then conducted in which one of the 
simplifying assumptions were imposed. The results of each the simulations were 
compared to those of the base case to calculate the effects of the respective assumptions 
on the transmission of the soybean checkoff benefits to soybean producers. After 
presenting the results of the base case simulation analysis, the effects of the simplifying 
assumptions are presented and discussed through a comparison of their respective 
simulation results to those of the base case. 
 
Base Case Result 
 Before altering the structure of the world soybean and soybean products model 
presented in the previous chapter to reflect the various simplifying assumptions often 
made in analyzing checkoff programs, a base case is first presented against which the 
changes in the effects of the soybean checkoff program resulting from altering the 
assumptions can be measured.  The base case reflects the domestic and international 
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market and price effects and the U.S. producer benefit-cost ratio (BCR) resulting from 
the soybean checkoff program over the 1980/81-2012/13 period when none of the 
simplifying assumptions are imposed on the model.  
 To generate the soybean checkoff program market effects and the producer BCR 
in the base case, the world soybean and products model was first simulated over the 
1980/81-2012/13 period assuming that none of the simplifying assumptions hold and 
that all soybean checkoff expenditures during that period were made exactly as was done 
historically. Those results are termed the “baseline simulation” or the “with checkoff 
expenditures simulation.” Then continuing to assume that the simplifying assumptions 
do not hold, the model was simulated again over the same period with all soybean 
checkoff expenditures in all countries for all commodities and types of activity (research, 
domestic promotion, foreign market promotion) in all years set to zero. This simulation 
is termed the “zero expenditure simulation base case” or the “without soybean checkoff 
expenditures base case simulation.” The differences in the values of the endogenous 
variables in the baseline simulation from those in the zero expenditure simulation base 
case reflect the impact of the soybean checkoff program when none of the simplifying 
assumptions are imposed on the model. The differences in the values of the endogenous 
variables between those two simulations are referred to collectively as the “base case.”  
 Key market and price effects from the base case are presented in Tables 13 and 
14. For example, U.S. soybean planted acreage was 3.5% higher on average over the 
1980/81-2012/13 period in the baseline simulation (which includes the effects of the 
checkoff expenditures) than over the same period in the zero checkoff expenditure 
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simulation (which represents the effects of removing all soybean checkoff expenditures 
from the model) (Table 13). With yield growth in addition to acreage growth occurring 
as a result of soybean checkoff expenditures on production research over the years, U.S. 
soybean production was even higher in the baseline simulation base case relative to the 
zero expenditure simulation (5.2%) than was the case for acreage.  
 Also, given a higher U.S. crush margin in the baseline simulation than in the zero 
expenditure simulation (7.2%) and the effects of the soybean checkoff expenditures for 
domestic soybean demand promotion, U.S. soybean crush demand was 3.6% higher in 
the baseline simulation than in the zero expenditure simulation. Also, U.S. soymeal 
demand was 4.0% higher and U.S. soyoil demand 3.9% higher in the baseline simulation 
compared to the zero expenditure simulation (Table 14).  Although U.S. prices of 
soybeans, soymeal, and soyoil also were all higher in the baseline simulation than in the 
zero expenditure simulation (1.0%, 2.4%, and 1.3%, respectively) reflecting the effects 
of the domestic and foreign checkoff promotion expenditures, the increase in the 
production of soybeans as a result of the checkoff expenditures on production research 
resulted in a smaller percentage increase in those prices than in their respective demands. 
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Table 13. Base Case: Soybean Checkoff Program Effect on U.S. Soybean Supply, 
1980/81-2012/13 
Annual Average Change                           Base Scenario 
 
Base Case Results 
 
      % change 
U.S. Soybean Planted Acres       1,000 acres 
  
Cornbelt 947.8 
 
3.0 
Delta 283.5 
 
4.1 
South 219.1 
 
4.8 
Plains 418.0 
 
4.1 
Lakes 298.4 
 
3.6 
Atlantic 117.2 
 
3.4 
Other 30.0 
 
5.9 
Total 2,314.1 
 
3.5 
    
U.S. Soybean Yield        bu./acres   
Cornbelt 0.60  1.5 
Delta 0.25  0.9 
South 0.14  0.5 
Plains 0.52  1.6 
Lakes 0.64  1.7 
Atlantic 0.62  2.3 
Other 0.23  0.6 
    
U.S. Soybean Production            mil. bu. 
  
Cornbelt 60.0 
 
4.7 
Delta 9.7 
 
5.3 
South 6.7 
 
5.5 
Plains 21.7 
 
6.4 
Lakes 17.2 
 
5.6 
Atlantic 5.1 
 
5.8 
Other 1.2 
 
6.7 
Total 121.6 
 
5.2 
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Table 14. Base Case: Soybean Checkoff Program Effect on U.S. Soybean Demand 
and Prices, 1980/81-2012/13 
Annual Average Change                 Base Scenario 
 
Base Case Results 
 
  % Change 
    
U.S. Soybean Crush (mil. bu.) 42.6 
 
3.6 
 
   
U.S. Soymeal Consumption (1,000 tons) 1,005.6 
 
4.0 
    
U.S. Soyoil Consumption (mil. lb.) 536.2 
 
3.9 
 
536.2 
 
3.9 
    
U.S. Soybean Farm Prices ($/bu) 0.07 
 
1.0 
    
U.S. Soybean and Product Wholesale Prices  
  
Soybean ($/bu) 0.07 
 
1.0 
Soymeal ($/ton) 5.3 
 
2.4 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 0.4 
 
1.3 
Crush Margin ($/bu) 0.1   7.2 
 
 The soybean checkoff program also had a net positive effect on foreign demand 
soybeans and soybean products (Table 15). For soybeans, the checkoff promotion 
program had the largest quantity and percentage impact on Chinese soybean imports.  
The ROW and EU-15/27 also experience a substantial increase in soybean imports. For 
the last 20 years, the growing importance of China and the countries in the ROW as 
markets for soybeans resulted in an increase in the share of checkoff expenditures 
allocated to those markets.   
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Table 15. Base Case: Soybean Checkoff Program Effects on World Soybean and 
Products Trade – Base case, 1980/81-2012/13 
Annual Average Change                              Base Scenario 
 
Base Case Results 
 
Base Case % 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt 
 
 EU-15/27 554.1 
 
4.1 
Japan 110.9 
 
2.6 
China 1220.5 
 
9.9 
Rest of the world 446.4 
 
4.6 
Total 2332.0 
 
5.8 
    
World Soybean Exports 
   
United States 2112.1 
 
9.2 
Brazil 78.0 
 
0.6 
Argentina 141.8 
 
3.0 
Total 2332.0 
 
5.8 
    
World Soymeal Imports 
   
EU-15/27 192.5 
 
1.3 
Japan 49.6 
 
5.4 
China -78.0  - 
Rest of the world 366.3 
 
2.6 
Total 530.4 
 
1.8 
    
World Soymeal Exports 
   
United States 5.5 
 
0.1 
Brazil 45.4 
 
0.4 
Argentina 53.0 
 
0.4 
China 426.5 
 
- 
Total 530.4 
 
1.7 
    
World Soyoil Imports 
   
Japan 2.8 
 
22.8 
China -127.1 
 
-11.5 
Rest of the world 164.0 
 
4.1 
Total 39.7 
 
0.8 
    
World Soyoil Exports 
   
United States -24.7 
 
- 
Brazil 9.6 
 
0.7 
Argentina 11.1 
 
0.4 
EU-15/27 43.7 
 
10.6 
Total 39.7  0.8 
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 The U.S. soybean industry was the biggest beneficiary of the increase in soybean 
imports induced by the international market promotion expenditures of soybean checkoff 
funds. U.S. soybean exports were higher by 9.2% as a result of the checkoff program 
whereas Brazilian and Argentine soybean exports were higher by only 0.6% and 3.0%, 
respectively. 
 The soybean checkoff program also resulted in greater foreign market demand 
for soymeal by 1.8% over the sample period. The checkoff program resulted in an 
increase in Chinese soybean crush demand and, therefore, in the Chinese production of 
soybean products.  The increase in Chinese soymeal demand induced by the checkoff 
program was smaller than the increase in Chinese soymeal production leading to an 
increase in the net exports of soymeal by China.  Without soybean checkoff expenditures, 
the zero checkoff simulation indicates that China would have been a net soymeal 
importing country (78.0 mt of soymeal imports). With the checkoff expenditures in the 
baseline simulation, China becomes a net soymeal exporter (426.5 mt of soymeal 
exports).  The large increase in the availability on soymeal for export from China fills 
most of the increased foreign demand for soymeal as a result of the soybean checkoff 
program. As a result, U.S. soymeal exports increased by only 0.1% in the base case. On 
average over the entire 1980/81-2012/13 period, soyoil imports by ROW increased by 
4.1% while soyoil imports by China decreased by 11.5%. Similar to soymeal case, this 
result is the consequence of the increase in soybean oil production in China given the 
large increase in Chinese soybean crush. Although world soyoil imports increase by 0.8% 
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in the base case, the larger annual increase in soyoil demand in the U.S. results in a 
decrease in U.S. soyoil exports. 
 As usually calculated, the producer profit Benefit Cost Ratio (PBCR) is the 
additional industry profits (additional cash receipts net of additional production costs and 
checkoff assessments) earned by producers as a consequence of the checkoff 
expenditures (as measured through the scenario analyses) divided by the historical level 
of checkoff expenditures made to generate those additional profits. For the soybean 
checkoff program, the additional soybean industry profits (in $ million) generated by the 
program in any given year (t) are calculated as: 
 
(17) Rt = (p
w
t   q
w
t - C
w
t) − (p
wo
t   q
wo
t - C
wo
t) 
 
where p is the farm price of soybeans ($/bu.); C is production cost; q is production of 
soybeans (million bu.) which is the product of yield (y) and “w” and “wo” indicate the 
values from the with checkoff expenditure scenario (baseline simulation) and the without 
checkoff expenditures scenario (zero checkoff expenditures), respectively. Since the 
estimated production cost (C) varies depending on the basis (cost per bushel or cost per 
acreage), this study used the average value of costs of added production from both basis; 
C = [cost per bushel ($/bu) * total production (million bu) + cost per acreage ($/acre) * 
total acre (million acres)]/2.  
 Then the grower profit BCR is calculated as: 
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(18) 𝑃𝐵𝐶𝑅 = ∑
𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
where E is total checkoff expenditures ($ million) (production research, domestic 
promotion, and international market promotion). Because the checkoff represents a cost 
to producers, checkoff expenditures in each year (Et) must be netted out of the additional 
profit generated (Rt) in those years (i.e., Rt - Et) to arrive at the net grower profit BCR: 
 
(19) NBCR= PBCR - 1 
 
 The benefit-cost analysis of the soybean checkoff program under the base case 
results is summarized in Table 16.  
  
Table 16. U.S. Soybean Checkoff Program Benefit-Cost Analysis – Base case, 
1980/81-2012/13 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts ($ million)     35,219.3 
    Soybean Checkoff Investment ($ million) 
  
1,356.2 
    Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) ($/$ spent) 
 
26.0 
    Cost of Production ($/acre) 
  
240.45 
  
Cost of Production ($/bu)   6.58 
    Cost of Added Production ($ million) 
  
24,546.5 
    Net revenue ($ million) 
  
10,672.9 
    Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio (PBCR) ($/$ spent) 
 
7.9 
    Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio (NBCR) ($/$ spent) 6.9 
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 Over the 1980/81 to 2012/13 sample period, the soybean checkoff program 
added $35,219.3 million to U.S. soybean cash receipts. The Gross Revenue Benefit-Cost 
Ratio (RBCR) is calculated as added soybean cash receipts divided by the aggregate 
soybean checkoff investments across all countries, commodities, and types across all 
sample years. Over that period, a sum of $1,356 million of soybean checkoff funds were 
invested. Consequently, the RBCR is $26.0 (or 26-to-1). Because the checkoff program 
induced additional soybean production over the years, the additional cost to producers of 
that production needs to be deducted from the gross revenues to determine a producer 
BCR net of the additional production costs. The cost of added production is $24,546.5 
million. Net revenue is calculated as the added soybean cash receipts minus the cost of 
the added production, a total of $10,672.9 million.   
 Given the base case results for the 1980/81 through 2012/13 period, the NBCR is 
calculated to be $6.9, indicating that the producer benefits from the soybean checkoff 
program exceeded the total expenditure of checkoff funds over that period. 
 
Effects of Simplifying Assumptions 
 Using the results from the base case as presented in Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16 as 
the basis for comparison, the effects of the eight major simplifying assumptions on U.S. 
and world soybean an products markets and on the producer BCR are analyzed in this 
section.  
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Perfectly Inelastic Supply Curve Assumption 
(No supply response to a promotion-induced demand shift) 
  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the assumption of a perfectly inelastic 
supply curve implies that the production of soybeans does not change with a checkoff-
induced shift in demand. Thus, to measure the U.S. and world soybean and product 
market effects of the soybean checkoff program in the absence of supply response, the 
price elasticities of the U.S. regional soybean acreage equations are set to zero and a new 
zero expenditure simulation is then conducted with the model. The changes in the 
endogenous values from their baseline simulation values in this case then measures the 
effects of the soybean checkoff program when U.S. supply is not allowed to respond to 
any price changes that the soybean checkoff program may induce. Note that U.S. 
regional acreages and yields are still allowed to be affected by soybean checkoff 
production research expenditures.  
 The differences between the base case results and those of the price inelastic 
supply case (no supply response) results are provided in Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20. The 
inelastic supply makes a difference in effects of checkoff expenditures in U.S. soybean 
and products markets (Table 17). Even with a price inelastic supply, yield growth and 
acreage growth occurring as a result of the soybean checkoff expenditures on production 
research over the years results in an increase in U.S. soybean production of 58.6 million. 
However, with no supply response to the higher soybean price, soybean production 
increase from the soybean checkoff program is only half the increase in the base case so 
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that the measured impact on U.S. soybean production is 63.0 million bushels lower in 
the no supply response case compared to the base case. 
 
Table 17. Effect of Supply Response in U.S. Soybean Supply, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No Supply Response Case and Base case 
 
Inelastic 
Supply 
Case 
Results 
% Change 
from 
Baseline 
Base 
Case 
Results 
% change 
from 
baseline 
Difference 
in Effects 
from Base 
Case 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres  
(1,000 acres) 
 
  
Cornbelt 239.9 0.9 947.8 3.0 -653.9 
Delta 49.9 0.7 283.5 4.1 -233.6 
South 49.4 1.0 219.1 4.8 -169.7 
Plains 77.1 0.7 418.0 4.1 -340.9 
Lakes 38.4 0.4 298.4 3.6 -260.0 
Atlantic 14.3 0.4 117.2 3.4 -102.9 
Other 6.0 1.1 30.0 5.9 -24.0 
Total 529.1 0.8 2,314.1 3.5 -1,785.0 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production (mil. bu.)  
  
Cornbelt 32.7 2.5 60.0 4.7 -27.3 
Delta 3.1 1.6 9.7 5.3 -6.6 
South 2.1 1.7 6.7 5.5 -4.6 
Plains 10.0 2.8 21.7 6.4 -11.7 
Lakes 7.8 2.5 17.2 5.6 -9.4 
Atlantic 2.4 2.7 5.1 5.8 -2.7 
Other 0.4 1.9 1.2 6.7 -0.8 
Total 58.6 2.5 121.6 5.2 -63.0 
Note: (1) Price inelastic case results, (2) Price inelastic % change from baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between price inelastic results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
 
 
Also, the U.S. soybean farm price increases by $0.27/bu more in the price inelastic 
supply case than in the base case (Table 18). Because of the limited availability of 
soybeans for crush, U.S. soybean crush is 0.9 million bushels smaller in the price 
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inelastic supply case. Also, the U.S. soymeal and soyoil prices are $10.1/ton and 0.83 
cents/lb higher than those of base case, respectively. 
  
Table 18. Effect of Supply Response in U.S. Soybean Demand and Prices, 1980/81-
2012/13 
The Difference between No Supply Response case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
41.7 3.0 42.6 3.6 -0.9 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 tons     
 
877.6 3.4 1,005.6 4.0 -128.0 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
500.5 3.7 536.2 3.9 -35.7 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
0.33 5.0 0.07 1.0 0.26 
      
U.S. Soybean 
and Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) 0.34 4.9 0.07 1.0 0.27 
Soymeal ($/ton) 10.1 4.7 5.3 2.4 4.88 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 0.83 3.2 0.35 1.3 0.48 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
0.0 0.3 0.1 7.2 -0.09 
Note: (1) Price inelastic case results, (2) Price inelastic % change from baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between price inelastic results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 19. Effect of Supply Response in World Soybean and Products Trade, 
1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No Supply Response case and Base case 
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt                                                                                                              
EU-15/27 477.9 3.5 554.1 4.1 -76.2 
Japan 107.2 2.5 110.9 2.6 -3.7 
China 637.4 4.9 1220.5 9.9 -583.1 
Rest of the world 114.0 1.1 446.4 4.6 -332.4 
Total 1336.5 3.3 2332.0 5.8 -995.5 
      
World Soybean Exports 
United States 439.6 1.8 2112.1 9.2 -1672.5 
Brazil 334.5 2.8 78.0 0.6 256.5 
Argentina 562.4 12.9 141.8 3.0 420.5 
Total 1336.5 3.3 2332.0 5.8 -995.5 
      
World Soymeal Imports 
EU-15/27 203.9 1.6 192.5 1.3 11.4 
Japan 45.2 1.7 49.6 5.4 -4.3 
China -78.0 - -78.0 - 0 
Rest of the world 253.3 0.6 366.3 2.6 113.0 
Total 424.5 1.4 530.4 1.8 -105.9 
      
World Soymeal Exports 
United States 103.3 1.6 5.5 0.1 -97.8 
Brazil 43.2 0.4 45.4 0.4 2.2 
Argentina  17.4 0.1 53.0 0.4 35.7 
China 260.5 - 426.5 - 165.9 
Total 424.5 1.4 530.4 1.7 105.9 
      
World Soyoil Imports 
Japan 3.3 27.7 2.8 22.8 -0.5 
China -112.4 -10.3 -127.1 -11.5 -14.7 
Rest of the world 140.4 3.5 164.0 4.1 23.6 
Total 31.4 0.6 39.7 0.8 8.3 
      
World Soyoil Exports 
United States -12.8 - -24.7 - -11.9 
Brazil 8.7 0.7 9.6 0.7 0.9 
Argentina 3.3 0.1 11.1 0.4 7.8 
EU-15/27 31.1 7.6 43.7 10.6 11.6 
Total 31.4 0.6 39.7 0.8 8.3 
Note: (1) Price inelastic case results, (2) Price inelastic % change from baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between price inelastic results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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 The assumption of a price inelastic supply also makes a difference in effects of 
checkoff expenditures on world soybean and products markets and trade (Table 19). 
With no supply response, prices increase by more than in the base case resulting in less 
growth in foreign market demand than in the base case. Furthermore, U.S. exports are 
restricted by the lower increase in production. For soybeans, U.S. exports are 1,672.5 
thousand mt smaller in the price inelastic supply than in the base case. On the other hand, 
soybean exports of competing countries are greater in the price inelastic supply. A 
greater increase in prices in the absence of supply response leads to a smaller increase in 
domestic consumption of soymeal and soyoil. Thus, the increase in exports of soymeal is 
greater and the decrease in exports of soyoil is less than in the base case. 
 By comparing the effects of the checkoff program on the benefits to U.S. 
soybean producers in the price inelastic supply case and in the base case, the impact of 
supply response on the upstream transmission of benefits can be seen examined (Table 
20). Because of the relatively greater increase in soybean price in the price inelastic 
supply case, added soybean cash receipts and the RBCR are $6,421.9 million and $4.7 
higher, respectively, than in the base case. Meanwhile, the smaller increase in soybean 
production leads to a much lower cost of added production. Thus, in the inelastic supply 
case, increased net revenue is $21,097.6 million higher than the base case. In the price 
inelastic supply case, PBCR and NBCR are both $15.6 higher than in the base case. 
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Table 20. The Impact of Supply Response on the Upstream Transmission of 
Benefits to U.S. Soybean Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts 
($ million) 41,641.2 35,219.3 6,421.9 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment ($ million) 1,356.2 1,356.2 0 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 30.7 26.0 4.7 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 9,870.7 24,546.5 -14,675.7 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) 31,770.5 10,672.9 21,097.6 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(PBCR) ($/$ spent) 23.4 7.9 15.6 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) 22.4 6.9 15.6 
Note: (1) Price inelastic case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between price inelastic results 
and base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
 
 The assumption of no supply response results in a much higher soybean price and 
lower production than in the base case resulting in relatively higher benefits and lower 
costs to U.S. soybean producers in the no supply response case. Clearly, the more likely 
the gain in producer surplus with a perfectly inelastic supply curve is more than the gain 
in the case of a sloped supply curve. Studies of the effects of checkoff-funded demand 
promotion expenditures for commodities that assume that supply is price inelastic can 
lead to overestimated benefits to producers.  
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Perfectly Elastic Supply Curve Assumption 
(No price response to a promotion-induced demand shift) 
  
The assumption of a perfectly elastic supply implies that price does not change in 
the model when demand changes. To measure the effect of the soybean checkoff 
expenditures in the absence of a response of U.S. soybean supply, this scenario requires 
that the U.S. farm price of soybeans be exogenized in the world soybean and products 
model (fixed exogenously). Then the zero expenditure simulation scenario is again 
conducted with the modified model and the changes from the baseline results are 
calculated. The changes in the endogenous variables from their baseline values results 
are then compared to the base case results to determine the effects of this simulation on 
the calculated producer benefits from the soybean checkoff program. The simplifying 
assumption of a perfectly elastic U.S. supply (no price effects) has an important effect on 
the calculated impacts on U.S. and world soybean markets and on the calculated benefits 
to producers. (Table 21, 22, 23, and 24).   
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Table 21. Effect of Price Response in U.S. Soybean Supply, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No Price Response case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres 
1,000 
acres   
  
Cornbelt 1178.1 3.7 947.8 3.0 230.3 
Delta 248.4 3.6 283.5 4.1 -35.1 
South 163.6 3.5 219.1 4.8 -55.5 
Plains 458.9 4.5 418.0 4.1 40.9 
Lakes 233.5 2.7 298.4 3.6 -64.9 
Atlantic 52.7 1.5 117.2 3.4 -64.5 
Other 28.5 5.5 30.0 5.9 -1.5 
Total 2363.6 3.6 2,314.1 3.5 49.5 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production 
mil. bu. 
  
  
Cornbelt 78.7 6.2 60.0 4.7 18.7 
Delta 10.1 1.6 9.7 5.3 0.3 
South 5.9 1.7 6.7 5.5 -0.8 
Plains 26.4 2.8 21.7 6.4 4.7 
Lakes 17.8 2.5 17.2 5.6 0.6 
Atlantic 4.3 2.7 5.1 5.8 -0.7 
Other 1.3 1.9 1.2 6.7 0.1 
Total 144.5 2.5 121.6 5.2 22.9 
Note: (1) Perfectly elastic case Results, (2) Perfectly elastic % change from baseline, (3) Base case Results, 
(4) Base case %, (5) Difference between perfectly elastic case results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 22. Effect of Price Response in U.S. Soybean Demand and Prices, 1980/81-
2012/13 
The Difference between No Price Response case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
42.9 3.6 42.6 3.6 0.3 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 tons     
 
1046.3 4.1 1,005.6 4.0 40.8 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
547.7 4.0 536.2 3.9 11.5 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
0.00 0.0 0.07 1.0 -0.07 
      
U.S. Soybean 
and Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) 0.00 0.0 0.07 1.0 -0.07 
Soymeal ($/ton) 4.1 1.8 5.3 2.4 -1.2 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 0.23 0.9 0.35 1.3 -0.12 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
0.12 9.4 0.1 7.2 0.02 
Note: (1) Perfectly elastic case results, (2) Perfectly elastic, (3) Base Case results, (4) Base case %, (5) 
Difference between perfectly elastic case results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
 
 
 With perfectly elastic supply, U.S. soybean production is higher 22.9 million 
bushels than the base case because the increase in soybean demand from the checkoff 
expenditures is not required to adjust to a price change induced by the demand shift 
(Table 21). As a consequence, supply increases to equal the larger demand in the price 
elastic supply case. Although total increased soybean planted acres are greater than the 
base case, planted acres are less increased in some region. Because higher price of 
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soybeans in the base case results in greater soybean production compared to the perfectly 
elastic supply case in the region that has relatively large price elasticity such as South, 
Atlantic, Lakes and Other (Table 2).    
 With perfectly elastic supply, there are no changes for the U.S. soybean farm 
price. Because of relatively lower price of soybeans, U.S. soybean crush is 0.3 million 
bushels greater in the perfectly elastic supply case (Table 22). In this scenario, only 
soybean price is exogenized in the model, prices of products are allowed to be changed. 
In the perfectly elastic supply case, the U.S. soymeal price and the U.S. soyoil price are 
1.2 $/bu and 0.12 cents/lb lower than those of base case, respectively.  
 Perfectly elastic supply also makes differences in effects of checkoff 
expenditures in world soybean and products trade (Table 23). With no price response, 
relatively lower prices result in more growth in demands in foreign markets than the 
base case. Greater soybean production in the U.S. leads to a growth in U.S. exports. For 
soybeans, the U.S. exports are 612.1 thousand mt greater in the perfectly elastic supply 
case than in the base case. On the other hand, soybean exports of competing countries 
are smaller in the perfectly elastic supply case. Less increased prices in the absence of 
price response lead more increased domestic consumption of soymeal and soyoil thus 
exports of both products are decreased while exports of competing countries are more 
increased. 
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Table 23. Effect of Price Response in World Soybean and Products Trade, 1980/81-
2012/13 
The Difference between No Price Response case and Base case 
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt                                                                                                              
EU-15/27 595.4 4.4 554.1 4.1 41.3 
Japan 112.6 2.6 110.9 2.6 1.7 
China 1351.5 11.0 1220.5 9.9 131.0 
Rest of the world 532.5 5.6 446.4 4.6 86.1 
Total 2592.1 6.5 2332.0 5.8 260.1 
      
World Soybean Exports 
United States 2724.2 12.2 2112.1 9.2 612.1 
Brazil -50.8 -0.4 78.0 0.6 -128.9 
Argentina -81.3 -1.6 141.8 3.0 -223.1 
Total 2592.1 6.5 2332.0 5.8 260.1 
      
World Soymeal Imports 
EU-15/27 180.5 1.2 192.5 1.3 -12.0 
Japan 51.0 5.6 49.6 5.4 1.4 
China -78.0 - -78.0 - 0 
Rest of the world 390.6 2.7 366.3 2.6 24.4 
Total 544.2 1.8 530.4 1.8 13.8 
      
World Soymeal Exports 
United States -24.1 -0.4 5.5 0.1 -29.6 
Brazil 47.3 0.4 45.4 0.4 1.8 
Argentina  66.9 0.5 53.0 0.4 13.8 
China 454.2 - 426.5 - 27.7 
Total 544.2 1.8 530.4 1.7 13.8 
      
World Soyoil Imports 
Japan 2.6 20.5 2.8 22.8 -0.2 
China -125.9 -11.4 -127.1 -11.5 1.2 
Rest of the world 169.3 4.2 164.0 4.1 5.2 
Total 45.9 0.9 39.7 0.8 6.2 
      
World Soyoil Exports 
United States -28.2 - -24.7 - -3.5 
Brazil 10.2 0.8 9.6 0.7 0.6 
Argentina 13.9 0.6 11.1 0.4 2.8 
EU-15/27 50.0 12.3 43.7 10.6 6.4 
Total 45.9 0.9 39.7 0.8 6.2 
Note: (1) Perfectly elastic case results, (2) Perfectly elastic %, (3) Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) 
Difference between perfectly elastic case results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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 By comparing effects of the checkoff program on benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers in the perfectly elastic supply case and in the base case, the impact of price 
response on the upstream transmission of benefits is examined (Table 24). Because of 
the relatively larger production in the perfectly elastic supply case, added soybean cash 
receipts is $1,020.3 million higher and RBCR is $0.7 higher than those in the base case 
are. Meanwhile, more increased production leads to a much higher cost of added 
production. Thus, in the perfectly elastic supply case, net revenue is $3,566.6 million 
lower than the base case. In the perfectly elastic supply case, PBCR and NBCR are $2.6 
lower than those of the base case, respectively.  
 
Table 24. The Impact of Price Response on the Upstream Transmission of Benefits 
to U.S. Soybean Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts 
($ million) 36,239.7 35,219.3 1,020.3 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment 
($ million) 1,356.2 1,356.2 0 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 26.7 26.0 0.7 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 28,989.4 24,546.5 4,586.9 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) 7,250.2 10,672.9 -3,566.6 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(PBCR) ($/$ spent) 5.3 7.9 -2.6 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) 4.3 6.9 -2.6 
Note: (1) Perfectly elastic case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between perfectly elastic case 
results and base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
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 No price response introduces the relatively lower soybean price and larger 
production than the base case, thus results in relatively higher benefits but much higher 
costs to U.S. soybean producers. Clearly, the gain in producer surplus with a perfectly 
elastic supply curve is less than the gain in the case of price response. Studies of the 
effects of checkoff-funded demand promotion expenditures for commodities often 
assume that supply is perfectly elastic can lead to underestimated benefits.  
 
No U.S. Government Intervention Assumption 
 U.S. farm policy has prescribed different types of intervention in the soybean 
sector over time (equation 5).  The effects of government intervention on the 
transmission of the benefits from checkoff expenditures have been different over time 
given the changing form of intervention by the government in the soybean sector. 
 To measure the effect of the checkoff expenditure in the absence of government 
intervention, the model is modified to remove price supports by government policy. For 
this purpose, the expected soybean farm price for each region is replaced with lagged 
farm price in the acreage equations.  
  Any exogenous (farm policy) determination of the soybean farm price in each 
year is removed in the model. The modified model is then used to simulate the effects of 
removing all soybean checkoff expenditures (again, over all countries, commodities, and 
types of expenditure over the 1980/81 to 2012/13 sample period (the “no government 
intervention” simulation). The resulting changes in the endogenous variables in the “no 
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government simulation” are then compared to those of base case to determine the extent 
of the impact of the “no government” assumption in the impact of the soybean checkoff 
program and the calculation of the producer BCR. The “no government” simulation 
results are compared to those of the base case in Tables 25, 26, 27, and 28. 
 
Table 25. Effect of Government Intervention in U.S. Soybean Supply, 1980/81-
2012/13 
The Difference between No Government Intervention case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres 
1,000 
acres   
  
Cornbelt 958.0 3.0 947.8 3.0 10.1 
Delta 283.4 4.1 283.5 4.1 -0.1 
South 235.0 5.2 219.1 4.8 15.9 
Plains 418.9 4.1 418.0 4.1 0.9 
Lakes 301.9 3.6 298.4 3.6 3.6 
Atlantic 118.0 3.5 117.2 3.4 0.8 
Other 30.7 6.0 30.0 5.9 0.7 
Total 2346.0 3.6 2,314.1 3.5 32.0 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production 
mil. bu. 
  
  
Cornbelt 60.3 4.8 60.0 4.7 0.3 
Delta 9.7 5.2 9.7 5.3 0.0 
South 7.1 5.9 6.7 5.5 0.4 
Plains 21.7 6.4 21.7 6.4 0.0 
Lakes 17.4 5.7 17.2 5.6 0.2 
Atlantic 5.0 5.7 5.1 5.8 0.0 
Other 1.2 6.7 1.2 6.7 0.0 
Total 122.5 5.3 121.6 5.2 0.9 
Note: (1) No government intervention case results, (2) No government intervention % change from 
baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no government intervention case 
results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 26. Effect of Government Intervention in U.S. Soybean Demand and Prices, 
1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No Government Intervention case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
42.6 3.6 42.6 3.6 0.0 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 tons     
 
1,006.0 4.0 1,005.6 4.0 0.4 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
536.3 3.7 536.2 3.9 0.1 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
0.06 0.9 0.07 1.0 -0.01 
      
U.S. Soybean 
and Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) 0.06 0.9 0.07 1.0 -0.01 
Soymeal ($/ton) 5.1 2.3 5.3 2.4 -0.2 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 0.34 3.2 0.35 1.3 -0.01 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
0.1 7.4 0.1 7.2 0.0 
Note: (1) No government intervention case results, (2) No government intervention % change from 
baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no government intervention case 
results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
 
 
 The existence of government intervention makes differences in effects of 
checkoff expenditures in U.S. soybean and products markets (Table 25 and 26). Under 
government intervention, if market prices were below the supported price, increased 
demand brought on by checkoff promotion programs does not introduce a growth in 
acreage planted (Figure 30). Thus, the effect of checkoff expenditure for promotion on 
an increase of acreage planted is greater in the no government intervention case than the 
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base case. Since soybean production is relatively larger, the soybean farm price become 
$0.01 lower in the no government intervention case.  
 The government intervention does not make notable differences in effects of 
checkoff expenditures in world soybean and products trade (Table 27). With no 
government intervention, less increased prices result in more growth in demands in 
foreign markets than the base case. Furthermore, U.S. exports are increased by 
additional production. For soybeans, the U.S. exports are 18.1 thousand mt greater in the 
no government intervention case than in the base case. Less increased prices in the 
absence of government intervention lead more increased total consumption of soymeal 
and soyoil in foreign markets thus an increase in total imports of soymeal and soyoil are 
greater than in the base case. 
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Table 27. Effect of Government Intervention in World Soybean and Products 
Trade, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No Government Intervention case and Base case 
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt                                                                                                              
EU-15/27 556.6 4.1 554.1 4.1 2.5 
Japan 111.0 2.6 110.9 2.6 0.1 
China 1225.4 9.9 1220.5 9.9 4.9 
Rest of the world 456.6 4.6 446.4 4.6 10.2 
Total 2349.6 5.9 2332.0 5.8 17.6 
      
World Soybean Exports 
United States 2130.2 9.2 2112.1 9.2 18.1 
Brazil 78.4 0.6 78.0 0.6 0.4 
Argentina 141.0 3.0 141.8 3.0 -0.8 
Total 2349.6 5.9 2332.0 5.8 17.6 
      
World Soymeal Imports 
EU-15/27 192.1 1.3 192.5 1.3 -0.4 
Japan 49.7 5.4 49.6 5.4 0.1 
China -78.0 - -78.0 - 0 
Rest of the world 369.6 2.6 366.3 2.6 3.4 
Total 533.6 1.8 530.4 1.8 3.1 
      
World Soymeal Exports 
United States 5.5 0.1 5.5 0.1 0.0 
Brazil 45.5 0.4 45.4 0.4 0.0 
Argentina 53.5 0.4 53.0 0.4 0.4 
China 429.1 - 426.5 - 2.6 
Total 533.6 1.8 530.4 1.7 3.1 
      
World Soyoil Imports 
Japan 2.8 22.5 2.8 22.8 0.0 
China -127.4 -11.5 -127.1 -11.5 -0.2 
Rest of the world 164.7 4.1 164.0 4.1 0.7 
Total 40.2 0.8 39.7 0.8 0.5 
      
World Soyoil Exports 
United States -24.8 - -24.7 - 0.0 
Brazil 9.6 0.7 9.6 0.7 0.0 
Argentina 11.3 0.4 11.1 0.4 0.1 
EU-15/27 44.0 10.7 43.7 10.6 0.4 
Total 40.2 0.8 39.7 0.8 0.5 
Note: (1) No government intervention case results, (2) No government intervention %, (3) Base case 
results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between No government intervention results and base case results  
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 By comparing effects of the checkoff program on benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers in no government intervention case and in the base case, the impact of supply 
response on the upstream transmission of benefits is examined (Table 28). Because of 
the lower soybean price in no government intervention case, added soybean cash receipts 
is $159.3 million lower and RBCR is $0.1 lower than those in the base case are. 
Meanwhile, more increased production leads to a higher cost of added production in no 
government intervention case. Thus, in no government intervention case, increased net 
revenue is $456.8 million lower than the base case. Also, PBCR and NBCR are $0.4 
lower than those of the base case, respectively.  
  
Table 28. The Impact of Government Intervention on the Upstream Transmission 
of Benefits to U.S. Soybean Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts 
($ million) 35,060.0 35,219.3 -159.3 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment 
($ million) 1,356.2 1,356.2 0 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 25.9 26.0 -0.1 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 24,843.9 24,546.5 297.4 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) 10,216.1 10,672.9 -456.8 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(PBCR) ($/$ spent) 7.5 7.9 -0.4 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) 6.5 6.9 -0.4 
Note: (1) No government intervention case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between 
government intervention c results and base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
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 No government intervention introduces the much lower soybean price but more 
added production driven by checkoff programs than the base case, thus results in 
relatively lower benefits and higher costs to U.S. soybean producers. Clearly, the gain in 
producer surplus with no government intervention is less than the gain with government 
intervention. Studies of the effects of checkoff expenditures for commodities often 
assume that there are no price supports by the government can lead to underestimated 
benefits.  
   
No Free-Rider Gains Assumption 
 A free rider, in the upstream transmission of checkkoff benefits, refers to some 
country that benefits from a checkoff-promotion-induced change in global demand 
without paying for the checkoff program. In world soybean markets, major export 
competitors include Brazil and Argentina are exporting more soybeans and soybean 
products than they would have been without U.S. checkoff program. 
 To measure the effects of free rider gains on the transmission of the benefits from 
checkoff expenditures for domestic soybean promotion, soybean, soymeal and soyoil 
exports by Brazil and Argentina exogenized (historical levels) in the model. U.S. 
soybean, soymeal, and soyoil exports, on the other hand, are left as endogenously 
determined variables in the model.   
 The modified world soybean and products model is then simulated by setting all 
checkoff expenditures to zero as done in the preceding simulation (the “no free rider” 
case). The “no free rider” simulation changes in the endogenous variables in the model 
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from their baseline simulation values are compared to the base case to determine the 
effect of the “no free rider” assumption on the measured changes in world soybean and 
products supplies, demands, prices, and trade and the producer BCR. A comparison of 
the “no free rider” case from those of the base case is provided in Table 29, 30, 31, and 
32.  
 
Table 29. Effect of Free Riders in U.S. Soybean Supply, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No free rider case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres 
1,000 
acres   
  
Cornbelt 979.8 3.1 947.8 3.0 32.0 
Delta 306.3 4.5 283.5 4.1 22.7 
South 247.1 5.5 219.1 4.8 28.0 
Plains 438.7 4.3 418.0 4.1 20.7 
Lakes 330.3 3.9 298.4 3.6 31.9 
Atlantic 135.6 4.0 117.2 3.4 18.4 
Other 32.1 6.3 30.0 5.9 2.1 
Total 2,469.8 3.8 2,314.1 3.5 155.8 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production 
mil. bu. 
  
  
Cornbelt 61.2 4.8 60.0 4.7 1.3 
Delta 10.4 5.6 9.7 5.3 0.6 
South 7.4 6.2 6.7 5.5 0.8 
Plains 22.4 6.6 21.7 6.4 0.7 
Lakes 18.4 6.0 17.2 5.6 1.1 
Atlantic 5.5 6.3 5.1 5.8 0.5 
Other 1.3 7.1 1.2 6.7 0.1 
Total 126.7 5.5 121.6 5.2 5.0 
Note: (1) No free rider case results, (2) No free rider % change from baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between no free rider case results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 30. Effect of Free Riders in U.S. Soybean Demand and Prices, 1980/81-
2012/13 
The Difference between No free rider case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
42.7 3.9 42.6 3.6 0.1 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 
tons 
    
 
977.8 3.8 1,005.6 4.0 -27.8 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
527.2 3.9 536.2 3.9 -8.9 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
0.10 1.4 0.07 1.0 0.03 
      
U.S. Soybean and 
Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) 0.10 1.4 0.07 1.0 0.03 
Soymeal ($/ton) 6.4 2.9 5.3 2.4 1.1 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 0.45 1.7 0.35 1.3 0.1 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
0.1 7.9 0.1 7.2 0.01 
Note: (1) No free rider case results, (2) No free rider % change from baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between no free rider case results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
 
 
 The existence of free riders makes differences in effects of checkoff expenditures 
in U.S. soybean and products markets (Table 29 and 30). Checkoff promotion programs 
in domestic and foreign market shift out the demand of soybeans. Soybean production is 
5.1 million bushels greater than that in the base case. As shown in Table 30, U.S. 
soybean producers face greater demand in the case of without free riders, an annual 
average of soybean farm price is $0.03 higher than the base case.   
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 The existence of free riders also makes differences in effects of checkoff 
expenditures in world soybean and products trade (Table 31). With the existence of free 
riders, programs raised not only U.S. soybean exports but also soybean exports by Brazil 
and Argentina. Without free riders, higher prices result in less growth in demands in 
foreign markets. In the no free rider case, checkoff programs are forced to have no 
effects on exports by Brazil and Argentina. Thus, the U.S is able to export more 
soybeans than the base case. Compared to the base, U.S. soymeal and soyoil exports are 
greater than those in the case of no free rider. 
 By comparing effects of the checkoff program on benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers in the no free rider case and in the base case, the impact of the free rider on 
the upstream transmission of benefits is examined (Table 32). Without free riders, a 
greater soybean production results in greater added soybean cash receipts than the base 
case. In no free rider case, added soybean cash receipts are $3,300.6 million higher and 
RBCR is $2.4 higher than those in the base case are. Meanwhile, a greater soybean 
production leads to a higher cost of added production. However, an increase in added 
soybean cash receipts is higher than an increase in cost of added production. Thus, in no 
free rider case, increased net revenue is $2,196.1 million higher than the base case. 
Without free riders, PBCR and NBCR are $1.6 higher than those of the base case, 
respectively.  
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Table 31. Effect of Free Riders in World Soybean and Products Trade, 1980/81-
2012/13 
The Difference between No free rider case and Base case 
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt                                                                                                              
EU-15/27 576.1 4.2 554.1 4.1 21.9 
Japan 111.0 2.6 110.9 2.6 0.1 
China 1149.1 9.2 1220.5 9.9 -71.4 
Rest of the world 410.1 4.2 446.4 4.6 -36.4 
Total 2246.2 5.6 2332.0 5.8 -85.7 
      
World Soybean Exports 
United States 2246.2 9.8 2112.1 9.2 134.1 
Brazil 0 - 78.0 0.6 -78.0 
Argentina 0 - 141.8 3.0 -141.8 
Total 2246.2 5.6 2332.0 5.8 -85.7 
      
World Soymeal Imports 
EU-15/27 161.0 1.1 192.5 1.3 -31.5 
Japan 47.6 5.2 49.6 5.4 -1.9 
China -78.0 - -78.0 - 0 
Rest of the world 314.6 2.2 366.3 2.6 -51.7 
Total 445.3 1.5 530.4 1.8 -85.2 
      
World Soymeal Exports 
United States 33.1 0.5 5.5 0.1 27.6 
Brazil 0 - 45.4 0.4 -45.4 
Argentina  0 - 53.0 0.4 -53.0 
China 412.2 - 426.5 - -14.3 
Total 445.3 1.4 530.4 1.7 -85.2 
      
World Soyoil Imports 
Japan 2.8 22.5 2.8 22.8 -0.1 
China -127.4 -11.5 -127.1 -11.5 -2.1 
Rest of the world 164.7 4.1 164.0 4.1 -9.6 
Total 40.2 0.8 39.7 0.8 -11.8 
      
World Soyoil Exports 
United States -20.1 - -24.7 - 4.6 
Brazil 0 - 9.6 0.7 -9.6 
Argentina 0 - 11.1 0.4 -11.1 
EU-15/27 48.0 11.8 43.7 10.6 4.4 
Total 27.9 0.6 39.7 0.8 -11.8 
Note: (1) No free rider case results, (2) No free rider % change from baseline, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between no free rider case results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
 
 232 
 
Table 32. The Impact of Free Riders on the Upstream Transmission of Benefits to 
U.S. Soybean Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts 
($ million) 38,519.9 35,219.3 3,300.6 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment 
($ million) 1,356.2 1,356.2 0 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 28.4 26.0 2.4 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 25,651.0 24,546.5 1,104.5 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) 12,869.0 10,672.9 2,196.1 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(PBCR) ($/$ spent) 9.5 7.9 1.6 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) 8.5 6.9 1.6 
Note: (1) No free rider case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between no free rider results and 
base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
 
 No free rider introduces the much higher soybean exports by the U.S. and more 
production than the base case, thus results in relatively higher benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers. Clearly, the more likely the gain in producer surplus without free riders is 
more than the gain in the case with free riders. Studies of the effects of checkoff-funded 
demand promotion expenditures for commodities often assume that no free riders lead to 
overestimated benefits.  
 
No Domestic Supply Chain Assumption 
 Some analyses of checkoff programs ignore the process of simultaneous 
interactions between the soybean level of the supply chain and the soybean product 
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levels of the supply chain.  As represented in Figure 32, if domestic soybean use is 
promoted, then the soybean price increases. However, an increase in the supply of the 
joint products reduces prices in the markets for both joint products and the lower prices 
for the soybean products shift the soybean demand curve back resulting a smaller initial 
increases of the soybean price and soybean production. The assumption of no domestic 
supply implies that soybean markets are not influenced by feedback effects from joint 
product markets. 
 In addition, there are no market effects of promotion for joint products on 
benefits to U.S. soybean producers in the absence of a domestic supply chain. To 
distinguish the effect of a domestic supply chain from effects of promotions for joint 
products, the base case here also needs to be modified. In the base case in this scenario, 
the soybean model was first simulated over the period of 1980/91 through 2011/12 with 
all checkoff expenditures set to their actual, historical levels. The model was then again 
simulated over the same period with only checkoff expenditures for soybean promotion 
set to zero. The differences in the simulated values of the endogenous variables in the 
model (supply, demand, prices, trade, etc. across all countries and commodities in the 
model) between the two simulations were calculated and taken as measures of the effects 
of checkoff expenditures for soybean promotion when the assumption of no domestic 
supply chain is made. 
 To measure the U.S. and world soybean and product market effects of the 
soybean checkoff program in the absence of domestic supply chain effects, the U.S. 
crush margin variable (equation (4) in Table 3) was allowed to respond only to the 
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soybean price. In the base model, the crush margin is calculated using soybean farm 
price, soymeal wholesale price and soyoil wholesale price. This scenario requires that 
the U.S. wholesale prices of soymeal and soyoil in the crush margin equation to be 
exogenized at historical levels in the model. However, the U.S. soybean farm price in the 
crush margin equation is the value that is determined endogenously to satisfy the market 
clearing condition.  
 The modified model is then used to simulate the effects of removing only 
checkoff expenditures for soybean promotion in both cases. Other checkoff funds for 
production research and joint products are retained in the model in both cases. The 
differences between the base case results and those of no domestic supply chain case 
results are provided in impacts of domestic supply chain on the transmission of the 
returns of the soybean checkoff program to soybean producers (Tables 33, 34, 35, and 
36). 
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Table 33. Effect of Domestic Supply Chain in U.S. Soybean Supply, 1980/81-
2012/13 
The Difference between No Domestic Supply Chain case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres 
1,000 
acres   
  
Cornbelt 144.2 0.4 140.0 0.4 4.2 
Delta 134.9 1.9 130.8 1.9 4.1 
South 163.2 3.5 158.6 3.4 4.6 
Plains 99.3 0.9 96.4 0.9 2.9 
Lakes 136.8 1.6 132.7 1.5 4.1 
Atlantic 109.4 3.2 106.4 3.1 3.0 
Other 12.9 2.4 12.5 2.4 0.4 
Total 800.8 1.2 777.5 1.2 23.3 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production 
mil. bu. 
  
  
Cornbelt 6.1 0.5 5.9 0.5 0.2 
Delta 4.2 2.2 4.1 2.2 0.1 
South 4.9 4.0 4.8 3.9 0.1 
Plains 3.5 1.0 3.4 0.9 0.1 
Lakes 5.2 1.6 5.0 1.6 0.2 
Atlantic 3.2 3.6 3.1 3.5 0.1 
Other 0.5 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.0 
Total 27.6 1.1 26.8 1.1 0.8 
Note: (1) No domestic supply chain case results, (2) No domestic supply chain % change from baseline, (3) 
Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no domestic supply chain results and base case 
results ((1) minus (3)) 
  
 236 
 
Table 34. Effect of Domestic Supply Chain in U.S. Soybean Demand and Prices, 
1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No Domestic Supply Chain case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
39.6 1.6 36.4 1.5 0.2 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 tons     
 
170.6 0.6 164.9 0.6 5.7 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
82.1 0.6 79.0 0.6 3.1 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
0.25 3.7 0.24 3.6 0.01 
      
U.S. Soybean 
and Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) 0.25 3.6 0.24 3.5 0.01 
Soymeal ($/ton) -12.8 -5.4 -12.5 -5.2 -0.3 
Soyoil (cents/lb) -1.1 -4.0 -1.1 -3.9 0.00 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
-0.2 -14.7 -0.7 -31.4 0.5 
Note: (1) No domestic supply chain case results, (2) No domestic supply chain % change from baseline, (3) 
Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no domestic supply chain results and base case 
results ((1) minus (3)) 
 
 
 The existence of a domestic supply chain makes differences in effects of 
checkoff expenditures in U.S. soybean and products markets as shown in Tables 33 and 
34). With domestic supply chain, a smaller initial increase in soybean price occurs as a 
result of the lower prices of joint products. In other words, the U.S. soybean price is 
$0.01 higher in the no domestic supply chain case. A higher soybean price in the no 
domestic supply chain case leads to larger planted acres than in the base case. Therefore, 
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soybean production is 0.8 million bushels higher compared to the base case. Because 
there is no feedback effect from the prices of joint products, U.S. soybean crush is 0.2 
million bushels greater in the case without a domestic supply chain. 
 The existence of a domestic supply chain also makes differences in the effects of 
checkoff expenditures on world soybean and products trade (Table 35). Assuming away 
a domestic supply chain results in a greater increase in prices resulting in less growth in 
soybean demand in foreign markets than in the base case. In both cases, U.S. exports are 
restricted by higher domestic consumption. On the other hand, soybean exports of 
competing countries increase in both cases. Without a domestic supply chain, U.S. 
exports of soybeans are smaller than in the base case as result of larger a U.S. soybean 
crush. A greater increase in the production of joint products in the no domestic supply 
chain case leads to a larger increase in U.S. exports of soymeal and soyoil than in the 
base case. 
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Table 35. Effect of Domestic Supply Chain in World Soybean and Products Trade, 
1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No Supply Response case and Base case 
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt                                                                                                              
EU-15/27 -293.7 - -276.8 - -16.9 
Japan 90.5 2.1 90.9 2.1 -0.4 
China 516.0 3.9 533.8 4.1 -17.8 
Rest of the world 218.7 2.2 225.5 2.3 -6.8 
Total 531.4 1.3 573.4 1.4 -42.0 
      
World Soybean Exports 
United States -321.7 - -259.1 - -62.6 
Brazil 295.5 2.5 288.4 2.4 7.1 
Argentina 557.6 12.8 544.0 12.5 13.6 
Total 531.4 1.3 573.4 1.4 -42.0 
      
World Soymeal Imports 
EU-15/27 343.3 2.4 327.0 2.3 16.3 
Japan -52.6 - -53.4 - 0.8 
China -78.0 - -78.0 - 0 
Rest of the world 711.9 5.1 685.2 4.9 26.7 
Total 924.7 3.2 880.9 2.5 43.8 
      
World Soymeal Exports 
United States 697.6 11.7 635.6 10.6 62.0 
Brazil -97.3 - -94.8 - -2.5 
Argentina  -243.7 - -237.5 - -6.2 
China 568.1 - 577.5 - -9.4 
Total 924.7 3.1 880.9 2.9 43.8 
      
World Soyoil Imports 
Japan -16.2 - -16.3 - 0.1 
China -90.6 - -94.1 - 3.5 
Rest of the world 134.8 3.3 129.1 3.2 5.7 
Total 28.0 0.5 18.7 0.4 9.3 
      
World Soyoil Exports 
United States 164.9 24.3 150.4 21.7 14.5 
Brazil -22.7 -1.7 -22.1 - -0.6 
Argentina -57.0 -2.2 -55.6 - -1.4 
EU-15/27 -57.2 -11.2 -54.1 -10.6 -3.1 
Total 28.0 0.5 18.7 0.4 9.3 
Note: (1) No domestic supply chain case results, (2) No domestic supply chain %, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between no domestic supply chain results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 36. The Impact of Domestic Supply Chain on the Upstream Transmission of 
Benefits to U.S. Soybean Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts ($ million) 29,254.6 28,577.5 677.1 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment ($ million) 268.1 268.1 0 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 109.1 106.6 2.5 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 6,802.0 6,601.2 200.8 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) 22,452.6 21,976.3 476.3 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio (PBCR) 
($/$ spent) 83.7 82.0 1.7 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) 82.7 81.0 1.7 
Note: (1) No domestic supply chain case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between no domestic 
supply chain results and base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
 
 By comparing effects of the checkoff program on benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers in the no domestic supply chain case and in the base case, the impact of the 
existence of a domestic supply chain on the upstream transmission of the benefits of the 
soybean checkoff program to soybean producers is examined (Table 36). Because of the 
relatively greater increase in both the soybean price and soybean production in the no 
domestic supply chain case, added soybean cash receipts are $677.1 million higher and 
the RBCR is $2.5 higher than those in the base case. The greater increase in soybean 
production leads to a higher cost of added production as well. Thus, in the no domestic 
supply case, the increase in soybean net revenue is $476.3 million higher than in the base 
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case. In the no domestic supply chain case, the PBCR and NBCR are each $1.7 higher 
than those of the base case, respectively.  
 The no domestic supply chain assumption results in a much higher soybean price 
and more soybean production than the base case, thus leading to relatively higher 
benefits to U.S. soybean producers. Clearly, the gain in producer surplus if the existence 
of a supply is assumed away is higher than the in the base case. Studies of the effects of 
checkoff-funded demand promotion expenditures for commodities often ignore the 
process of simultaneous interactions between multilevel level markets leading to 
overestimated benefits.  
  
No Global Supply Chain Assumption 
 Some analyses of checkoff programs ignore the process of simultaneous 
interactions between domestic and foreign markets. Increased consumption from 
promotion can have effects across the entire global soybean and products supply chain as 
the demand shift affects prices and trade of soybeans, meal, and oil.  Failure to account 
for those effects can also seriously bias the calculation of producer benefits from 
checkoff promotion.   
 In addition, there are no market effects of international promotions for soybeans 
and products on benefits of U.S. soybean producers in the absence of global supply 
chain. To distinguish the effect of a global supply chain from effects of international 
promotions for soybeans and products, the base case here also must be modified. In the 
base case in this scenario, the soybean model was first simulated over the period of 
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1980/91 through 2011/12 with all checkoff expenditures set to their actual, historical 
levels. The model was then again simulated over the same period with only checkoff 
expenditures for domestic promotions for soybeans and products set to zero. The 
differences in the simulated values of the endogenous variables in the model (supply, 
demand, prices, trade, etc. across all countries and commodities in the model) between 
the two simulations were calculated and taken as measures of the effects of checkoff 
expenditures for domestic promotions when the assumption of no global supply chain is 
made. 
 To measure the effects of global supply chain on the transmission of the benefits 
from checkoff expenditures from only domestic soybean promotion, soybean, soymeal 
and soyoil exports by the U.S. are exogenized at their historical levels in the model. The 
modified world soybean and products model is then simulated by setting all checkoff 
expenditures for domestic promotions for soybean and products to zero as done in the 
preceding simulation (the “no global supply chain” case). Other effects of checkoff 
funds for production research and international promotions are retained in both cases. 
The changes in the simulated values of the endogenous variables in the model in the “no 
global supply chain” case from their baseline simulation values are compared to the base 
case to determine the effect of the “no global supply chain” assumption on the measured 
changes in domestic soybean and products supplies, demands, prices, and trade and the 
producer BCR. A comparison of the “no global supply chain” case from those of the 
base case is provided in Tables 37, 38, 39, and 40.  
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Table 37. Effect of Global Supply Chain in U.S. Soybean Supply, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No global supply chain case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres 
1,000 
acres   
  
Cornbelt 221.4 0.7 70.5 0.2 50.9 
Delta 169.6 2.4 79.6 1.1 90.0 
South 250.9 5.5 93.1 2.0 157.8 
Plains 124.4 1.2 55.2 0.5 69.2 
Lakes 175.5 2.1 67.6 0.8 107.9 
Atlantic 159.7 4.7 64.7 1.9 95.0 
Other 18.9 3.6 8.1 1.5 10.8 
Total 1120.4 1.7 438.6 0.6 681.8 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production 
mil. bu. 
  
  
Cornbelt 9.8 0.7 3.2 0.2 6.6 
Delta 5.8 3.1 2.7 1.4 3.1 
South 7.9 6.6 3.0 2.4 4.9 
Plains 4.5 1.3 2.0 0.6 2.5 
Lakes 7.1 2.2 2.7 0.8 4.4 
Atlantic 5.0 5.6 2.0 2.2 3.0 
Other 0.8 4.0 0.3 1.7 0.5 
Total 40.8 1.7 15.9 0.7 24.9 
Note: (1) No global supply chain case results, (2) No global supply chain  % change from baseline, (3) 
Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no global supply chain case results and base 
case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 38. Effect of Global Supply Chain in U.S. Soybean Demand and Prices, 
1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No global supply chain case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
39.4 2.9 41.5 3.0 -2.1 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 tons     
 
936.9 3.7 1,059.8 4.2 -122.9 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
446.4 3.3 531.4 3.9 -85.0 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
0.45 7.0 0.13 1.9 0.32 
      
U.S. Soybean 
and Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) 0.46 6.7 0.14 1.9 0.32 
Soymeal ($/ton) -0.2 - 3.3 1.5 -3.5 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 0.6 1.3 0.4 1.3 0.2 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
-0.4 - 0.0 - -0.4 
Note: (1) No global supply chain case results, (2) No global supply chain % change from baseline, (3) 
Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no global supply chain case results and base 
case results ((1) minus (3)) 
 
 
 The existence of a global supply chain makes a difference in effects of checkoff 
expenditures on U.S. soybean and products markets (Table 37 and 38). Checkoff 
promotion programs in the domestic market shift out the demand of soybeans. With the 
existence of global supply chain, programs also affect exports, imports and world 
soybean prices. When exports are exogenously fixed in the no global supply chain case, 
checkoff expenditures in U.S. soybean market result in a higher U.S. soybean price than 
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the base case. With the higher soybean price, soybean production is greater by 24.9 
million bushels and soybean crush is lower by 2.1 million bushels than in the base case.  
 
Table 39. The Impact of Global Supply Chain on the Upstream Transmission of 
Benefits to U.S. Soybean Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts 
($ million) 58,585.1 16,709.4 41,875.7 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment ($ million) 256.6 256.6 0 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 228.3 65.1 163.2 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 11,282.7 4,245.4 7,037.3 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) 47,302.5 12,464.0 34,838.5 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(PBCR) ($/$ spent) 184.3 48.6 135.7 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) 183.3 47.6 135.7 
Note: (1) No global supply chain case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between no global 
supply chain results and base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
 
 By comparing the effects of the checkoff program on the returns of the soybean 
checkoff program to U.S. soybean producers in the no global supply chain case to those 
in the base case, the impact of the global supply chain on the upstream transmission of 
benefits is examined (Table 39). If the existence of a global supply chain is assumed 
away, soybean producers face a higher soybean farm price and increased production 
results in greater added soybean cash receipts than in the base case. In the no global 
supply chain case, added soybean cash receipts are $41,875.7 million higher and the 
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RBCR is $163.2 higher than those in the base case are. Meanwhile, more a greater 
increase in production leads to a higher cost of added production. However, the increase 
in added soybean cash receipts is higher than the increase in the cost of added production. 
Thus, in the no global supply chain case, increased net revenue is $34,838.5 million 
higher than in the base case. Without a global supply chain, the PBCR and NBCR are 
$135.7 higher than those of the base case, respectively.  
 The assumption of no global supply chain results in a much higher soybean price 
and production than in the base case, resulting in higher benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers. Clearly, the measured gain to producers in terms of producer surplus is much 
higher is the global supply chain is assumed away than is the global supply chain 
linkages are taken into account in the analysis. Studies of the effects of checkoff-funded 
demand promotion expenditures for commodities hat assume away the global supply 
chain linkages in the markets they analyze will likely overestimate the benefits of a 
checkoff program to producers.  
  
No Checkoff Investments in Production Research 
(Only in demand promotion) 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, many checkoff programs studies analyze 
only the promotion effects of checkoff programs and ignore the fact that those programs 
simultaneously invest in production research. Therefore, those often ignore that the 
price-reducing effects of supply enhancement from research investments mute the price 
increasing effects of demand promotion. To measure the U.S. and world soybean and 
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product market effects of the soybean checkoff program in the case of ignoring the 
effects of checkoff investments in production research, the modified world soybean and 
products model is simulated by setting all checkoff expenditures for demand promotion 
to zero as done in the preceding simulation (the “no production research” case). The “no 
production research” simulation changes in the endogenous variables in the model from 
their baseline simulation values are compared to the base case to determine the effect of 
the “no production research” assumption on the measured changes in world soybean and 
products supplies, demands, prices, and trade and the producer BCR. A comparison of 
the “no production research” case from those of the base case is provided in Tables 40, 
41, 42, and 43.   
 Checkoff investments in production research make differences in the effects of 
checkoff expenditures in U.S. soybean and products markets (Table 40 and 41). 
Assuming no investments in production research, there is no price-reducing effects from 
the resulting supply expansion. Therefore, ignoring the effects of checkoff investments 
in production research leads to a much higher soybean price than in the base case. The 
U.S. soybean farm price is 0.34 $/bu higher in the no investments in research case. No 
checkoff investments in production research also makes difference in effects of checkoff 
expenditures on world soybean and products trade (Table 42). Because of the higher 
soybean price, soybean consumption in world markets is lower in the no investments in 
research case. For soybeans, the U.S. exports are 1,816.8 thousand mt smaller in the no 
investments in research case than in the base case.    
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Table 40. Effect of Checkoff Investments in Research in U.S. Soybean Supply, 
1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No production research case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres 
1,000 
acres   
  
Cornbelt 288.4 0.9 947.8 3.0 -659.4 
Delta 261.2 3.8 283.5 4.1 -22.3 
South 308.9 6.9 219.1 4.8 89.8 
Plains 196.0 1.9 418.0 4.1 -222 
Lakes 281.5 3.3 298.4 3.6 -16.9 
Atlantic 205.3 6.2 117.2 3.4 88.1 
Other 23.8 4.6 30.0 5.9 -6.2 
Total 1,565.1 2.4 2,314.1 3.5 -749.0 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production 
mil. bu. 
  
  
Cornbelt 11.8 0.9 60.0 4.7 -48.2 
Delta 7.8 4.2 9.7 5.3 -1.9 
South 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.5 2.4 
Plains 6.7 1.9 21.7 6.4 -15 
Lakes 10.4 3.3 17.2 5.6 -6.8 
Atlantic 5.8 6.7 5.1 5.8 0.7 
Other 0.9 4.6 1.2 6.7 -0.3 
Total 52.5 2.2 121.6 5.2 -69.1 
Note: (1) No production research case results, (2) No production research % change from baseline, (3) 
Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no production research results and base case 
results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 41. Effect of Checkoff Investments in Research in U.S. Soybean Demand and 
Prices, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No production research case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
41.8 3.3 42.6 3.6 -0.8 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 tons     
 
870.8 3.4 1,005.6 4.0 -124.8 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
494.8 3.6 536.2 3.9 -41.4 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
0.40 6.1 0.07 1.0 0.33 
      
U.S. Soybean 
and Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) 0.41 5.9 0.07 1.0 0.34 
Soymeal ($/ton) 11.8 5.5 5.3 2.4 6.5 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 1.0 3.8 0.35 1.3 0.65 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
0.0 -0.5 0.1 7.2 -0.1 
Note: (1) No production research case results, (2) No production research % change from baseline, (3) 
Base case results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no production research results and base case 
results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 42. Effect of Checkoff Investments in Research in World Soybean and 
Products Trade, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No production research case and Base case 
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt                                                                                                              
EU-15/27 498.1 3.7 554.1 4.1 -56.0 
Japan 107.3 2.5 110.9 2.6 -3.6 
China 410.0 3.1 1220.5 9.9 -810.5 
Rest of the world 29.8 0.3 446.4 4.6 -416.6 
Total 1045.2 2.5 2332.0 5.8 -1286.8 
      
World Soybean Exports 
United States 295.3 1.2 2112.1 9.2 -1816.8 
Brazil 293.5 2.5 78.0 0.6 215.5 
Argentina 456.4 10.3 141.8 3.0 314.6 
Total 1045.2 2.5 2332.0 5.8 -1286.8 
      
World Soymeal Imports 
EU-15/27 183.4 1.3 192.5 1.3 -9.1 
Japan 43.9 4.7 49.6 5.4 -5.7 
China -78.0 - -78.0 - 0 
Rest of the world 198.5 1.4 366.3 2.6 -167.8 
Total 347.9 1.2 530.4 1.8 -182.5 
      
World Soymeal Exports 
United States 110.8 1.7 5.5 0.1 105.3 
Brazil 46.9 0.4 45.4 0.4 1.5 
Argentina  21.9 0.2 53.0 0.4 -31.1 
China 168.3 - 426.5 - -258.2 
Total 347.9 1.1 530.4 1.7 -182.5 
      
World Soyoil Imports 
Japan 3.3 27.3 2.8 22.8 0.5 
China -95.2 -8.9 -127.1 -11.5 31.9 
Rest of the world 131.4 3.3 164.0 4.1 -32.6 
Total 39.4 0.8 39.7 0.8 -0.3 
      
World Soyoil Exports 
United States -9.7 - -24.7 - 15.0 
Brazil 9.6 0.7 9.6 0.7 0.0 
Argentina 3.9 0.2 11.1 0.4 -7.2 
EU-15/27 35.6 8.5 43.7 10.6 -8.1 
Total 39.4 0.8 39.7 0.8 -0.3 
Note: (1) No production research case results, (2) No production research %, (3) Base case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between no production research results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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 By comparing effects of the checkoff program on the benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers in the no investments in research case and in the base case, the impact of 
checkoff investments in production research on the upstream transmission of benefits is 
examined (Table 43). Because of the higher soybean price in the no investments in 
research case, added soybean cash receipts is $11,375.8 million higher and RBCR is 
$32.6 higher than those in the base case are. Meanwhile, a smaller increase in production 
leads to a much lower increase in the cost of added production. Thus, in the no 
investments in research case, increased net revenue is $23,485.8 million higher than the 
base case. Also, the PBCR and NBCR are $35.1 higher than those of the base case, 
respectively.  
 Assuming no checkoff investments in research results in a much higher soybean 
price and much lower soybean production than the base case, thus resulting in relatively 
higher benefits and lower costs to U.S. soybean producers. Clearly, producer surplus is 
higher with checkoff investments in production research than in the case without 
checkoff investments in production research. Studies of the effects of checkoff-funded 
demand promotion expenditures for commodities often ignore that checkoff 
expenditures are also invested in production research which can lead to a serious 
overestimation of the benefits of demand promotion alone to producers. 
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Table 43. The Impact of Checkoff Investments in Research on the Upstream 
Transmission of Benefits to U.S. Soybean Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts 
($ million) 46,595.1 35,219.3 11,375.8 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment 
($ million) 794.9 1,356.2 -561.3 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 58.6 26.0 32.6 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 12,436.5 24,546.5 -12,110.0 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) 34,158.7 10,672.9 23,485.8 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(PBCR) ($/$ spent) 43.0 7.9 35.1 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) 42.0 6.9 35.1 
Note: (1) No production research case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between no production 
research results and base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
 
No Promotion Programs at Multiple Levels of the Supply Chain 
(Promotion occurs at only the Retail Level of the Market) 
 Some analyses of checkoff programs ignore the potentially important checkoff-
promotion-induced simultaneous interactions among different levels of the supply chain 
on the transmission of benefits to producers. Consequently, many studies often only 
analyze effects of checkoff expenditures at the retail level of the market. 
  To measure the U.S. and world soybean and product market effects of the 
soybean checkoff program in the case of ignoring the effects of checkoff investments in 
soybean promotion, the modified world soybean and products model is simulated by 
setting only checkoff expenditures for soymeal and soyoil demand promotion and 
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production research to zero as done in the preceding simulation (the “no soybean 
promotion” case). The “no soybean promotion” simulation changes in the endogenous 
variables in the model from their baseline simulation values are compared to those in the 
base case to determine the effects of the “no soybean promotion” assumption on the 
measured changes in world soybean and products supplies, demands, prices, and trade, 
and the producer BCR. A comparison of the “no soybean promotion” case to those of the 
base case is provided in Tables 44, 45, 46, and 47. 
 
Table 44. Effect of No Promotion Programs at Multiple Levels of the Supply Chain 
in U.S. Soybean Supply, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No soybean promotion case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean  
Planted Acres 
1,000 
acres   
  
Cornbelt 784.8 2.4 947.8 3.0 -163.0 
Delta 127.0 1.8 283.5 4.1 -156.5 
South 32.2 0.7 219.1 4.8 -186.9 
Plains 316.2 3.1 418.0 4.1 -101.8 
Lakes 152.9 1.8 298.4 3.6 -145.5 
Atlantic -2.3 -0.1 117.2 3.4 -119.5 
Other 15.7 3.0 30.0 5.9 -14.3 
Total 1,426.6 2.1 2,314.1 3.5 -887.5 
      
U.S. Soybean  
Production 
mil. bu. 
  
  
Cornbelt 53.3 4.2 60.0 4.7 -6.7 
Delta 4.7 2.5 9.7 5.3 -5.0 
South 0.9 0.7 6.7 5.5 -5.8 
Plains 18.2 5.3 21.7 6.4 -3.5 
Lakes 11.8 3.8 17.2 5.6 -5.4 
Atlantic 1.7 1.8 5.1 5.8 -3.4 
Other 0.7 3.6 1.2 6.7 -0.5 
Total 91.3 3.9 121.6 5.2 -30.3 
Note: (1) No soybean promotion case Results, (2) No soybean promotion programs % change from 
baseline, (3) Base case Results, (4) Base case %, (5) Difference between no soybean promotion case 
results and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 45. Effect of No Promotion Programs at Multiple Levels of the Supply Chain 
in U.S. Soybean Demand and Prices, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No soybean promotion case and Base case 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
U.S. Soybean 
Crush 
mil. bu. 
  
  
 
6.1 1.8 42.6 3.6 -36.5 
U.S. Soymeal 
Consumption 
1,000 tons     
 
825.0 3.2 1,005.6 4.0 -180.6 
      
U.S. Soyoil 
Consumption 
mil. lbs.     
 
452.8 3.3 536.2 3.9 -83.4 
      
U.S. Soybean 
Farm Prices 
$/bu     
 
-0.16 -2.3 0.07 1.0 -0.2 
      
U.S. Soybean 
and Product 
Wholesale Prices 
$/unit    
 
Soybean ($/bu) -0.16 -2.2 0.07 1.0 -0.2 
Soymeal ($/ton) 18.0 8.7 5.3 2.4 12.7 
Soyoil (cents/lb) 1.5 5.8 0.35 1.3 1.1 
Crush Margin 
($/bu) 
0.8 108.9 0.1 7.2 0.7 
Note: (1) No soybean promotion case results, (2) No soybean promotion case %, (3) Base Case results, (4) 
Base case %, (5) Difference between no soybean promotion case results and base case results ((1) minus 
(3)) 
 
 
 Ignoring wholesale level promotion of soybeans and focusing only on the 
promotion of soybean products at retail make a difference in effects of checkoff 
expenditures on U.S. soybean and products markets (Table 44 and 45). Without 
investments in soybean promotion, soybean crush is smaller than in the base case. 
Therefore, a lower increase in the supply of joint products results in higher prices of 
joint products. In addition, ignoring the effects of checkoff investments in soybean 
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promotion leads to a much lower soybean price than the base case. The U.S. soybean 
farm price is 0.2 $/bu lower in the case of only promoting at the retail level (Table 45).  
 No checkoff investments in soybean promotion also make a difference in the 
effects of checkoff expenditures on world soybean and products trade (Table 46). In the 
retail-only promotion case, checkoff expenditures result in an increase in exports of 
soybeans and a decrease in exports of joint products compared to the base case. Total 
imports and exports of soybeans and soybean products were smaller than the base case.  
  By comparing effects of the checkoff program on benefits to U.S. soybean 
producers in the retail-only promotion case and in the base case, the impact of checkoff 
investments in the retail-only promotion case on the upstream transmission of benefits is 
examined (Table 47). Because of the lower soybean price in the retail-only promotion 
case, added soybean cash receipts are $27,342.4 million lower and the RBCR is $18.8 
lower than those in the base case. Meanwhile, a smaller increase in production leads to a 
lower cost of added production. Since the cost of added production is larger than added 
soybean cash receipts, checkoff effects on net revenue is negative in the retail-only 
promotion case. Thus, assuming only retail level promotion, net revenue is $19,787.3 
million lower than in the base case. In the retail-only promotion case, the PBCR and the 
NBCR are $16.3 lower than those of the base case, respectively.  
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Table 46. Effect of No Promotion Programs at Multiple Levels of the Supply Chain 
in World Soybean and Products Trade, 1980/81-2012/13 
The Difference between No soybean promotion case and Base case 
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
World Soybean Imports 1,000 mt                                                                                                              
EU-15/27 827.2 6.2 554.1 4.1 273.9 
Japan 19.7 0.4 110.9 2.6 -94.7 
China 642.5 5.0 1220.5 9.9 -578.0 
Rest of the world 201.9 2.0 446.4 4.6 -244.5 
Total 1691.3 4.2 2332.0 5.8 -640.7 
      
World Soybean Exports 
United States 2276.3 10.0 2112.1 9.2 164.2 
Brazil -199.1 -1.6 78.0 0.6 -277.1 
Argentina -385.9 -7.3 141.8 3.0 -527.7 
Total 1691.3 4.2 2332.0 5.8 -640.7 
      
World Soymeal Imports 
EU-15/27 -133.3 -0.9 192.5 1.3 -325.8 
Japan 102.8 11.9 49.6 5.4 53.2 
China -78.0 - -78.0 - 0 
Rest of the world -324.1 -2.2 366.3 2.6 -690.4 
Total -432.5 -1.4 530.4 1.8 -962.9 
      
World Soymeal Exports 
United States -616.9 -8.5 5.5 0.1 -622.4 
Brazil 139.8 1.3 45.4 0.4 94.4 
Argentina  288.4 2.4 53.0 0.4 235.4 
China -243.9 - 426.5 - -670.4 
Total -432.5 -1.4 530.4 1.7 -962.9 
      
World Soyoil Imports 
Japan 19.2 -481.8 2.8 22.8 16.4 
China -30.9 -3.1 -127.1 -11.5 96.2 
Rest of the world 33.4 0.8 164.0 4.1 -130.6 
Total 21.6 0.4 39.7 0.8 -18.1 
      
World Soyoil Exports 
United States -173.4 -17.1 -24.7 - -148.7 
Brazil 31.6 2.4 9.6 0.7 22.0 
Argentina 66.2 2.7 11.1 0.4 55.1 
EU-15/27 97.1 27.1 43.7 10.6 53.4 
Total 21.6 0.4 39.7 0.8 -18.1 
Note: (1) No soybean promotion case results, (2) No soybean promotion %, (3) Base case results, (4) Base 
case %, (5) Difference between no soybean promotion case and base case results ((1) minus (3)) 
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Table 47. The Impact of No Promotion Programs at Multiple Levels of the Supply 
Chain on the Upstream Transmission of Benefits to U.S. Soybean 
Producers, 1980/81-2012/13  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Added Soybean Cash Receipts ($ million) 7,876.9 35,219.3 -27,342.4 
  
  
Soybean Checkoff Investment ($ million) 1,088.1 1,356.2 -268.1 
  
  
Revenue Benefit-Cost Ratio (RBCR) 
($/$ spent) 7.2 26.0 -18.8 
  
  
Cost of Added Production ($ million) 16,991.3 24,546.5 -7,555.2 
  
  
Net revenue ($ million) -9,114.4 10,672.9 -19,787.3 
  
  
Grower Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio (PBCR) 
($/$ spent) -8.4 7.9 -16.3 
  
  
Grower Net Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(NBCR) ($/$ spent) -9.4 6.9 -16.3 
Note: (1) No soybean promotion case results, (2) Base case results, (3) Difference between no soybean 
promotion case results and base case results ((1) minus (2)) 
 
 Assuming retail-only promotion results in lower production than in the base case, 
thus resulting in much lower benefits and lower costs to U.S. soybean producers. Clearly, 
the gain in producer surplus without checkoff investments in soybean promotion is less 
than the gain in the case with all checkoff investments. Studies of the effects of 
checkoff-funded demand promotion expenditures for commodities often ignore that 
checkoff expenditures are also invested at the wholesale level which can lead to 
underestimating the benefits of the promotion. 
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CHAPTER VI  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Most evaluations of checkoff programs make one or more assumptions to 
simplify their analyses without realizing the impact that such assumptions may have on 
the measured transmission of checkoff program returns along the supply chain back to 
producers. Typical simplifying assumptions that are made in the checkoff evaluation 
literature include no supply response, no price response, no government intervention in 
supporting farm prices and influencing farm supply, no free-rider gains, no domestic 
supply chains, no global supply chains, no checkoff investments in production research, 
and no promotion programs at multiple levels of the supply chain. These assumption 
could have serious effects on the measured upstream transmission of the benefits of 
generic promotion programs to producers. 
 
Summary 
 This study empirically analyzed the effects of key simplifying assumptions often 
made in analyses of checkoff programs that may affect the upstream transmission of the 
benefits of commodity checkoff programs to producers. Prior to examining those effects, 
the first part of this study concentrated on a qualitative analysis of the world soybean and 
products market as a background for constructing a world soybean model. A conceptual 
model of world soybean and soybean products markets was first proposed and discussed. 
Then an econometric simulation model of  world soybean and soybean products markets 
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that relaxes all of the simplifying assumption was developed to examine the effects of 
imposing those assumption on the transmission of the benefits of a commodity checkoff 
program  to producers. 
 Using the world soybean and soybean products model, a baseline case was 
simulated over the period of 1980/81 to 2012/13 in which none of the simplifying 
assumptions were made.  The baseline simulation measured the effects of no 
expenditures on soybean checkoff production research or demand promotion.  In this 
case, the soybean checkoff program boosts U.S. soybean production by an annual 
average of 5.2% compared to what would have been the case without a soybean checkoff 
program. The U.S. soybean crush also averaged 3.1% higher than would have been the 
case without the checkoff program. Also, the price farmers receive for soybeans 
averaged 1% higher and U.S. soybean exports 9% higher than would have been the case 
without the program. The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the soybean checkoff program was 
positive at $6.9 of returns to producers per dollar spent on promotion indicating that the 
U.S. soybean checkoff program has been highly effective in benefitting soybean 
producers over the study period.  
 
Conclusions 
 As expected, whether a supply response was allowed for in the analysis had an 
impact on the measured transmission of benefits to producers. The U.S. soybean farm 
price is higher if supply is not allowed to respond than in the base case in which supply 
responds to price changes. However, U.S. soybean production is lower without allowing 
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a supply response case compared to the base case while the soybean price is higher.  The 
lower increase in production than in the base case, results in relatively higher benefits 
and lower costs to U.S. soybean producers. It implies that benefits would be 
overestimated if supply response is not considered in the analysis.  
 Assuming no price response (a perfectly elastic supply) also had important 
impacts on the transmission of the benefits of the soybean checkoff program to 
producers.  With a perfectly elastic supply curve so that a promotion-enhanced demand 
curve has no effect on price, the U.S. soybean production is higher than in the base case 
because supply increases to equal the larger demand in the perfectly price elastic supply 
case. Because of the relatively larger soybean production in the perfectly elastic supply 
case, added soybean cash receipts and the RBCR are higher than those in the base case. 
Assuming no price response results in a relatively lower soybean price and larger 
production than in the base case. The result is higher measured benefits to producers 
because of much higher costs of a much higher soybean production. Thus, assuming a 
perfectly elastic supply so that price does not increase as promotion shifts demand leads 
to an underestimation of the producer benefits of a soybean checkoff program.  
 Assuming away the complexities of government intervention in commodity 
markets also impacts the measurement of the producer benefits of checkoff promotion. 
U.S. farm policy intervention in the soybean industry over the years has meant that 
supply does not respond to price when the price is below the government mandated 
support price level (loan rate or target price). Thus, assuming away government 
intervention results in more production than would actually occur (the base case). 
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Although soybean production increased more in the “no government intervention” 
simulation, a lower soybean farm price results in lower added soybean cash receipts than 
in the base case. Thus, when government intervention is assumed away, the increase in 
net revenues to producers as a result of checkoff programs is lower than in the base case. 
the result is an underestimation of he returns to producers if government intervention in 
commodity markets is ignored.  
 Failure to consider free riders in the analysis caused differences in the effects of 
checkoff programs on U.S. soybean production and U.S. soybean farm price. Because 
Brazilian and Argentine soybean and product markets are assumed not to respond to the 
foreign demand increases generated by U.S. soybean heckoff promotion, both U.S. 
soybean exports and U.S. soybean production are higher without the export response of 
the free riders (Brazil and Argentina) than in the base case.  As a consequence, the 
annual average U.S. soybean farm price is somewhat lower without free riders but 
revenue to producers is higher given the increase in U.S. production relative to he price 
decline compared to the base case. The result is higher estimated returns to U.S. soybean 
producers when the free rider problem is assumed away.  Thus, assuming away the free 
rider problem results in an overestimation of the benefits of te checkoff program to 
producers.  
 Assuming away the dometic supply chain linkages between soybeans and 
soybean products in the analysis of the soybean checkoff program also impacts the 
calculation of the benefits of the program to producers. The assumption of no domestic 
supply chian implies that U.S. soybean markets prices and markets are not influenced by 
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feedback effects from the joint product markets (soymeal and soyoil). When the supply 
chain linkages are included, lower prices of joint products lead a moderate the positive 
soybean price effect of the soybean checkoff program. In other words, the U.S. soybean 
price increases by more in the “no domestic supply chain case” compared to the “base 
case”.  The higher soybean price in the no domestic supply chain case leads to larger 
planted acres than the base case and, therefore, a higher level of soybean production 
compared to the base case. Because of the higher soybean price and the greater 
production in the “no domestic supply chain case,” added soybean cash receipts and the 
net revenue BCR are higher than those in the base case, resulting in higher estimated  
benefits of the soybean checkoff program to U.S. soybean producers. In other words, 
assuming away domestic supply chain linkages in the analysis of the effects of a 
commodity checkoff program can lead to oversestimating the producer returns from that 
checkoff program. 
 Assuming away global supply chain effects while accounting for domestic 
supply chain effects also impacts the measured returns of the soybean checkoff program 
to producers.  Assuming away any linkage of domestic U.S. soybean and product 
markets to global markets results in a higher U.S. soybean farm price and production 
resulting in higher added soybean cash receipts than the base case. In the “no global 
supply chain case,” the added soybean cash receipts and the net revenue BCR are higher 
than those in the base case. The increase in added soybean cash receipts is greater than 
the increase in the cost of added production. Thus, in the “no global supply chain case,” 
the increase in net revenue to U.S. soybean producers is higher than the base case. The 
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effects of assuming no global supply chain linkages introduces a much higher soybean 
price and higher production than the base case, resulting in higher benefits to U.S. 
soybean producers leading to an over-estimation of the returns to producers. 
 Some checkoff programs like soybean invest in not only demand promotion but 
also production research. Failure to account for the price-reducing effects of supply 
enhancement from production research investments made with checkoff funds results in 
a higher market price from demand promotion.  In the case of the soybean checkoff 
program, when the supply effects of production research investments are not included in 
the analysis, the soybean price as well as the added soybean cash receipts and the net 
revenue BCR are all higher than those in the base case. Soybean production is also lower 
but the increase in price more than offsets the reduction in production to generate 
increased revenues.  At the same time, the lower soybean production in the “no 
production research case” leads to a lower cost of added production than the base case. 
With higher cash receipts and lower total costs of production from the lower production, 
net revenue to farmers increases.  The result is an overestimation of the returns from the 
soybean checkoff program to producers if the checkoff investments in production 
research are ignored in the analysis.  
 Some analyses of checkoff programs ignore the potentially important checkoff-
promotion-induced simultaneous interactions among different levels of the supply chain 
on the transmission of benefits to producers. Consequently, many studies often only 
analyze effects of checkoff expenditures only at the retail level of the market and ignore 
the checkoff promotion expenditures at other levels of the market.  To measure this 
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effect, the model was simulated once again this time assuming only retail level 
promotion of soybean products occurs (soymeal and soyoil) while the promotion 
expenditures on soybean promotion are ignored. Without investments in soybean 
promotion, the U.S. soybean crush is smaller than in the base case. Consequently, the 
production of soybean products is also lower resulting in higher prices of the joint 
products than in the base case. At the same time, the U.S. soybean price is much lower 
and, therefore, soybean production is also lower than in the base case. The consequence 
is a smaller increase in net revenue to producers but also lower total costs of production. 
In this case, the cost of added production is larger than added soybean cash receipts 
leading to a lower measure net revenue BCR to producers. The implication is that 
ignoring the multiple levels of the market at which checkoff expenditures are made can 
lead to an underestimation of the producer returns from a checkoff program.  
 Despite the large and growing literature that evaluates the producer benefits of 
commodity checkoff programs, little empirical research has focused on the various 
simplifying assumptions that are often made in such analyses.  This study demonstrates 
that such assumption can influence the rate and extent of the retail-to-farm transmission 
of generic advertising and promotion effects. The overall implication of these findings is 
that ignoring the effects of those assumptions on the upstream transmission of the 
benefits of generic promotion programs in the study of checkoff programs can result in 
often substantial over- or under-estimation of the producer returns from checkoff 
programs. 
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Limitations of this Study 
 The results of the study may be subject to a number of possible limitations. First, 
this study is limited to the soybean markets. The results of the study focused only on the 
effects of assumptions on the upstream transmission of the benefits of generic promotion 
programs in the case of soybeans, which may be different in cases of other commodities. 
Second, the study did not examined effects of simultaneously imposed assumptions but 
just analyzed the effects of each assumption. Consequently, this analysis ignores the 
potentially important simultaneous interactions among effects of assumptions. Third, 
when estimating demand equations of soybean products in the international markets, 
considering sufficient and appropriate substitutes may improve the reliability of the 
model. Fourth, uses of soyoil could be subdivided into purposes – food use and 
industrial use. Unfortunately, the model used in this study includes only aggregated 
soyoil demand for the simplicity of estimating equations in soyoil blocks. In addition, 
having livestock sectors exogenous prevents this study from fully capturing the 
feedbacks from the sectors.  
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 Given that this study has some shortcomings in terms of scope of research 
objects, some work may be needed in future. First, additional studies on different 
commodity sectors will be needed to verify how effects of those assumptions differ from 
the effects in the case of soybeans. Second, considering that earlier studies were not 
based on single assumption, but were based on multiple assumptions, examining effects 
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of simultaneously imposed assumptions will serve as a useful guideline for future efforts 
to conduct more precise evaluation of upstream transmission effects of the checkoff 
benefits. Third, a bias resulted from the effects of assumptions would be differently 
estimated according to sizes of elasticities and a structure of supply chain. Efforts to 
examine conditions for each assumption that lead seriously under- or over-estimated 
benefits should help resolve the objective of this study.  
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APPENDIX A   
 
Variable Variables 
Endogenous Variables 
 
U.S. Regional Soybean Variables  
Region 
Acres 
Planted 
(1,000 
acres) 
Acres 
Harvested 
(1,000 
acres) 
Yield
1
 
(bu/acres) 
Production 
(1,000 bu) 
Market 
Price
2
 
($/bu) 
Expected 
Price
3
 
($/bu) 
Atlantic ASOYSAC ASOYSHC ASOYSYC ASOYSPC ASOYPFC ASOYPCC 
Cornbelt CSOYSAC CSOYSHC CSOYSYC CSOYSPC CSOYPFC CSOYPCC 
Delta DSOYSAC DSOYSHC DSOYSYC DSOYSPC DSOYPFC DSOYPCC 
Lakes LSOYSAC LSOYSHC LSOYSYC LSOYSPC LSOYPFC LSOYPCC 
Other OSOYSAC OSOYSHC OSOYSYC OSOYSPC OSOYPFC OSOYPCC 
Plains PSOYSAC PSOYSHC PSOYSYC PSOYSPC PSOYPFC PSOYPCC 
South SSOYSAC SSOYSHC SSOYSYC SSOYSPC SSOYPFC SSOYPCC 
 
1 Weighted Average regional yields with weighs equal to the share of regional production accounted for by each state 
in the region. 
2 Average farm price over all states in the respective regions weighted by production in each state in the region. 
3 Expected price at the farm calculated as given in the model. 
 
U.S. National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
UCOMDPC U.S. cottonseed meal share of high protein meal use (soymeal equivalents), marketing 
year 
UCOODPC U.S. cottonseed oil share of oleic/linoleic oil use, marketing year 
UHPMDCC U.S. high protein meal use, 1,000 tons, marketing year (calculated as in model) 
UHPMPWC U.S. high protein meal price, $/tons, marketing year, wtd ave. (calculated as in model) 
UOLODDC U.S. oleic/linoleic oil use, mil lb., marketing year (calculated as in model) 
UOLOPWC U.S. oleic/linoleic oil price, ¢/lb, marketing year, wtd ave. (calculated as in model) 
USOMDDC U.S. soymeal use, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMDPC U.S. soymeal share of high protein meal use, marketing year 
USOMHEC U.S. soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 tons, September 30 
USOMMEC U.S. soymeal exports, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMPWC  U.S. wholesale price of soymeal, $/ton, marketing year 
USOMSPC  U.S. soymeal production, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOODDC  U.S. soyoil use, mil lb., marketing year 
USOODPC  U.S. soyoil share of oleic/linoleic oil use, marketing year 
USOOHEC  U.S. soyoil ending stocks, mil lb., September 30 
USOOHTC  U.S. soyoil total ending stocks, mil lb., September 30 
USOOMEC  U.S. soyoil commercial exports, mil lb., marketing year 
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USOOMTC  U.S. soyoil total exports, mil lb., marketing year 
USOOPWC  U.S. wholesale price of soyoil, ¢/lb, marketing year 
USOOSPC  U.S. soyoil production, mil lb., marketing year 
USOYDCC  U.S. soybean crush, million bu., crop year 
USOYEHR  U.S. soybean stock to use ratio, crop year 
USOYGCC  U.S. soybean crush margin, $/bu, crop year (calculated as in model) 
USOYHEC  U.S. soybean private ending stocks, million bu., August 31 
USOYHTC  U.S. soybean total ending stocks, million bu., August 31 
USOYMEC  U.S. soybean exports, mil bu., crop year 
USOYPFC  U.S. farm price of soybeans, $/bu, crop year 
USOYPWC  U.S. wholesale price of soybeans, $/bu, crop year 
USOYSAC  Total U.S. soybean acreage planted, million acres, crop year 
USOYSHC  Total U.S. soybean acreage harvested, million acres, crop year 
USOYSPC  Total U.S. soybean production acreage harvested, million bu., crop year 
 
 
U.S. Regional Corn Variables  
Region 
Acres 
Planted 
(1,000 acres) 
Acres 
Harvested 
(1,000 acres) 
Production 
(1,000 bu) 
Market Price
1
 
($/bu) 
Expected 
Price
2
 
($/bu) 
Atlantic ACORSAC ACORSHC ACORSPC ACORPFC ACORPCC 
Cornbelt CCORSAC CCORSHC CCORSPC CCORPFC CCORPCC 
Delta DCORSAC DCORSHC DCORSPC DCORPFC DCORPCC 
Lakes LCORSAC LCORSHC LCORSPC LCORPFC LCORPCC 
Other OCORSAC OCORSHC OCORSPC OCORPFC OCORPCC 
Plains PCORSAC PCORSHC PCORSPC PCORPFC PCORPCC 
South SCORSAC SCORSHC SCORSPC SCORPFC SCORPCC 
Residual TCORSAC TCORSHC TCORSPC TCORPFC TCORPCC 
 
1 Average farm price over all states in the respective regions weighted by production in each state in the region. 
2 Expected price at the farm calculated as given in the model. 
 
U.S. National Corn Market Variables  
UCORDFC  U.S. feed demand for corn, million bu., marketing year 
UCORDOC  U.S. food demand for corn, million bu., marketing year 
UCORHOC  U.S. corn private ending stocks, million bu., September 30 
UCORHTC  U.S. corn total ending stocks, million bu., September 30 
UCORMEC  U.S. corn exports, million bu., marketing year 
UCORPFC  U.S. farm price of corn, $/bu, marketing year 
UCORPPC  U.S. weighted ave. expected farm price of corn, $/bu, marketing year (calculated as in 
model) 
UCORPWC  U.S. wholesale price of corn, $/bu, marketing year 
UCORSAC  Total U.S. corn acreage planted, million acres, crop year 
UCORSHC  Total U.S. corn acreage planted, million acres, crop year 
UCORSPC  Total U.S. corn production, million bu, crop year 
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European Union National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
ECORPIA  EU import price of U.S. corn, cif Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
ESOMDDC  EU soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOMMIC  EU net imports of soymeal (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOMPIA  EU import price of soymeal, cif Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
ESOMSPC  EU production of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOODDC  EU soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOOMXC  EU net exports of soyoil (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOOPXA  EU export price of soyoil, fob Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
ESOOSPC  EU production of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYDCC  EU soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYMIC  EU net imports of soybeans (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYPIA  EU import price of soybeans, cif Rotterdam, $/mt, annual 
 
Japan National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
JSOMDDC  Japan soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOMMIC  Japan net imports of soymeal (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOMPUA  Japan unit import price of soymeal, $/mt, annual 
JSOMSPC  Japan production of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOODDC  Japan soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOOMIC  Japan net imports of soyoil (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOOPUA  Japan unit import price of soyoil, $/mt, annual 
JSOOSPC  Japan production of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOYDCC  Japan soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOYMIC  Japan net imports of soybeans (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOYPUA  Japan unit import price of soybeans, $/mt, annual 
 
China National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
HSOMDDC  China soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOMMXC  China net exports of soymeal (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOMPWA  China wholesale price of soymeal, RMB yuan/mt, annual 
HSOMSPC  China production of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOODDC  China soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOOMIC  China net imports of soyoil (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOOPWA  China wholesale price of soyoil, RMB yuan/mt, annual 
HSOOSPC  China production of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOYDCC  China soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOYMIC  China net imports of soybeans (imports-exports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOYPFA  China farm price of soybeans, RMB yuan/mt, annual 
HSOYPWA  China wholesale price of soybeans, RMB yuan/mt, annual 
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HSOYSHC  China soybean acreage harvested, 1,000 ha, crop year 
HSOYSPC  China soybean production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
 
 
Rest of the World (ROW)
1
 National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
RSOMDDN  ROW soymeal use, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOMMIN  ROW net imports of soymeal (imports-exports), 1,000 mt (residual calculated as in 
model) 
RSOMSPN  ROW soymeal production, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOODDN  ROW soyoil use, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOOMIN  ROW net imports of soyoil (imports-exports), 1,000 mt (residual calculated as in model) 
RSOOSPN  ROW soyoil production, 1,000 mt (calculated as in model) 
RSOYMIN  ROW net imports of soybeans (imports-exports), 1,000 mt (residual calculated as in 
model) 
1 Defined as all countries except the EU-15/27, Japan, China, Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S. 
 
Brazil National Soybean and Product Market Variables  
BSOMDDC  Brazil soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMMEC  Brazil exports of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMPXC  Brazil export price of soymeal, $/mt, marketing year 
BSOMSPC  Brazil soymeal production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOODDC  Brazil soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOOMXC  Brazil net exports of soyoil (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOOPXC  Brazil export price of soyoil, $/mt, marketing year 
BSOOSPC  Brazil soyoil production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYDCC  Brazil soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYMXC  Brazil net exports of soybeans (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYPXC  Brazil export price of soybeans, $/mt, marketing year 
BSOYSHC  Brazil soybean acreage harvested, 1,000 ha, crop year 
BSOYSPC  Brazil soybean production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
 
Argentina National Soybean and Product Market Variables 
GSOMDDC  Argentina soymeal use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMMEC  Argentina exports of soymeal (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMPXA  Argentina export price of soymeal, $/mt, calendar year 
GSOMSPC  Argentina soymeal production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOODDC  Argentina soyoil use, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOOMEC  Argentina exports of soyoil (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOOPXA  Argentina export price of soyoil, $/mt, calendar year 
GSOOSPC  Argentina soyoil production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOYDCC  Argentina soybean crush, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
 281 
 
GSOYMEC  Argentina exports of soybeans (exports-imports), 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOYPXA  Argentina export price of soybeans, $/mt, calendar year (for 1972, ave. price 1971 and 
1973 is used) 
GSOYSHC  Argentina soybean acreage harvested, 1,000 ha, crop year 
GSOYSPC  Argentina soybean production, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
 
General 
Dn   Indicator variable for year n such that n=1 and all other years=0 
Dnm   Indicator variable for years n and m such that years n and m =1 and all other 
years=0 
DnTm   Indicator variable for years n through m such that years n through m =1 and all 
other years=0 
TIME   Time trend (years=1960...2012) 
 
United States 
ACORSYC  Atlantic region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
AOATPPC  Atlantic region expected farm price for oats (same formula as for corn, see model for 
formula) 
ASOYPLC  Atlantic region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
ASOYRESDF  Atlantice region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $US, crop year 
CCORSYC  Cornbelt region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
CSOYPLC  Cornbelt region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
CSOYRESDF  Cornbelt region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $US, crop year 
DACORS1  Atlantic region weather indicator variable 1, 1961, 1987, 2008=1, all other years=0 
DACORS2  Atlantic region weather indicator variable 1, 1973, 1977, 1984=1, all other years=0 
DASOYSA  Delta region weather indicator variable,1980=1, 1987=-1, all other years=0 
DCCORS  Cornbelt region weather indicator variable, 1960, 1962, 1981, 1987, 1995, 2002, 2006=1, 
all other years=0 
DCORSYC  Delta region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
DCOYSYC  Cornbelt region weather indicator variable 1, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1985, 1994, 2000=1, all 
other years=0 
DDCORS  Delta region weather indicator variable, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2009, 2011=1, 1976, 1999=-1, 
all other years=0 
DFB02   Indicator variable for the effects of the 1990 farm bill, 2002-2006=1, all other 
years =0 
DFB96   Indicator variable for the effects of the 1996 farm bill, 1996-2006=1, all other 
years =0 
DLBW  Lakes region weather indicator variable, 1989, 1990, 2004, 2005=1, 1991, 2003=-1, all 
other years=0 
DLCORS  Lakes region weather indicator variable, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1989=1, all other years=0 
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DOSOYSA1  Other region weather indicator variable 1, 1976, 2010, 2012=1, all other years=0 
DOSOYSA2  Other region weather indicator variable 2, 1996, 2003=1, 1979, 1980, 2004=-1, all other 
years=0 
DPCORS  Praines region weather indicator variable 4, 1961, 1975, 1976=1, 1973=-1, all other 
years=0 
DPIK   Indicator variable for the 1982 U.S. payment-in-kind (PIK) program, 1982 =1, 
all other years =0 
DPSOYSA1  Plains region weather indicator variable 1, 1977, 1996=1, 1965, 1984, 1994, 2006=-1, 
all other years=0 
DPSOYSA2  Plains region weather indicator variable 2, 2007=1, 2008=-1, all other years=0 
DPSOYSA3  Plains region weather indicator variable 3, 2005=1, 2009, 2010, 2012=-1, all other 
years=0 
DRGHT07 Indicator variable for drought, 2007 = 1, all other years=0 
DRICPPC  Delta region expected farm price for rice (same formula as corn,see model for formula) 
DSCORS1  South region weather indicator variable 1, 1961, 1987, 2006=1, all other years=0 
DSCORS2  South region weather indicator variable 2, 1977, 1984, 2007=1, all other years=0 
DSOYPLC  Delta region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
DSOYRESDF  Delta region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $US, crop year 
DTCORS  Residual other region weather indicator variable, 1986, 1987, 2009, 2012=1, 1977, 1989, 
2002, 2004=-1, all other years=0 
DUECRIS  Dummy variable for U.S. recession, 2008, 2009, 2010=1, all other years=0 
DUHPMDD  Indicator variable for high protein meal demand, 1993, 1995, 2001, 2001, 2006=1, all 
other years=0 
DUSOMH  Indicator variable for soymeal ending stocks, 1984, 1998, 2000=1, 1985, 1987=-1 all 
other years=0 
EL_NINO Dummy variable for El Niño 
EMBARGO  Dummy variable for the 1972 U.S. embargo of U.S. soybean and product exports 
JGCAUA  Japan grain consuming animal units, million head, February 1 
LA_NINA Dummy variable for La Niña 
LBARPPC  Lakes region expected farm price for barley (same formula as for corn, see model for 
formula) 
LCORSYC  Lakes region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
LSOYPLC  Lakes region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
LSOYRESDF  Lakes region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $US, crop year 
NORFLEX  Percent of acres required in the normal flex program under the 1990 farm bill, % 
OCORSYC  Other region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
OSOYPLC  Other region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
OSOYRESDF  Other region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $US, crop year 
OWHEPPC  Other region expected farm price for wheat (same formula as corn, see model for 
formula) 
PCORSYC  Plains region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
PSOYPLC  Plains region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
PSOYRESDF  Paines region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $US, crop year 
RCORMEC  Corn exports by non-U.S. corn exporting countries, mil bu., crop year 
SCORSYC  South region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
SSOYPLC  South region non-recourse soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
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SSOYRESDF  South region stock of soybean checkoff research expenditures, $US, crop year 
TCORSYC  Residual other region wtd average corn yield, bu/acre, crop year 
UCOMPWC  U.S. wholesale price of cottonseed meal, $/ton, marketing year 
UCOMSPC  U.S. production of cottonseed meal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
UCOODPC  U.S. cottonseed oil share of oleic/linoleic oils use, marketing year 
UCOOPWC  U.S. wholesale price of cottonseed oil, ¢/lb, marketing year 
UCOOSPC  U.S. production of cottonseed oil, mil lb, marketing year 
UCORARP  Corn acreage reduction program requirement, % 
UCORDZC  U.S. seed, feed, and other use of corn, mil bu, marketing year 
UCORHCC  U.S. government stocks of corn (CCC+FOR), mil bu., crop year 
UCORMMC  U.S. imports of corn, mil bu., crop year 
UCORPDC  Corn acreage diversion payments, $/bu, crop year 
UCORPLC  U.S. average corn loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
UCORPTC  U.S. corn target price, $/bu, crop year 
UCPI67   U.S. consumer price index, 1967=100, annual 
UFPI67   U.S. farm price index, 1967=100, annual 
UGCAUA  U.S. grain consuming animal units, million head, marketing year 
UHOGPFC  U.S. farm price of hogs (barrow/guilt), $/cwt, marketing year 
ULAOPWC  U.S. lauric oils price (wtd average of coconut and palm kernel oils), ¢/lb, marketing year 
UOISCPC  U.S. soybean processing capacity, mil bu, marketing year 
UPEMDPC  U.S. peanut meal share of high protein meal use, marketing year 
UPEMPWC  U.S. wholesale price of peanut meal, $/ton, marketing year 
UPEMSPC  U.S. production of peanut meal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
UPEODPC  U.S. peanut oil share of oleic/linoleic oils use, marketing year 
UPEOPWC  U.S. wholesale price of peanut oil, ¢/lb, marketing year 
UPEOSPC  U.S. production of peanut oil, mil lb, marketing year 
USOMDZC  U.S. other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMEXP U.S. Stock of soybean checkoff demand promotion expenditures for soymeal, $US, 
mktg year 
USOMMMC  U.S. imports of soymeal, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOMQ  U.S. soymeal extraction rate, 1,000 tons/mil bu 
USOODZC  U.S. other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 tons, marketing year 
USOOEXP U.S. Stock of soybean checkoff demand promotion expenditures for soyoil, $US, mktg 
year 
USOOHGC  U.S. government stocks of soyoil, mil lb, marketing year 
USOOMGC  U.S. government PL480 exports of soyoil, mil lb, marketing year 
USOOMMC  U.S. imports of soyoil, mil lb, marketing year 
USOOQ  U.S. soyoil extraction rate, lbs/ bu 
USOYDZC  U.S. seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, mil bu, marketing year 
USOYEXP U.S. Stock of soybean checkoff demand promotion expenditures for soybeans, $US, 
mktg year 
USOYHGC  U.S. government stocks of soybeans, mil bu, marketing year 
USOYMMC  U.S. imports of soybeans, mil bu, marketing year 
USOYPLC  U.S. average soybean loan rate, $/bu, crop year 
USOYPTC  U.S. soybean target price, $/bu, crop year 
UWHEPFC  U.S. farm price of wheat, $/bu, crop year 
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UWPI67R  U.S. wholesale price index, 1967=100, annual 
UYDA   U.S. personal disposable income, bil $US, annual 
 
European Union (15/27) 
DEBANM Dummy variable for EU-15/27 ban on meal imports, 2000, 2001, 2002=1, all other 
years=0 
DEBIOFUEL Dummy variable for EU-15/27 biofuel policy, from 2000 to 2012=1, all other years=0 
DECRIS  Dummy variable for EU-15/27 recession, from 2008 to 2012=1, all other 
years=0 
DEGERBF Indicator variable for an increase in biofuel use in Germany, from 2005 to 2007=1, all 
other years=0 
DEPRECAP93 Dummy variable for the period before the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), from 
2008 to 1992=1, all other years=0 
DESOMDD1  Indicator variable 1 for EU-15/27 meal demand, 1972, 1981=1, 1995, 2008=-1, all other 
years=0 
DESOMDD2  Indicator variable 2 for EU-15/27 meal demand, 1974, 1993, 2009=1, 2007=-1, all other 
years=0 
DESOYDC1  Indicator variable 1 for EU-15/27 crush demand, from 1972 to 1976, 1984, 1988, 
1993=1, all other years=0 
DESOYDC2  Indicator variable 2 for EU-15/27 crush demand, 1979, 1981, 1997, 1998, 2001=1, 1983, 
1985, 1987, 1990, 1991, 2012=-1 all other years=0 
DESOYDC3  Indicator variable 3 for EU-15/27 crush demand, 1980, 1989, 1990=1, all other years=0 
ECWPI2  EU-15/27 wtd average wholesale price index, 1985=100, annual 
EGCAUA  EU-15/27 grain consuming animal units, million head, January 1 
EGDP   EU-15/27 aggregate GDP, billions of SDRs 
EPAOPIA  EU-15/27 palm oil price, cif NW Europe, $/mt, annual 
ESOMDZC  EU-15/27 other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOMEXPR  EU-15/27 stock of international market promotion expenditures for soymeal, real 
deflated SDRs 
ESOMHEC  EU-15/27 ending stocks of soymeal, end of marketing year 
ESOMQ  EU-15/27 soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
ESOODZC  EU-15/27 other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOOEXPR  EU-15/27 stock of international market promotion expenditures for soyoil, real deflated 
SDRs 
ESOOHEC  EU-15/27 ending stocks of soyoil, end of marketing year 
ESOOQ   EU-15/27 soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
ESOYDZC  EU-15/27 seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
ESOYEXPR  EU-15/27 stock of international market promotion expenditures for soybeans, real 
deflated SDRs 
ESOYHEC  EU-15/27 ending stocks of soybeans, end of marketing year 
ESOYSPC  EU-15/27 production of soybeans, marketing year 
XECUSA  Exchange rate, SDRs$US, annual 
 
Japan  
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DJSOYDC  Indicator variable for Japan crush demand, 1989, 1992, 2006=1, all other years=0 
JSOMDZC  Japan other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOMEXPR  Japan stock of international market promotion expenditures for soymeal, real deflated 
Yen 
JSOMHEC  Japan ending stocks of soymeal, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
JSOMQ   Japan soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
JSOODZC  Japan other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOOEXPR  Japan stock of international market promotion expenditures for soyoil, real deflated Yen 
JSOOHEC  Japan ending stocks of soyoil, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
JSOOQ   Japan soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
JSOYDZC  Japan seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
JSOYEXPR  Japan stock of international market promotion expenditures for soybeans, real deflated 
Yen 
JSOYHEC  Japan ending stocks of soybeans, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
JSOYSPC  Japan soybean production, 1,000 mt, Japan crop year 
JTRAFTWTO Japan tariff on soybean imports from 2000 to 2012, 10,900 yen/ton 
JTRPREWTO Japan tariff on soybean imports from 1971 to 1999, 17,000 yen/ton 
JWPI85   Japan wholesale price index, 1985=100, annual 
XJAUSA  Exchange rate, Japanese Yen/$US, annual 
 
China  
DHSOMDD1  Indicator variable 1 for China meal demand, from 1980 to 1983=1, from 1989 to 2001=-
1 all other years=0 
DHSOMDD2  Indicator variable 2 for China meal demand, 1983=1, 1996, 2000=-1 all other years=0 
DHSOMDD3  Indicator variable 3 for China meal demand, 2003=1, 2005=-1 all other years=0 
DHSOYDC  Indicator variable for China crush demand, 2006, 2007, 2008=1, 1998, 2001, 2002=-1 
all other years=0 
DHSOYSH  Indicator variable for China acres haversted, 1983, 1996, 2007, 2012=1, all other 
years=0 
DPSWTO  Indicator variable for Chinese reform for WTO’s rules, from 1995 to 2012 =1, all other 
years=0 
DPSWTO  Indicator variable for the period before Chinese reform for WTO’s rules, from 1980 to 
1994 =1, all other years=0 
HCORPFA  China farm price of corn, RMB Yuan/mt, annual 
HFPI85   China farm price index, 1985=100, annual 
HGDP05  China real gross domestic product, 2005 prices, annual 
HGDPI05  China gross domestic product index, 2005=100, annual 
HPOP   China national population, annual 
HSOMDZC  China other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOMEXPR  China stock of international market promotion expenditures for soymeal, real deflated 
Yuan 
HSOMHEC  China ending stocks of soymeal, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
HSOMQ  China soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
HSOODZC  China other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
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HSOOEXPR  China stock of international market promotion expenditures for soyoil, real deflated 
Yuan 
HSOOHEC  China ending stocks of soyoil, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
HSOOQ  China soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
HSOYDZC  China seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
HSOYEXPR  China stock of international market promotion expenditures for soybeans, real deflated 
Yuan 
HSOYHEC  China ending stocks of soybeans, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
HSOYSYC  China soybean yield, mt/hectare, crop year 
XCHUSA  Exchange rate, Chinese RMB Yuan/$US, annual 
 
Rest-of-the-World (ROW) 
DRECCRIS1 Dummy variable 1 for global recession, 2011=1, all other years=0 
DRECCRIS2 Dummy variable 2 for global recession, 1971, 2008=1, all other years=0 
DRMECRIS Dummy variable for Asia economic crisis, 1998=1, all other years=0 
DROILSK Dummy variable for oil shock, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981=1, all other years=0 
DRSOMD1  Indicator variable 1 for ROW soymeal demand, 1974, 1984, 2002, 2005, 2009=1, all 
other years=0 
DRSOMD2  Indicator variable 2 for ROW soymeal demand, 1971, 1990, 1999=1, 1972, 1987, 1996, 
1997, 2008, 2009, 2010=-1 all other years=0 
DRSOMD3  Indicator variable 3 for ROW soymeal demand, 1979, 1980, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991=1, 
1985, 1992=-1 all other years=0 
DRSOMD4  Indicator variable 4 for ROW soymeal demand, 1999, 2003=1, 2004, 2009=-1 all other 
years=0 
DRSOMD5  Indicator variable 5 for ROW soymeal demand, 1982=1, 1972, 1987, 2002=-1 all other 
years=0 
DRSOOD1  Indicator variable 1 for ROW soyoil demand, 1983, 1997, 2000=1, 1971, 1990=-1 all 
other years=0 
DRSOOD2  Indicator variable 2 for ROW soyoil demand, 1972, 1986, 2005, 2008=1, 2012=-1 all 
other years=0 
DRSOOD3  Indicator variable 3 for ROW soyoil demand, 1971, 1975, 1985, 2003=1, 1979, 1984, 
1998=-1 all other years=0 
DRWTOAF  Dummy variable for the period from 2001 to 2012 =1, all other years=0 
DSRSOYM1  Indicator variable 1 for ROW soybean imports, 1990, 1998, 2007=1, 1979, 1983, 1987, 
1997, 2010=-1 all other years=0 
DSRSOYM2  Indicator variable 2 for ROW soybean imports, 1981, 1996, 2004=1, 1994, 2002=-1 all 
other years=0 
DSRSOYM3  Indicator variable 3 for ROW soybean imports, 1982, 1998, 2009=1, 1973, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1993=-1 all other years=0 
DSRSOYM4  Indicator variable 4 for ROW soybean imports, 1978, 1980=1, 1992=-1 all other years=0 
RGDP85  ROW real GDP index, real 1985 prices, annual 
RSOMEXPR  ROW stock of international market promotion expenditures for soymeal, real deflated 
$US 
RSOOEXPR  ROW stock of international market promotion expenditures for soyoil, real deflated $US 
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RSOYEXPR  ROW stock of international market promotion expenditures for soybeans, real deflated 
$US 
 
Brazil 
BGDP85  Brazil real gross domestic product, 1985 prices, annual 
BSOMDZC  Brazil other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMHEC  Brazil soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
BSOMMMC  Brazil soymeal imports, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOMQ  Brazil soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
BSOODZC  Brazil other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOOHEC  Brazil soyoil ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
BSOOQ  Brazil soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
BSOYDZC  Brazil seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
BSOYHEC  Brazil soybean ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
BSOYSYC  Brazil soybean yield, mt/hectare, crop year 
BWPI85  Brazil whole sale price index, 1985=1, annual 
XBZUSA  Exchange rate, Trillion Brazilian Reais/$US, annual 
 
Argentina 
DGPREEX  Dummy variable for the period in the absence of soybean exports, from 1960 to 1971 =1, 
all other years=0 
DGREEXB  Dummy variable for the policy to boost soybean crushing, from 2004 to 2006 =1, all 
other years=0 
GGDP85  Argentina real gross domestic product, 1985 prices, annual 
GSOMDZC  Argentina other use (statistical discrepancy) of soymeal, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMHEC  Argentina soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
GSOMMMC  Argentina soymeal imports, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOMQ  Argentina soymeal extraction rate, mt of soymeal/mt of soybeans 
GSOMTX  Dummy variable for export taxes on soymeal, from 1960 to 1991 =0.035, from 1992 to 
2001 =0, from 2002 to 2006 =0.2, from 2007 to 2012 =0.35, all other years=0 
GSOODZC  Argentina other use (statistical discrepancy) of soyoil, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOOHEC  Argentina soymeal ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
GSOOQ  Argentina soyoil extraction rate, mt of soyoil/mt of soybeans 
GSOOTX  Dummy variable for export taxes on soyoil, from 1960 to 1991 =0.035, from 1992 to 
2001 =0, from 2002 to 2006 =0.193, from 2007 to 2012 =0.32, all other years=0 
GSOYDZC  Argentina seed, feed, and other use of soybeans, 1,000 mt, marketing year 
GSOYHEC  Argentina soybean ending stocks, 1,000 mt, end of marketing year 
GSOYSYC  Argentina soybean yield, mt/hectare, marketing year 
GSOYTX  Dummy variable for export taxes on soybeans, from 1960 to 2001 =0.035, from 2002 to 
2006 =0.235, 2007=0.35, 2008=0.45, from 2009 to 2012 =0.35, all other years=0 
GWPI85  Argentina wholesale price index, 1985=1, annual 
XARUSA  Exchange rate, million Argentina Austral/$US, annual 
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APPENDIX B   
Ex-Post Simulation Validation Statistics, Theil Forecast Error Statistics, 1880/81 to 2012/13 
 
Variable 
Bias  
(UM) 
Reg 
 (UR) 
Dist 
 (UD) 
Var  
(US) 
Covar  
(UC) Theil U 
ASOYPCC 0.00 0.31 0.69 0.10 0.90 0.09 
ASOYPFC 0.05 0.35 0.60 0.15 0.80 0.10 
ASOYSHC 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.01 
ASOYSPC 0.00 0.24 0.76 0.26 0.74 0.01 
CSOYPCC 0.00 0.35 0.65 0.14 0.86 0.08 
CSOYPFC 0.05 0.35 0.59 0.17 0.78 0.10 
CSOYSHC 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.12 0.88 0.00 
CSOYSPC 0.00 0.16 0.84 0.18 0.82 0.00 
DSOYPCC 0.00 0.45 0.55 0.21 0.79 0.08 
DSOYPFC 0.06 0.40 0.54 0.20 0.74 0.10 
DSOYSHC 0.04 0.12 0.84 0.10 0.86 0.01 
DSOYSPC 0.01 0.06 0.93 0.08 0.91 0.01 
LSOYPCC 0.00 0.36 0.63 0.16 0.83 0.08 
LSOYPFC 0.06 0.35 0.59 0.17 0.77 0.09 
LSOYSHC 0.02 0.09 0.90 0.10 0.88 0.00 
LSOYSPC 0.00 0.21 0.78 0.22 0.77 0.00 
OSOYPCC 0.00 0.30 0.70 0.10 0.90 0.08 
OSOYPFC 0.05 0.35 0.60 0.16 0.79 0.10 
OSOYSHC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
OSOYSPC 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.00 
PSOYPCC 0.00 0.38 0.62 0.16 0.83 0.08 
PSOYPFC 0.05 0.35 0.60 0.17 0.78 0.10 
PSOYSHC 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.04 0.95 0.00 
PSOYSPC 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.11 0.89 0.00 
SSOYPCC 0.00 0.38 0.61 0.16 0.84 0.08 
SSOYPFC 0.06 0.38 0.56 0.19 0.75 0.10 
SSOYSHC 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.04 0.96 0.01 
SSOYSPC 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.01 0.98 0.01 
USOYDCC 0.01 0.04 0.94 0.07 0.91 0.01 
USOYHEC 0.20 0.01 0.79 0.01 0.79 0.08 
USOYHTC 0.20 0.01 0.79 0.01 0.79 0.08 
USOYMEC 0.02 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.02 
USOYPFC 0.05 0.36 0.59 0.18 0.77 0.10 
USOYSHC 0.02 0.10 0.89 0.11 0.87 0.00 
USOYSPC 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.26 0.74 0.00 
 289 
 
Variable 
Bias  
(UM) 
Reg 
 (UR) 
Dist 
 (UD) 
Var  
(US) 
Covar  
(UC) Theil U 
UCOODPC 0.57 0.01 0.42 0.09 0.34 0.13 
UHPMDDC 0.23 0.00 0.77 0.01 0.76 0.01 
UHPMPWC 0.01 0.25 0.75 0.14 0.85 0.05 
UOLODDC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 
UOLOPWC 0.02 0.07 0.91 0.01 0.97 0.07 
USOMDDC 0.28 0.00 0.71 0.01 0.71 0.01 
USOMDPC 0.03 0.12 0.85 0.03 0.94 0.00 
USOMHEC 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.04 0.96 0.07 
USOMMEC 0.08 0.18 0.74 0.03 0.89 0.07 
USOMPWC 0.01 0.26 0.73 0.15 0.84 0.05 
USOMSPC 0.01 0.04 0.94 0.07 0.91 0.01 
USOODDC 0.15 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.85 0.01 
USOODPC 0.57 0.02 0.41 0.10 0.33 0.01 
USOOHEC 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.12 0.88 0.09 
USOOHTC 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.12 0.88 0.09 
USOOMEC 0.03 0.24 0.72 0.06 0.91 0.15 
USOOMTC 0.03 0.37 0.59 0.13 0.84 0.13 
USOOPWC 0.02 0.08 0.90 0.01 0.97 0.07 
USOOSPC 0.01 0.04 0.94 0.07 0.92 0.01 
USOYEHR 0.16 0.03 0.81 0.00 0.84 0.08 
USOYGCC 0.05 0.50 0.45 0.10 0.86 0.27 
USOYPWC 0.05 0.32 0.63 0.14 0.81 0.10 
UCOODPC 0.57 0.01 0.42 0.09 0.34 0.13 
UHPMDDC 0.23 0.00 0.77 0.01 0.76 0.01 
USOMMEC 0.08 0.18 0.74 0.03 0.89 0.07 
USOYDCC 0.01 0.04 0.94 0.07 0.91 0.01 
UCORSAC 0.18 0.10 0.72 0.00 0.81 0.03 
UCORSHC 0.16 0.07 0.77 0.00 0.84 0.03 
UCORSPC 0.11 0.01 0.88 0.00 0.89 0.03 
UCORDFC 0.18 0.04 0.78 0.00 0.82 0.02 
UCORDOC 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.49 0.04 
UCORMEC 0.10 0.10 0.80 0.01 0.89 0.08 
UCORHOC 0.26 0.18 0.56 0.04 0.70 0.15 
UCORHTC 0.26 0.12 0.62 0.02 0.72 0.13 
UCORPFC 0.15 0.45 0.41 0.22 0.63 0.18 
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Variable 
Bias  
(UM) 
Reg 
 (UR) 
Dist 
 (UD) 
Var  
(US) 
Covar  
(UC) Theil U 
UCORPWC 0.14 0.44 0.42 0.22 0.64 0.17 
UCORPFC 0.15 0.45 0.41 0.22 0.63 0.18 
UCORPPC 0.07 0.49 0.44 0.34 0.60 0.08 
CCORSAC 0.03 0.10 0.87 0.00 0.97 0.02 
DCORSAC 0.34 0.02 0.64 0.06 0.59 0.09 
SCORSAC 0.19 0.38 0.43 0.10 0.71 0.06 
PCORSAC 0.32 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.03 
LCORSAC 0.03 0.28 0.68 0.06 0.91 0.03 
ACORSAC 0.37 0.01 0.61 0.02 0.61 0.08 
OCORSAC 0.02 0.16 0.82 0.00 0.98 0.04 
TCORSAC 0.16 0.38 0.46 0.13 0.71 0.06 
UCORSAC 0.18 0.10 0.72 0.00 0.81 0.03 
CCORSHC 0.02 0.08 0.90 0.00 0.98 0.03 
DCORSHC 0.33 0.02 0.65 0.06 0.61 0.09 
SCORSHC 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.12 0.68 0.07 
PCORSHC 0.28 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.71 0.04 
LCORSHC 0.02 0.17 0.81 0.01 0.97 0.04 
ACORSHC 0.35 0.01 0.64 0.02 0.63 0.09 
OCORSHC 0.01 0.10 0.89 0.01 0.98 0.05 
TCORSHC 0.14 0.41 0.45 0.09 0.77 0.08 
UCORSHC 0.16 0.07 0.77 0.00 0.84 0.03 
CCORSPC 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.02 0.97 0.03 
DCORSPC 0.24 0.01 0.75 0.03 0.73 0.07 
SCORSPC 0.21 0.31 0.49 0.13 0.66 0.07 
PCORSPC 0.24 0.00 0.76 0.01 0.75 0.04 
LCORSPC 0.02 0.05 0.93 0.01 0.98 0.04 
ACORSPC 0.34 0.09 0.57 0.00 0.66 0.10 
OCORSPC 0.01 0.07 0.92 0.00 0.99 0.05 
TCORSPC 0.15 0.34 0.51 0.09 0.76 0.07 
UCORSPC 0.11 0.01 0.88 0.00 0.89 0.03 
CCORPFC 0.15 0.45 0.41 0.22 0.64 0.18 
DCORPFC 0.15 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.63 0.17 
SCORPFC 0.15 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.62 0.17 
PCORPFC 0.15 0.44 0.41 0.21 0.64 0.18 
LCORPFC 0.14 0.44 0.42 0.21 0.65 0.18 
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Variable 
Bias  
(UM) 
Reg 
 (UR) 
Dist 
 (UD) 
Var  
(US) 
Covar  
(UC) Theil U 
ACORPFC 0.16 0.45 0.39 0.23 0.61 0.17 
OCORPFC 0.16 0.47 0.37 0.25 0.60 0.18 
TCORPFC 0.15 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.62 0.17 
CCORPPC 0.07 0.48 0.45 0.33 0.60 0.08 
DCORPPC 0.03 0.47 0.49 0.28 0.69 0.08 
SCORPPC 0.03 0.50 0.47 0.31 0.66 0.08 
PCORPPC 0.07 0.49 0.44 0.34 0.59 0.07 
LCORPPC 0.08 0.50 0.42 0.35 0.57 0.07 
ACORPPC 0.02 0.47 0.51 0.28 0.70 0.08 
OCORPPC 0.02 0.47 0.51 0.30 0.69 0.08 
TCORPPC 0.02 0.50 0.48 0.30 0.67 0.08 
ESOOSPC 0.03 0.31 0.67 0.13 0.85 0.03 
ESOYDCC 0.03 0.31 0.66 0.14 0.84 0.03 
ESOYMIC 0.03 0.28 0.70 0.12 0.85 0.03 
ECORPIA 0.12 0.43 0.45 0.19 0.70 0.17 
ESOYPIA 0.02 0.21 0.77 0.07 0.91 0.08 
ESOMPIA 0.00 0.16 0.84 0.05 0.95 0.07 
ESOOPXA 0.04 0.08 0.88 0.02 0.95 0.07 
ECORPIA 0.12 0.43 0.45 0.19 0.70 0.17 
ESOMDDC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.01 
ESOMMIC 0.01 0.04 0.95 0.02 0.98 0.03 
ESOMSPC 0.03 0.32 0.65 0.14 0.83 0.03 
ESOODDC 0.03 0.00 0.97 0.02 0.95 0.02 
ESOOMXC 0.00 0.27 0.73 0.15 0.84 0.12 
JSOYPUA 0.05 0.28 0.67 0.12 0.82 0.09 
JSOMPUA 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.07 0.92 0.06 
JSOOPUA 0.01 0.00 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.06 
JSOMDDC 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.01 
JSOMMIC 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.04 
JSOMSPC 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.02 
JSOODDC 0.00 0.01 0.98 0.06 0.94 0.02 
JSOOMIC 0.00 0.73 0.27 0.36 0.64 0.45 
JSOOSPC 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.02 
JSOYDCC 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.02 
JSOYMIC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.98 0.01 
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Variable 
Bias  
(UM) 
Reg 
 (UR) 
Dist 
 (UD) 
Var  
(US) 
Covar  
(UC) Theil U 
HSOYSHC 0.13 0.12 0.75 0.00 0.87 0.04 
HSOYSPC 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.02 0.85 0.04 
HSOYMIC 0.13 0.00 0.87 0.01 0.87 0.04 
HSOYDCC 0.07 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.92 0.02 
HSOYPIA 0.04 0.15 0.82 0.04 0.93 0.11 
HSOYPFA 0.03 0.14 0.83 0.03 0.94 0.12 
HSOMSPC 0.07 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.92 0.02 
HSOMDDC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 
HSOMMXC 0.05 0.07 0.88 0.00 0.95 0.30 
HSOMPWA 0.00 0.07 0.92 0.01 0.98 0.05 
HSOOSPC 0.07 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.93 0.02 
HSOOMIC 0.01 0.33 0.66 0.10 0.89 0.22 
HSOODDC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 
HSOOPWA 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.98 0.05 
RSOMMIN 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.03 0.97 0.03 
RSOOSPN 0.04 0.13 0.83 0.03 0.93 0.08 
RSOOMIN 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.98 0.05 
RSOMDDN 0.02 0.03 0.96 0.06 0.92 0.03 
RSOMSPN 0.04 0.13 0.83 0.03 0.93 0.08 
RSOMSPN 0.04 0.13 0.83 0.03 0.93 0.08 
RSOODDN 0.03 0.01 0.96 0.04 0.93 0.04 
RSOOSPN 0.04 0.13 0.83 0.03 0.93 0.08 
RSOYMIN 0.04 0.13 0.83 0.03 0.93 0.08 
GSOOPXA 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.02 0.97 0.08 
GSOMMEC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 
GSOMPXA 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.99 0.06 
GSOOMXC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 
GSOOPXA 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.02 0.97 0.08 
GSOYMEC 0.26 0.16 0.58 0.04 0.70 0.17 
GSOYPXA 0.01 0.12 0.86 0.03 0.96 0.07 
GSOYSPC 0.51 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.48 0.03 
GSOYDCC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.04 
GSOMSPC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.04 
GSOMDDC 0.02 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.08 
GSOOSPC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.04 
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Variable 
Bias  
(UM) 
Reg 
 (UR) 
Dist 
 (UD) 
Var  
(US) 
Covar  
(UC) Theil U 
GSOODDC 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.01 
GSOYSHC 0.52 0.00 0.47 0.01 0.47 0.03 
BSOMDDC 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.06 0.91 0.02 
BSOMSPC 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.02 
BSOODDC 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.01 0.97 0.02 
BSOOMXC 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.97 0.08 
BSOOSPC 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.02 
BSOYMXC 0.01 0.08 0.91 0.12 0.87 0.05 
BSOYSHC 0.03 0.14 0.83 0.18 0.79 0.02 
BSOYSPC 0.01 0.14 0.85 0.16 0.82 0.02 
BSOYDCC 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.02 
BSOMMEC 0.01 0.08 0.91 0.02 0.97 0.03 
BSOMPXC 0.00 0.16 0.84 0.06 0.94 0.06 
BSOOPXC 0.03 0.06 0.92 0.00 0.97 0.07 
BSOYPXC 0.03 0.24 0.73 0.10 0.88 0.08 
 
 
 
 
